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Summary 
The thesis analyses how the standard model of liberalised electricity markets that was 
developed to increase the efficiency of electricity supply can deal with new objectives. 
While the liberalisation literature argues that additional objectives can be incorporated 
in the market framework through price signals, a large body of literature based on evo-
lutionary economics argues that innovation and systemic transformation require govern-
ance mechanisms that complement the price mechanism of the market to overcome the 
lock-in of the existing system and coordinate innovation processes. 
The thesis focuses on the integration of distributed generation (DG) into electricity net-
works. In the standard model the governance of networks is mainly based on incentive 
regulation by independent regulators. Thus, the main question is how DG can be inte-
grated into this regime and whether and how it needs to evolve. The research question is 
broken down according to both different governance issues (connection, integration, 
innovation, transformation) and different governance levels on which they can be ad-
dressed. 
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This is analysed from two angles: Firstly, there is a mainly theoretical discussion of 
network regulation. Various approaches to amending the standard model are discussed. 
Secondly, this is complemented by country case studies of the UK and Denmark. 
The conceptual analysis shows how incentive regulation can accommodate the efficient 
integration of DG as an additional objective. There is also scope for this model to incor-
porate governance mechanisms that are geared towards infrastructure transformation. 
The UK case study shows the practical implementation of this approach and corre-
sponding difficulties. 
As for Denmark – a DG and network transformation pioneer – the standard model plays 
a marginal role and economic issues are mainly dealt with outside regulation. The same 
is true for mechanisms beyond economic incentives. 
The thesis shows the potential of the standard model to pursue new objectives as well as 
the need to broaden the scope beyond governance based on economic incentives.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
This thesis deals with two major political forces that have shaped policy-making in gen-
eral and the electricity sector in particular throughout recent decades: Market liberalisa-
tion on the one hand and sustainability as well as climate change in particular on the 
other hand.  
For many decades, the electricity supply industry was run by vertically integrated and 
often state-owned monopolies. Starting in the 1990s, the sector was turned upside-down 
in the European Union and many countries throughout the world through privatisation, 
vertical unbundling and the introduction of competition in generation and supply. The 
main objective of liberalisation was to increase the economic efficiency of the sector 
and reduce electricity prices (Sioshansi, Pfaffenberger 2006; Sioshansi 2008a). During 
the introduction of competition, there was in most cases no particular concern about 
sustainability issues (Helm 2007: 1-8). For example, a search in the above mentioned 
references (Sioshansi, Pfaffenberger 2006; Sioshansi 2008a) that contain an overview 
on the worldwide liberalisation process provides a total of 9 hits for ‘sustainability’ and 
a total 193 hits for ‘efficiency’. On a very general level the question of this thesis ad-
dresses whether and how liberalisation and sustainability can be reconciled. 
Within the broad debate on electricity market liberalisation and sustainability, this thesis 
focuses on one specific development that can contribute to making the electricity sector 
more sustainable: electricity generation in small-scale plants, often called distributed 
generation (DG), powered by renewable energy sources or producing both power and 
heat.  
For many decades, the electricity supply industry has been dominated not only by large 
vertically integrated monopolies, but also by centralised power generation in large-scale 
plants. With generation and networks being closely intertwined, the network infrastruc-
Transforming the Grid Part I: Introduction, Background and Research Question 
 
-3- 
ture has developed accordingly: Most power plants are connected to the high-voltage 
transmission grid, while the distribution network mainly serves as a distributor of 
power. In recent years this paradigm has been increasingly challenged by distributed 
generation (Jenkins et al. 2000: 1-3). 
Distributed generation impacts significantly on the electricity network (Jenkins et al. 
2000) and is one of the reasons why the electricity network has come to be seen as a 
cornerstone of transformation of the electricity system towards more sustainability. In-
novations in the grid are often discussed under the label ‘Smart Grids’ (IEA 2011). 
As opposed to generation and supply, electricity networks are still regulated as natural 
monopolies. With the introduction of incentive regulation, the efficiency objective of 
liberalisation has also been applied to the networks. Network regulation is the dominant 
governance mechanism for electricity networks and it therefore heavily affects the net-
work integration of DG (Cossent et al. 2008).  
1.2 Research question 
The starting point of this thesis is the question of whether and how market liberalisation 
that was designed to increase efficiency, and where market prices are the main govern-
ance mechanism, can accommodate new objectives resulting from sustainability and 
climate change.  
While the liberalisation literature argues that additional objectives can be incorporated 
in the market framework through price signals, a large body of literature based on evo-
lutionary economics argues that sustainability requires systemic transformations rather 
than individual innovations. In turn, this requires governance mechanisms that comple-
ment the price mechanism of the market to overcome the lock-in of the existing system 
and coordinate innovation processes. 
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This general question is broken down for the case of distributed generation and electric-
ity networks. More specifically, it is analysed whether and how the standard model of 
network regulation that is part of the standard model of electricity market liberalisation 
can be developed and adapted to accommodate DG and network developments neces-
sary to integrate a higher share of DG. An important part of the research is thus based 
on regulatory economics and explores ways of incorporating additional incentives 
alongside economic efficiency for network operators. At the same time, the thesis ex-
plores the limits of the standard model of economic network regulation.  
The following figure shows how the general question on liberalisation and sustainability 
is narrowed down in the following chapters 2 and 3 to address the specific research 
question of this thesis. 
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Figure 1:  Narrowing down the focus of research 
Focus on 
economic
network regulation
Focus within the
electricity system:
Networks and 
distributed generation
Two strands of literature: 
1) Economic literature on market liberalisation
2) Literature on governance of system transformation
Two major politcal forces: 
Market liberalisation and sustainability
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1.3 Overview of thesis structure 
The thesis consists of three parts: a literature review, a conceptual part that analyses 
ways to integrate DG and network innovation into the standard model of network regu-
lation from a conceptual perspective, and an empirical part with two country case stud-
ies. 
Following this introduction, the first part presents in two steps the relevant literature 
upon which the research question is based. Chapter 2 introduces and contrasts two per-
spectives on electricity systems. Firstly, the economic literature on electricity market 
liberalisation and secondly the system transformation literature. The "tension" between 
these two accounts, especially when it comes to making the electricity system more sus-
tainable, represents a central starting point for the further research. Within this general 
debate, chapter 3 then concentrates on the focus of this study: distributed generation that 
can make the electricity system more sustainable, its interaction with the electricity 
network as well as network regulation as the standard way of dealing with networks in 
the liberalised electricity market model. Based on chapters 2 and 3, chapter 4 presents 
the research question and methodology for the further research. 
Based on the methodology derived in the first part, the second part examines the inter-
action between DG and the electricity network in three steps: Chapter 5 analyses DG 
connections to the networks and how network operators can be incentivised to connect 
and integrate DG. Chapter 6 analyses how network regulation affects RD&D and inno-
vations in the network and discusses various approaches to promote network innova-
tions. Chapter 7 examines mechanisms for dealing with a more comprehensive system 
transformation that may become necessary because of DG, and analyses how the overall 
standard model of network regulation may be adapted. 
The third part consists of two country case studies (on the UK and Denmark), examin-
ing how the standard model of network regulation is applied and adapted in the light of 
distributed generation and network innovation. Chapters 8 and 9 present the case studies 
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of the UK and Denmark respectively, and chapter 10 contains a comparative evaluation 
of the two cases. 
Finally, chapter 11 presents conclusions and recommendations. 
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2 Liberalisation and transformation of electricity systems  
The electricity sector has seen major restructuring since the early 1990s through the 
privatisation and liberalisation of electricity markets, which has been introduced in the 
European Union and many other countries worldwide (for an overview see Sioshansi, 
Pfaffenberger 2006). The main objective of liberalisation has been to introduce competi-
tion in the electricity sector in order to increase the efficiency of electricity supply. 
While liberalisation has been unfolding, climate change has been moving up the politi-
cal agenda. The electricity sector has always been an important object of environmental 
policy (Joskow 2006b: 3), yet climate change together with a more general sustainabil-
ity discourse has intensified this debate (Scrase et al. 2009; Smith 2009) and many ar-
gue that a structural transformation of the entire electricity system is required to provide 
low-carbon electricity (Praetorius et al. 2009) . Another reason why the efficiency ob-
jective has lost its dominance is concerns about security of supply (Jamasb, Pollitt 
2008c). 
On a very general level, the question of this thesis is how liberalisation and climate pol-
icy objectives can be reconciled; or in other words whether and how market liberalisa-
tion that was designed to increase efficiency can accommodate new objectives resulting 
from climate change. The following section presents some basics of electricity market 
liberalisation. Proponents of liberalisation argue that additional objectives like carbon 
reduction can be accommodated within this framework if markets are designed correctly 
and prices are allowed to signal all relevant costs. Energy policy thus mainly becomes a 
matter of market design. 
As distinct from this line of thought, the second section presents the literature on system 
transformation that has emerged from evolutionary economics and science and technol-
ogy studies. It emphasises that systems like the electricity sector can be locked into 
‘suboptimal’ structures. As a consequence, price-signals will not be sufficient to achieve 
the required carbon reduction. Additional governance mechanisms are therefore needed. 
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The final section of this chapter summarises and compares the two approaches, deriving 
in the process a number of general research questions. 
2.1 Electricity market liberalisation 
The following section sketches out the standard model of electricity market liberalisa-
tion, its main objectives and how it proposes to deal with new objectives such as the 
ones resulting from climate change. 
2.1.1 The standard model of electricity market liberalisation 
Liberalisation introduces a new governance arrangement for the electricity sector, re-
placing hierarchical governance through state-ownership, monopolies and top-down 
planning with competitive markets where decisions by private actors are first and fore-
most guided by market prices.  
The previous monopolies have often led to inefficient electricity supply, with high costs 
and prices that did not reflect costs. Liberalisation and competition are to increase the 
efficiency of power supply and “to provide better incentives for controlling construc-
tion and operating costs of new and existing generating capacity, to encourage innova-
tion in power supply technologies, and to shift the risks of technology choice, construc-
tion cost and operating ‘mistakes’ to suppliers and away from consumers” (Joskow 
2006b: 3). Additionally, competition and the threat of new entry are to reduce compa-
nies’ profit margin. 
Electricity market liberalisation is rooted in neo-classical economics. It rejects the pre-
vious notion that electricity markets are different and is based on the assumption that 
electricity can be treated just like any other commodity and the electricity market can 
largely be run like any other market, except that market design needs to provide for real-
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time balancing of demand and supply. The outcome of the competitive market process 
is considered to lead to an optimal allocation of resources (IEA 2005: 71-97).  
As a consequence, policy interventions should be limited to the correction of market 
failures and should make use of market-based instruments and price signals. One exam-
ple of a market failure is the natural monopoly in the electricity network. The standard 
model therefore proposes to regulate the network, using profit incentives to increase the 
efficiency of the networks (see section 3.2). A second source of market failure is exter-
nalities in which the market price does not include all the costs incurred by society. The 
liberalisation paradigm relies on correcting these market failures through internalising 
all costs into prices (Joskow 2006b: 22).  
It is now more widely agreed than at the beginning of the liberalisation process that lib-
eralisation and regulation are not substitutes, and that liberalisation generally involves 
re-regulation rather than deregulation. It is acknowledged that ‘regulation-for-
competition’ is an important prerequisite for markets to function properly (Jordana, 
Levi-Faur 2004: 5-8; Pollitt 2008). However, proponents of the standard model are still 
wary that regulation goes beyond the promotion of competition and recommend to “to 
avoid excessive government and regulatory involvement” (Littlechild 2006b: xviii). 
According to the IEA (2005: 14-15), while competition requires strong government in-
volvement and commitment, this is often best expressed by not intervening. The role of 
the government thus becomes reduced to making the market work. 
In terms of market design, electricity liberalisation around the world has been guided by 
what has been called the “standard model” (Littlechild 2001) and different variants of 
this model have been implemented. According to Joskow (2006b) and Littlechild 
(2006b), the standard model consists of the following elements: 
1) Privatisation of energy companies that were state-owned 
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2) Unbundling or vertical separation: Liberalisation of the industry is based on the 
innovative notion that the sector can be unbundled and the different parts of the 
electricity supply chain can be organised separately. For electricity generation and 
supply, it is currently widely agreed that competitive markets can best achieve effi-
cient outcomes. For electricity networks, however, a consensus has emerged that 
they cannot be run as a competitive market, at least not for the time being (as op-
posed to many telecommunication networks). 
3) Horizontal restructuring to create an adequate number of competing generators. 
4) Designation of an independent system operator to maintain network stability and 
facilitate competition. 
5) Voluntary energy and ancillary services markets and trading arrangements, includ-
ing contract markets and real-time balancing of the system. 
6) Regulation of access to the transmission network and incentives for an efficient lo-
cation and interconnection of new generation facilities. 
7) Retail competition and the unbundling of retail tariffs from network charges and 
rules to enable access to the distribution networks in order to promote competition at 
the retail level. 
8) Specification of arrangements for supplying customers until retail competition is in 
place. 
9) Creation of independent regulatory agencies: In the standard model of liberalised 
electricity markets economic regulation through sector-specific regulatory authori-
ties has become the main governance approach for electricity networks. Other parts 
of the market may be regulated by this agency. 
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10) Provision of transition mechanisms that anticipate and respond to problems and 
support the transition rather than hinder it. 
Examples of countries and regions that come closest to the standard model and have 
significantly influenced its development typically include the UK, Scandinavia, Austra-
lia as well as the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland interconnection (PJM) in the 
north east of the US (IEA 2005).  
Although there is a standard model of electricity market liberalisation, it is important to 
keep in mind that this model is not fixed but undergoing change. As the IEA (2005: 11) 
has pointed out, “electricity market liberalisation is not an event. It is a long process 
(…) that has not yet been completed anywhere in the world – nor will it be in the fore-
seeable future.” There is an ongoing process of developing and improving the govern-
ance structure of liberalised markets (Sioshansi, Pfaffenberger 2006; Sioshansi 2008a). 
There is a standard model, but there are also a number of open questions, new questions, 
setbacks and “reform of the reforms” (Sioshansi 2008b: 1). The practical experiences 
from implementing liberalisation in different countries have fed back into the further 
development of the standard model. 
The assumption was that the electricity sector can be run like other markets (Helm 
2007: 1), but to make it work in practice requires a lot of detailed development work 
specific to the electricity sector (Sioshansi, Pfaffenberger 2006; Sioshansi 2008a). There 
are also many variations emerging in the actual implementation of the standard model 
(Correljé, de Vries 2008). Pollitt fittingly calls electricity market liberalisation “the 
longest running and most interesting set of multi-country micro-economic experiments” 
(Pollitt 2008: vii). 
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2.1.2 Objectives beyond short-term efficiency in the standard model 
Given that electricity market liberalisation was driven by the desire to make the sector 
more efficient, the question arises as to whether and how new objectives resulting from 
the need to make the sector more sustainable can be accommodated within this model.  
When discussing the liberalisation model in the electricity sector we need to bear in 
mind the coordination needs of this sector (Stoft 2002: 17-29; de Vries 2004). Electric-
ity supply requires a close coordination between different components. In every single 
moment electricity generation must exactly match electricity demand (which requires 
appropriate operational mechanisms) and there needs to be enough capacity available to 
meet peak demand (which requires timely and sufficient investment). This is one of the 
main reasons why electricity markets around the world were for many decades operated 
by vertically integrated and often publicly owned monopolies. There is also a tight tech-
nical coupling between generation and networks. Unbundling vertically integrated com-
panies that used to run these system elements within one company requires alternative 
governance mechanisms. 
Based on the economic thinking that is behind the liberalisation model, proponents of 
market liberalisation argue that competitive markets can achieve sustainable and low-
carbon electricity supply (Joskow 2006b: 22). In order to achieve this, they need to be 
designed to allow any costs of high-carbon electricity production that have hitherto been 
external to the market process to feed through into the price signals market participants 
receive. Other governance mechanisms are generally not required.  
According to the liberalisation literature, policy interventions should be designed to be 
compatible with competitive markets (Joskow 2006b: 22-23). The European Emission 
Trading Scheme that creates a market for CO2 emissions is a case in point. Further po-
litical intervention, like direct support for renewable technologies, is not required ac-
cording to this view and would indeed be counterproductive, as it tends to distort the 
price signal (Pollitt 2008: xxxii; e.g. the German discussion on emissions trading and 
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support for renewables: Wissenschaftlicher Beirat BMWA 2004). From a liberalisation 
perspective, the rising climate change agenda is regarded as “a potential vehicle for the 
return of old-style intervention in electricity generation and in retail competition” and 
thus a potential threat to competition. (Pollitt 2008: xxxii). 
The liberalisation literature generally argues that new objectives like environmental 
ones can be integrated into the market framework (Joskow 2006b: 4). However, there is 
no clear evidence yet for the proper functioning of competitive electricity markets even 
with regard to the initial objectives that go beyond short-term efficiency, namely effi-
cient investment and innovation, as will be argued in the following sections. 
At the beginning of liberalisation, the main issue was how liberalised markets can best 
be designed and regulated in order to promote competition and increase the efficiency 
of existing assets. Sweating the ‘inherited’ assets has worked well, and most competi-
tive markets have led to cost as well as price reductions (Newbery, Pollitt 1997; Jamasb, 
Pollitt 2008a: xxviii; Markiewicz et al. 2004). 
However, beyond the reduction of operational costs, there is an increasing debate on the 
ability of competitive electricity markets to reproduce themselves and develop in the 
medium- to long-term. In other words, liberalised markets may have been in some kind 
of “grace period” (Finon et al. 2004), building on the legacy of the former monopolis-
tic markets and the overcapacities that characterised many of them – overcapacities that 
have indeed been one of the reasons why competition was introduced in the first place. 
The debate on long-term issues includes the effects of liberalisation on investment and 
innovation. 
2.1.2.1 Investment 
It was one of the objectives of electricity market liberalisation to provide more efficient 
investment by shifting the investment risk from consumers to investors. This has two 
dimensions: firstly, the efficiency of individual investments was to increase, for exam-
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ple by putting the squeeze on the construction costs of a new power plant; and secondly, 
the overall level of investment was to be reduced to an efficient level to avoid overca-
pacities.  
The first objective will in most cases be promoted by competition. As for the second 
one, however, it may well be that the pendulum swings back and over-investment turns 
into under-investment. Under the headings of generation and network adequacy, in-
vestment in competitive generation markets and regulated networks has increasingly 
become a focus of analysis and political debate. The question is whether and under 
which conditions the liberalised market model is able to provide sufficient capacity 
when ageing assets need to be replaced (Roques et al. 2005; Brunekreeft 2005; Neuhoff, 
de Vries 2004). Providing sufficient investment is sometimes equated with ensuring the 
sector’s sustainability (Lévêque 2006). Joskow (2006b: 20) has adequately summarised 
the state of the discussion as follow: “The jury is still out on whether and how competi-
tive power markets can stimulate appropriate levels of investment”. 
Investment decisions that used to be based on central planning in monopolistic markets 
are now based on market prices. Investors make investment decisions on the basis of the 
profitability of individual projects rather than system requirements. This is how other 
markets function, too, and orthodox economic theory holds that competitive markets do 
provide sufficient investment as any scarcity will be reflected in prices and thereby trig-
ger investment to make up for the capacity shortfall.  
However, the electricity sector exhibits a number of peculiarities that can undermine 
this model. These include the high capital intensity of electricity supply, low price-
elasticity of demand and the fact that in every single moment electricity generation must 
exactly match electricity demand and the resulting need for peaking capacity (de Vries 
2004: 66-100). Because of the latter point, price spikes would be needed to recover the 
costs of peaking units with low load factors, but in practice it will be difficult for regula-
tors to distinguish between the exercise of market power and legitimate scarcity rents 
(Roques et al. 2005: 97). Moreover, because of the central role of electricity supply for 
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the society and economy, price spikes may be politically unacceptable, adding to the 
risk for investors. In his study of generation adequacy, de Vries (2004: 262) concludes 
that “the myth of the invisible hand suggests that supply and demand will always be 
balanced through the price mechanism, which [this study] showed not necessarily to be 
true in electricity markets”. 
A further issue is the coordination of investments in the unbundled functions of the elec-
tricity system in a competitive environment, including coordination of network and gen-
eration investments (Baldick, Kahn 1993; de Vries 2004: 195-229). 
2.1.2.2 Innovation 
The concern about the ability of liberalised markets to provide adequate investment in 
generation and networks shows that long-term issues of electricity market governance 
increasingly come to the fore. The ability of these systems to invest in RD&D and to 
develop innovations is of even greater importance for their long-term development, es-
pecially in the light of the sustainability challenge. 
Privatisation and the introduction of competition were expected to stimulate innovation 
(Joskow 2006b: 3; IEA 1999: 11, 45), both in terms of process innovations to reduce 
costs and product innovations to increase choice for customers. Market prices are to 
signal to companies where innovation efforts can become profitable. 
There are empirical studies showing that liberalisation has stimulated companies to in-
novate, which is in line with the initial standard model assumption that competition 
promotes innovation. Competition may have stimulated creativity in companies; accord-
ing to Markard (2004: 201), who has analysed two case studies (green power and fuel 
cells), liberalisation has led to “a greater variety of innovation projects, product innova-
tions and organizational innovations have gained importance (...) and the professional-
ism of innovation management is improving”.  
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However, at the same time, there are clear signs that companies have reduced their ac-
tivities in the development of new technological solutions overall. Explanations include 
the increased risk and the reduction of collaborative RD&D in a competitive environ-
ment as well the trade-off between short-term efficiency and RD&D spending (Dooley 
1998; Holt 2005a; Jamasb, Pollitt 2008a). A recent paper by Sanyal and Cohen (2009: 
64) analyses the sharp decline in RD&D spending in the US electricity industry and 
concludes that “the prognosis for research spending by the electric utilities in the re-
structured era is not optimistic”. 
2.1.2.3 Complementary mechanisms 
What do these potential problems with investment and innovation mean for the govern-
ance of liberalised electricity markets? Künneke and Groenewegen have observed that, 
following increasing concerns over potential destructive effects of liberalisation over the 
longer term, “a new balance is sought between various institutional arrangements, in-
cluding markets, public sector involvement, and private initiatives” (Künnecke, Gro-
enewegen 2005: 1-2). As a result of the potential short-comings of liberalised electricity 
markets, even within the liberalisation discourse there are proposals for additional gov-
ernance mechanisms to complement the price mechanism. This section presents a few 
examples. 
As for power plant investments, there are various mechanisms to complement energy-
only markets with capacity mechanisms, so that even peaking plants that do not gener-
ate much electricity can earn revenues from selling capacity (de Vries 2004: 107-171). 
Some of these approaches involve central planning and hierarchical interventions into 
the market, even though the capacity market itself may then be operated on a competi-
tive basis. One example is the ‘capacity requirements’ mechanism, implemented by the 
PJM market in the US, whereby a central planning agency determines the desired gen-
eration capacity margin and calculates capacity payments for each retail company. On 
this basis a capacity credit market is created. This model clearly deviates from a pure-
market model where all decisions are made on basis of prices. 
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With regard to necessary investments in the network infrastructure and the coordination 
between transmission and generation investments Keller and Wild (2004) state a trade-
off between co-ordination and competition, arguing that some coordination beyond 
markets may be needed, e.g. through a co-ordination group of all parties involved.  
Similarly, Hirschhausen et al. (2004) argue that “design decisions also require vertical 
coordination. These decisions concern for example systemic innovations, but also trade-
offs and complementarities between network and downstream investments. Whether 
these decisions should be made unilaterally, cooperatively, by state-approved commit-
tees or by a regulator is still largely unexplored.” With regard to innovation in competi-
tive markets, Jamasb and Pollitt (2008a) call for a new framework that could involve 
public and private partnerships.  
The brief overview of the discussions on investment and innovation in liberalised elec-
tricity markets indicates that competitive electricity markets may have difficulties in 
bringing about sufficient investment and innovation to maintain the current system and 
make it more efficient in the long term. Investment and innovation arguably become 
even more of a challenge once broader sustainability objectives need to be addressed. 
While the debate regarding the standard model mainly deals with the right level of in-
vestment and innovation, sustainability also requires the right kind of investment and 
innovation in a certain direction (cf. Stirling 2009), as well as at a certain speed. This 
also leads to questions of structural change – rather than investment and innovation 
within the existing centralised structure of electricity supply based on large-scale plants 
– and the question arises as to how different innovations can fit together to make up a 
functioning system. The coordination problems involved are arguably much more se-
vere.  
Perez-Arriaga and Linares (2008:149) argue that “the resolution of the sustainability 
challenge cannot be left only to market forces, but requires complementary instru-
ments” and present “indicative energy planning” as one such instrument. In the Energy 
Journal by the International Association of Energy Economics – which published this 
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contribution amidst prominent proponents of electricity market liberalisation – the idea 
of having some kind of long-term planning may be regarded as a maverick position. 
However, in the next section, I will present a strand of literature that seeks to re-invent 
planning to transform infrastructures and make them more sustainable. 
2.2 Electricity system transformation 
The liberalisation discourse described in the previous section has had a profound impact 
on electricity systems worldwide. Its main objective has been to increase efficiency of 
electricity system operation and investment. Apart from changing the governance struc-
ture of the market, it has not been particularly concerned with transforming the overall 
sector structure as a specific governance problem, including for example the technical 
structure, because in this view in a liberalised market technology choice and the further 
evolution of the system should be left to the market. 
In contrast to the market-based perspective of the liberalisation model a broad literature 
on the transformation of whole sectors has emerged, often with a focus on infrastructure 
sectors. This literature is mainly concerned with making these sectors more sustainable 
rather than increasing their efficiency (Kemp 1994; Rohracher 2008). Instead of merely 
relying on market prices as the dominant coordination mechanisms, it proposes a num-
ber of additional governance approaches that it argues are necessary to achieve struc-
tural transformation in line with sustainability requirements.  
In this section, the system transformation approach will be presented. The evolutionary 
and socio-technical view on innovations that is a common feature of these studies will 
be explained. What is meant by system transformation will be briefly addressed. Fi-
nally, a number of proposed governance approaches to influencing system transforma-
tion shall be outlined. 
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2.2.1 Transformation of socio-technical systems 
2.2.1.1 An evolutionary and socio-technical view on innovations 
Electricity market liberalisation is based on an economic model whereby innovations 
are seen as exogenous to the economic process, waiting ‘out there’ to be triggered by 
competition and changing price signals. A different perspective on technological inno-
vation processes has been developed by evolutionary economics and science and tech-
nology studies, whereby innovation processes are seen as a social process (Dosi 1988; 
Bijker et al. 1987). 
In this line of thought, technological change is not the result of rational behaviour by 
individual actors, but is influenced by a whole range of context factors, such as para-
digms and routines that guide the search for new solutions. This implies that technical 
change is not an optimisation process whereby rational actors translate price signals into 
optimal solutions. Rather, innovation processes are influenced by the bounded rational-
ity of actors, the institutions within which they operate or the dominating ‘techno-
economic paradigm’ (Freeman, Perez 1988). Innovation processes therefore follow cer-
tain trajectories and may become locked into suboptimal paths. 
An evolutionary view on innovations necessarily broadens the perspective from indi-
vidual technical artefacts to take into account wider context structures. The success of 
innovations depends on a match with the socio-institutional framework, or in evolution-
ary terms the ‘variation’ must fit into the ‘selection environment’. 
In recent years, this analysis has increasingly been broadened to look at socio-technical 
systems. This perspective was pioneered by historical studies on so-called ‘large techni-
cal systems’, with seminal work from Hughes (Hughes 1983; 1987; see Markard, 
Truffer 2006 for an overview and a link to market liberalisation). This strand of research 
has often chosen the electricity sector as a case. A similar shift away from innovation in 
individual technologies to the analysis of contexts, institutions and systems can be ob-
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served in the work on national innovations systems (Lundvall 1992), in the technologi-
cal innovation systems approach (Bergek et al. 2008) as well as the ecological moderni-
sation and industrial ecology literatures (Berkhout 2002). A socio-technical system per-
spective has also been widely adopted in the literature on environmental innovations 
and sustainability transitions (Weber, Hemmelskamp 2005; Elzen et al. 2004) in which 
the system transformation concept put forward mainly by Dutch scholars has had a pro-
found impact (Kemp et al. 2001; Geels 2002a). 
These studies extend the analysis of individual technological artefacts in two dimen-
sions: Firstly, rather than looking at individual technologies, they see the system as en-
compassing different technologies that are connected to a technical system (like elec-
tricity networks and electricity generation). Secondly, the analysis comprises both tech-
nical as well as social and institutional elements (like electricity generation and network 
regulation) that are linked together in a ‘seamless web’ (Hughes 1987) or socio-
technical system. Technologies as such do not fulfil any useful function, but need to be 
embedded in a ‘configuration that works’, which needs to include appropriate social and 
institutional elements (Rip, Kemp 1998). This implies that even if technical innovations 
were to fall from heaven, they may not fit into the existing socio-technical regime and 
could therefore not fulfil their function, even if “prices are right”. 
2.2.1.2 Lock-in and path-dependency 
One of the implications of the socio-technical systems perspective, with diverse ele-
ments in the system being aligned to each other, is that systems cannot adapt ‘instanta-
neously’ and switch to a new system design, for example in reaction to price signals as 
proposed by the liberalisation model. Rather, system development is characterised by 
momentum or path-dependency, similar to innovation processes on a micro-level that 
are for example directed by routines. The notion of optimisation based on price signals 
– which is one of the cornerstones of the liberalisation model – is thus abandoned. Even 
if new solutions have an economic advantage compared to incumbent technologies and 
so forth, they may find it difficult to diffuse into or change the dominant regime.  
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Unruh (2000) has spelt out the lock-in and path-dependency of socio-technical systems 
for the case of carbon-based energy systems and has coined the term ‘carbon lock-in’. 
He analyses various institutional and technical lock-in effects and argues that at a sys-
tem level, individual lock-in mechanisms, e.g. on a firm or user level or within political 
institutions, tend to reinforce each other to create a “techno-institutional complex”, lead-
ing to path dependencies at a system level. 
2.2.1.3 System transformation 
The system perspective emphasises the momentum and path dependency of socio-
technical systems. At the same time, it is one of the core objectives of this approach to 
develop a better understanding of how momentum and paths are re-directed and how 
systems are transformed. System transformation, in this view, means that the different 
elements of a system undergo long-term structural change to make up a new system. 
The interlinkage of different elements within the system leads to the notion of co-
evolution whereby each element is part of the selection environment in which other 
elements develop. 
Evolutionary perspectives on innovation processes highlight the role of institutional and 
technical context structure or the ‘selection environment’ which innovations must fit 
into. A concept that has been widely adopted to capture this evolutionary understanding 
of change is the multilevel perspective put forward by Rip and Kemp (1998) and further 
developed by Geels (2002b). The dominant configuration is called the regime, which is 
embedded into a broader landscape of macro-developments. New socio-technical con-
figurations emerge and grow in niches and in order to become successful innovations 
have to somehow link up with or undermine the dominating regime. The regime thus 
represents the selection environment for innovations.  
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2.2.2 Governance of system transformation 
The previous section has presented an evolutionary understanding of innovation proc-
esses and the system perspective that has developed from it. Much of this work has been 
about analysing historic case studies in order to better understand transformation proc-
esses. However, there is in increasing interest in the governance of future structural sys-
tem change and the transformation of socio-technical systems, not least of all because of 
sustainability objectives (Voß et al. 2006).  
This section goes on to show what the system perspective presented above means for 
the governance of system transformation, especially in comparison with the discourse 
on liberalisation. While the liberalisation paradigm relies on markets and price signals, 
the governance of transformation literature proposes a number of additional approaches 
to coordinate different actors and developments in the electricity sector in order to 
achieve long-term structural change of the sector as a whole in a desired direction. The 
understanding of system transformation is thus broader than the “electricity sector in 
transition” analysed by the market liberalisation literature (see for example Joskow 
2003), which focuses on the transition of the governance structure. While in the liberali-
sation model the development of the sector structure is to be left to market forces, the 
system transformation literature argues that due to the systemic nature of these sectors, 
individual innovations require the coordination of broader structural change to be suc-
cessful.  
Although systems have clearly been built up in the past and transformed without the 
explicit deployment of any specific governance mechanisms, the need for systems to 
become sustainable, together with the potential lock-in of systems in unsustainable 
paths, provides the rationale for developing appropriate governance mechanisms. An-
other rationale can be urgency and the inability of the standard model to lead to change 
quickly enough. Based on the evolutionary and systemic understanding of innovation 
and system change, a number of specific governance approaches are proposed. The fol-
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lowing sections present strategic niche management and foresight as two prominent 
examples. 
2.2.2.1 Strategic niche management 
In an evolutionary perspective, innovations do not fall from heaven as a result of chang-
ing prices, but need to grow over time and need to become embedded in a socio-
technical system. System change requires new ‘configurations that work’ to build up. 
Innovations thus depend on complementary technologies as well as supporting institu-
tions and actor networks, which also need to grow. These usually develop in niches of 
the dominant regime. Moving from the analysis of the functions of niches to the gov-
ernance of future developments, the use of ‘strategic niche management’ has been pro-
posed as a way of promoting innovations (Hoogma et al. 2002; Smith 2006). The idea is 
to make use of purpose-built niches to provide a learning space for innovations and sup-
port the development of new ‘configurations that work’. This obviously requires a deci-
sion on which innovations should be promoted. Moreover, niches should not be consid-
ered independently of each other, but rather should be included into an overall ‘portfo-
lio-management’, taking into account interlinkages between various innovation niches. 
2.2.2.2 Foresight 
On a system level, the system follows certain paths and cannot adapt instantaneously to 
switch to any other path. As history matters, it is necessary to develop an understanding 
of potential future development pathways and how these are affected by decisions taken 
today. The governance of system transformation literature therefore puts great emphasis 
on foresight. An understanding of future developments and options also provides the 
basis for the selection of strategic niches. 
Weber (2006: 197-199) describes three recent trends in the development of foresight 
approaches that reflect the evolutionary perspective on development of socio-technical 
systems. Firstly, foresight is no longer limited to technical developments, but increas-
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ingly includes wider context developments, including markets as well as other institu-
tional and social aspects. Secondly, foresight has moved from only involving expert 
opinion to a more participatory approach whereby consensus on risks and opportunities 
of possible future development paths is negotiated between heterogeneous stakeholders 
or conflicting viewpoints are made transparent. Finally, foresight is no longer merely 
seen as a tool to sketch out future developments or even predict the future, but is seen 
itself as a deliberative governance mechanism that can help develop a shared under-
standing of current problems, goals and emerging development options. Foresight can 
thus contribute to shaping the future through the coordination of expectations and vi-
sions that influence today’s actions of heterogeneous actors. This becomes particularly 
important in a liberalised market where the number and diversity of actors that influence 
future developments increases. 
A prominent approach to the governance of system transformation is transition man-
agement, which is being applied in the Netherlands. Visions and goals are developed in 
so-called transition arenas and are used to select specific projects and experiments, i.e. 
niches that can help promote these visions (Kemp, Loorbach 2006). Another pertinent 
example of foresight in practice is the UK Foresight exercise (The Government Office 
for Science 2008). 
2.3 Summary 
This final section briefly summarises and compares the two discourses on electricity 
market liberalisation and governance of system transformation. 
Proponents of electricity market liberalisation argue that this model is the most appro-
priate, not just for providing electricity at low costs, but also for meeting other objec-
tives, including those resulting from the sustainability agenda. According to this view, 
the most important prerequisite is that markets are allowed to function properly so that 
all costs, including any environmental costs, are reflected in market prices. This means 
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that policy intervention should be restricted to a minimum so as to not distort the cost 
reflectivity of prices. 
As opposed to this view, a large body of literature based on an evolutionary and socio-
technical system view on innovation argues that infrastructure systems like the electric-
ity sector are characterised by path-dependency and may become locked into a structure 
that is ‘sub-optimal’. It follows from this perspective that one cannot rely on the market 
alone and the price-signal it generates to coordinate individual market participants to 
make the electricity system sustainable. As the formerly monopolistic market with hier-
archical coordination is not seen as a solution either, this literature has developed a 
range of proposals as to how the governance of system transformation in a sustainable 
direction can be achieved. 
The following table summarises and compares some of the main features of the two 
approaches. 
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Table 1: Comparison of the discourses on liberalisation and transformation 
 
Electricity Market Liberalisation Electricity System Transformation 
Main objective Efficiency  
Optimisation of the current system 
Sustainability  
System transformation 
Scope Transformation of the governance 
structure, changes in other parts of 
the sector will follow from it. 
Transformation of the overall sector 
structure, look at all system elements 
and co-evolution between them. 
Role of inno-
vation 
Focus on individual innovations 
Innovation as optimisation by rational 
market participants, based on price 
signals (e.g. Mayo, Flynn 1988). 
Individual innovations as part of sys-
tem transformation 
Evolutionary view of innovation and 
transformation, relevance of institu-
tions, socio-technical systems, lock-in 
and path-dependency. 
Governance 
Competitive market and price signal 
is the main governance mechanism 
and will foster innovations and will 
bring about necessary technological 
change to make system sustainable. 
Other mechanisms likely to distort 
price signal 
Additional governance mechanisms 
on top of market prices needed to 
coordinate the build-up of a new ‘con-
figuration that works’.  
Explicit need for governance of trans-
formation 
Instruments 
Market design, focus on single in-
struments to correct market failure, 
preferably ‘market-based’, e.g. emis-
sion trading. 
Market and complementary instru-
ments: foresight and joint vision-
building, strategic niche management.
 
Although the two strands of literature have different theoretical understandings of inno-
vation and sector change, in terms of practical electricity market governance, the system 
transformation literature does not propose to provide an alternative to liberalisation and 
the two approaches should not be seen as mutually exclusive, but rather as complemen-
tary. As Rennings et al. (2003: 20) have formulated it: “(…) one could say that transi-
tion management = current policies + long-term vision + vertical and horizontal coor-
dination of policies + technology portfolio-management + process management”. 
However, much of work on the governance of transformation has been on the design of 
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specific transformation mechanisms, while the “+”, the link to ‘current policies’ and the 
potential to adapt them have been neglected. 
Against this background, the following chapter goes on to present the focus of this 
study. It shows how the electricity network infrastructure has become a focal point of 
efforts to make the system more sustainable and how distributed generation has been an 
important reason for this. It then presents economic network regulation as the govern-
ance model proposed by the standard model to deal with the network monopoly that 
persists in liberalised electricity markets. 
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3 Distributed generation, electricity networks and network regu-
lation 
The previous chapter has described the general background of liberalisation and trans-
formation in electricity systems at large. Within this context, this chapter goes on to 
present the focus of this thesis: distributed generation and network regulation. This is 
largely based on a review of the literature on distributed generation and network regula-
tion respectively. 
The following figure shows a stylised model of the electricity system, including genera-
tion, network/balancing system and demand. The focus of this thesis is on the network 
as well as the link between the network and generation. 
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Figure 2:  Focus on the network 
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The infrastructure connecting generation and demand, which was a “sleeping beauty” 
for many decades, has attracted increasing interest since liberalisation and may undergo 
significant transformation – not the least because the share of distributed generation is 
increasing. As part of the standard model of electricity liberalisation described in the 
previous chapter, economic network regulation is the main governance mechanism for 
the network monopoly1.  
Distributed generation and the network challenges it entails is used as an example in this 
study to analyse the capability of the standard model of electricity market liberalisation 
to deal with new objectives beyond efficiency as the primary objective and develop-
ments that may transform the fundamentals of the systems.  
The first section of this chapter introduces the focus on networks and distributed genera-
tion, while the second part gives an overview of the standard model of network regula-
tion. 
3.1 Electricity system development and distributed generation 
One of the issues that have put the infrastructure perspective on the agenda is distributed 
generation. Before explaining in more detail what this means and why further analysis is 
conducted on this aspect, the following section puts DG in the context of a more general 
‘infrastructure revival’. 
                                                 
1 As indicated in Figure 2, generation and demand are not just connected through cables, but also 
through a balancing system to make sure that generation meets demand second by second. With an in-
creasing share of distributed generation and the integration of the demand side into system operation, 
this balancing system will increasingly require a powerful communication and control infrastructure, 
which will also be subject to economic regulation as long as it is a monopoly. 
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3.1.1 The infrastructure moves to the centre stage 
One of the main characteristics of the electricity sector is that it is being operated as an 
interconnected system, connecting plants and customers in large geographical areas, 
often across national borders, with thousands of kilometres of cables and power poles 
that have become part of the landscape in many cases. But nevertheless, the electricity 
network has been rather invisible in many electricity sector debates, largely neglected 
both by system managers and sustainability advocates. 
The process of building this large scale, interconnected grid was described by Hughes 
(1983) as a major system building effort. However, once this had been completed, the 
network was no longer perceived as a separate issue and the network structure was 
rarely called into question. As Coutard (2003: 165) has observed, despite being the core 
of the electricity system, networks “were perceived by system managers and regulators 
as only a by-product of their supply activity with no economic value per se”. In fact, the 
more the network was extended and bottlenecks were removed, the more invisible it 
became: It came to be perceived as a ‘copper plate’ that does not impose any restric-
tions, rather than a meshed system built for a certain purpose, exhibiting certain con-
strains and governed by physical laws that enable certain developments, while impeding 
others.  
Apart from the proponents of the existing system, those who sought to change this sys-
tem and make it more environmentally friendly and sustainable, have also largely over-
looked the network. The electricity network itself certainly has only relatively minor 
environmental impacts – undoubtedly so, when compared to electricity generation. It is 
therefore not surprising that it has not figured prominently in the sustainability discourse 
in the energy sector. Sustainability in electricity has been mainly associated with replac-
ing “dirty” plants by cleaner ones on the generation side and reducing consumption on 
the demand side. An early example is the “soft energy path” put forward by Lovins 
(1977) whereby the centralised energy system is to be replaced by end-use efficiency 
and renewables. 
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More recently, ‘transition management’ in the Dutch energy sector, although pursuing a 
systems approach, also seems to neglect the electricity network as one of the core ele-
ments of the electricity system and, like previous approaches only looks at power plants, 
rather than the plant-network-interface2. 
Even studies that explicitly referred to the “Greening the Grid” (van Vliet 2002) tend to 
focus on the consumer, generation or new linkages or roles between the two without 
consideration of the physical network infrastructure. Another example of this ‘infra-
structure blindness’ are studies that have analysed in great detail the future potential of 
renewables, for example, and the changing generation mix that is required for a sustain-
able electricity system without considering the infrastructure implications that their gen-
eration scenarios would have (e.g. for Germany Wuppertal Institut, DLR 2002). 
Since the turn of millennium the network infrastructure has been waking up from dec-
ades of sleep. For example, in its European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-
Plan) the European Commission lists an integrated, smart European electricity grid as 
one of the four key challenges for Europe’s energy system (European Commission 
2007). The network revival has several dimensions: It is about making sure that there 
will be sufficient investment to maintain supply security, about upgrading the network 
and especially interconnectors between systems to open the network for new entrants 
and facilitate competition and about network innovations to integrate new generators 
and the demand side into system operation. 
The renewed interest in the network can be attributed to a number of developments that 
result from electricity market liberalisation. First, unbundling between generation, net-
work and supply activities that is one of the cornerstones of the liberalised market 
                                                 
2 Personal communication with ECN, 30 June 2006.   
See also http://www.senternovem.nl/energytransition/initiatives/index.asp 
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model, has made the individual elements, including the network, more visible. The fact 
that a separate governance mechanism has been established for the network adds to this 
(see section 3.2). More generally liberalisation has highlighted the role of the network 
as a prerequisite for a functioning marketplace: It connects supply and demand and can 
be a significant barrier to entry if new entrants cannot get access to the network. While 
before liberalisation, monopolistic supply areas were interconnected mainly to provide 
cheaper reserve, liberalisation leads to increasing trade, including international trade, 
which in turn increases the infrastructure requirements to accommodate that trade. 
Overall, it can be argued that “the invisible hand of the market or market forces (…) 
have forced this rather neglected sector into the limelight” (WRR 2008: 51). 
Another development that has put the spotlight on the electricity grid is the changing 
generation structure (IEA 2008). Firstly, the competitive market and new technologies 
like offshore wind plants have triggered changes in the geographical distribution of gen-
eration connected to the transmission network and the network needs to be adapted ac-
cordingly. Secondly, the share of plants connected to the distribution network increases. 
Distributed generation and its interaction with the network will be the focus of the fur-
ther analysis, as outlined in the following section. 
3.1.2 Distributed generation 
The changing generation structure to a large extent results from an increasing share of 
renewables and combined-heat-and power plants (CHP) and ambitious political targets 
exist to promote this development further, e.g., the European 20 % target for the share 
of renewables in final energy consumption, laid down in the 2009 European renewables 
directive. Many of these plants are small-scale compared to conventional plants and are 
often referred to as ‘distributed generation’ (DG) (Jenkins et al. 2000; IEA 2002a; Pecas 
Lopes et al. 2007). 
Distributed generation has a particularly strong impact on the network because it is con-
nected to a network level that was not designed for that purpose and because DG is not 
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just about connecting new plants to the existing system, but also about innovation and 
transformation of the system (see section 3.1.2.3). The case of DG shows that the re-
newed interest in the network infrastructure entails a more systemic view of the electric-
ity system. As indicated in Figure 2, with the infrastructure moving to the centre stage, 
the interconnections between generation, network and demand also come to the fore. 
Although unbundling may have made the network more visible, such a system view is 
at odds with the disaggregated unbundling view of the electricity system put forward by 
the liberalisation model. 
For these reasons, DG can serve as a particularly good example for analysis of the capa-
bility of the liberalised electricity market model to deal with developments that are not 
just about promoting competition and increasing efficiency, but also involve adapting 
the electricity system to make it more sustainable.  
The following sections will provide a brief overview of DG, and will discuss its poten-
tial network impacts. 
3.1.2.1 Definition and status 
There are a number of different definitions for DG (Ackermann et al. 2001), referring to 
either the location in the network, the plant capacity, the power delivery area, the tech-
nology, the environmental impact, the mode of operation or the ownership. It is true that 
DG plants tend to be small-scale3 and often, yet not always, have a lower environmental 
impact than conventional generation.  
                                                 
3  In many cases, DG will be quite small, below 1 MW or even below 1 kW. Assuming that the maxi-
mum voltage level operated as part of the distribution system is 110kV, the maximum capacity for 
DG can be in the range of 100-150 MW. See Jenkins (2000: 21-48) for a description of DG technolo-
gies. 
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However, only the first definition based on the location in the network can adequately 
capture the range of plants that can be subsumed under the heading of DG. What makes 
a plant “distributed” is neither its technology nor its environmental impact, but its loca-
tion within the network. While power plants have traditionally been connected to the 
transmission grid, distributed plants are connected to either the distribution grid that was 
not configured to accommodate generation or on the customer side of the meter.  
According to Ackermann et al. (2001), who have attempted to provide a consistent defi-
nition, “DG can be defined as electric power generation within distribution networks or 
on the customer side of the network”. A similar definition has been adopted by the UK 
energy regulator Ofgem (2002): “DG, sometimes called embedded generation, is elec-
tricity generation, which is connected to the distribution network rather than high volt-
age transmission network.”4 In the context of this study it is important to note that this 
definition includes a systemic perspective, highlighting the interconnection between 
generation and network. 
Although DG plays an increasingly prominent role in political debates and future sce-
narios of the electricity system, their current contribution is limited in terms of total 
capacity and generation in most electricity systems. What is more, in most countries 
which are leaving the “grace period” inherited from the monopolistic era and involving 
significant over-capacity and are entering an investment phase, there are significant in-
vestments in centralised plants. 
It is difficult to get hold of reliable and consistent statistical data on the status of DG, 
both globally and on a country-by-country basis. This is because most statistics report 
the share of renewables or CHP plants, but do not distinguish between DG plants and 
                                                 
4 The definition of the distribution grid, i.e. the voltage level it comprises, depends on the system at 
hand. 
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plants connected to the transmission grid. The other problem is that the definition of DG 
depends on the study and the country, making it difficult to compare and aggregate data 
across different statistics (Ackermann 2007: 1149). 
The most comprehensive statistical data is provided by World Alliance for Decentral-
ized Energy, an industry association mostly representing members from the CHP indus-
try. According to WADE (2005), the world market share of DG in generation capacity 
was 7.2 % in 2004. In absolute terms, global installed DG capacity stood at 282.3 GW. 
Most of these plants are industrial CHP or district heating plants. In 2005, DG contrib-
uted about 10 % to total power generation world-wide. In terms of the share of DG in 
total new generation, this has continually increased from 13.0% in 2002 to around 
24.5% in 2005 (WADE 2006), indicating that DG capacity is rising. Unfortunately, this 
data is incomplete in that it does contain a longer time series.  
DG penetration by country is shown in chapter 4 as a basis for the selection of the coun-
try case studies. The WADE definition of DG is similar to the one applied in this thesis 
in that it defines DG irrespective of size, technology or fuel used. There is a slight dif-
ference in that it defines DG as electricity production at or near the point of use and 
does not refer to the electricity network. However, “near the point of use” can be trans-
lated as “connected to the distribution grid”, as it will otherwise be difficult to deter-
mine which plants are near the point of use and which are not.(WADE 2006; WADE 
2006) 
3.1.2.2 Distributed generation: General drivers 
There are different factors that have led to an increasing interest in DG (Alanne, Saari 
2006; DoE 2007; Pepermans et al. 2005; Swisher 2002). The potential advantages of 
DG include environmental, security of supply and economic aspects.  
Electricity market liberalisation can in principle be said to have opened the door for DG 
in that it has lifted restrictions on building power plants and has opened the generation 
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market to new entrants. However, the drivers for an increase in DG have so far been 
mainly technical progress of DG technologies and political objectives to increase the 
share of DG that have led to the creation of niches outside the liberalised market in 
which these new technologies can operate supported by government policy (e.g. priority 
dispatch and feed-in mechanism or quota systems).  
However, DG has only rarely been recognised as a separate governance field and in 
most countries there is no explicit DG policy, but policies to promote renewables and 
CHP (e.g. Haas et al. 2008). Renewables are often small-scale and connected to the dis-
tribution network. The same holds for many CHP plants. Thus, the increasing share of 
DG results to a large extent from political efforts to promote renewables and CHP, 
mainly for environmental reasons. 
Electricity generation from renewables and CHP can generally be said to have a lower 
environmental impact than conventional fossil-fuel fired electricity only plants because 
they use renewable primary energy sources with no or lower emissions or heat utilisa-
tion increases their efficiency. The benefits are, however, not always unambiguous (e.g. 
Gulli 2006) and case-specific, depending on the technology, the fuel that is used and the 
technology it is compared to (e.g. Pehnt, Fischer 2006). 
There are different instruments to support the generation from new plant technologies. 
Most countries now apply either obligations combined with tradable certificates (as in 
the UK) or feed-in systems (as in Germany). There has been an extensive debate on the 
pros and cons of different support mechanisms (e.g. Haas et al. 2004; Mitchell et al. 
2006; Menanteau et al. 2003). It has been mainly about finding the most effective or 
efficient support instruments for individual plants, while the network infrastructure has 
been neglected, much in line with the general infrastructure blindness sketched out 
above. 
In terms of DG plant economics, there are large differences between plant technologies 
and the economics are highly technology-, site- and fuel-specific (see for example 
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Pepermans et al. 2005: 793 for investment costs for different DG technologies). How-
ever, there are a number of generic developments that can make small-scale plants more 
attractive and which may become increasingly relevant in the future:  
Firstly, it can generally be said that the scale economies that have dominated electricity 
generation for decades, have been diminishing (Casten 1990). DG may increasingly 
benefit from a shift from economies of scale to economies of mass production 
(Magnusson et al. 2005). 
Secondly, investments in centralised plants are much lumpier than DG investments and 
are therefore more difficult to gear towards actual market conditions and demand devel-
opments. In traditional power systems an expected increase in electricity demand was 
usually met by installing a new large-scale power plant, with the risk of overcapacity 
borne by customers. In today’s liberalised markets, building power plants has become a 
significantly riskier investment. Small-scale plants reduce the risk for individual inves-
tors of building capacity that is not called upon by the market. They are therefore better 
suited for investors to respond to demand changes and market developments (Swisher 
2001; Swisher 2002). 
In terms of supply security, DG can be attractive for individual power consumers be-
cause they can provide on-site back-up power and reduce the dependence on the public 
grid. This is particularly valuable in regions where reliable power supply cannot be pro-
vided via the network (Swisher 2002). 
From a societal perspective, an assessment of the impact of DG on supply security is 
more difficult. Again, it depends on the specific technology and needs to take into ac-
count different dimensions of supply security, too (Pepermans et al. 2005: 790-794; for 
a more general analysis of security of supply see Watson 2009b; Watson 2009a). For 
example, in terms of fuel supply, if DG is powered by renewables, it can reduce the 
dependence on fuel imports, whereas gas-driven DG may reduce fuel diversity and in-
crease dependence on gas imports. In terms of the security of the electricity infrastruc-
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ture, DG plants can both reduce and increase pressure on the infrastructure. On the one 
hand, generation close to consumers can reduce the dependence on the infrastructure. 
On the other hand, a changing generation structure which no longer matches the infra-
structure as well as the intermittency of many DG plants can make the electricity system 
more prone to failures. Despite the need for a diversified assessment of the impact of 
DG on security of supply, in political debates security is often used as an argument in 
favour of DG (for example European Commission 2003: 9). 
3.1.2.3 Distributed generation and electricity networks 
While the previous section has already mentioned the main generic energy or commod-
ity related benefits of DG, for this study the impacts of DG on the network infrastruc-
ture are most relevant, both in technical and economic terms. The definition of DG as 
generation connected to the distribution system or on the customer-side of the meter 
already indicates that DG needs to be analysed “in connection” with the network. 
The following stylised figure shows various overall cost effects of DG on the network 
found in the literature: DG can lead to additional costs in the network (case 2) as com-
pared to a reference case without DG (case 1), but the additional costs can be reduced 
through network integration and innovative network concepts (case 3). In some cases, 
DG may contribute to a reduction of network costs (case 4). 
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Figure 3:  How DG can affect network costs 
 
Source: Author’s own illustration, based on the following sections 
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These effects will be explained in more detail in the following sections. 
Additional grid costs of DG 
In current electricity systems, the distribution system is different from the transmission 
system in a number of ways (Cardell, Tabors 1997): 
 Distribution systems were designed to transport power from the transmission 
system to the consumers and power flows are uni-directional from higher to 
lower voltage levels. They do not normally contain generation and their protec-
tion systems may need to be adapted to accommodate generators. 
 Transmission systems are highly meshed whereas distribution systems are char-
acterised by a radial or looped grid architecture. As a consequence, there are 
normally only one or maybe two paths to each bus, as compared to several alter-
native paths in the meshed transmission system.  
 The high voltage lines of transmission systems have a low resistance as com-
pared to the lower-voltage lines in distribution systems, especially in rural sys-
tems with long lines. As a consequence, if a generator gets connected to the low-
voltage distribution system, this can significantly affect the voltage levels. 
 In distribution systems, and especially the low-voltage ends, there are usually no 
control systems available that are standard on the transmission level. As a result, 
the DSO has no real-time information on the status of the network and can 
hardly influence its operation to maintain system stability, e.g. when the voltage 
on the network is about to exceed the rating. In a liberalised market with unbun-
dled network operators and independent generators, this becomes even more of a 
problem as generators are mainly concerned with responding to market signals 
or the maximisation of revenues from a support mechanisms rather than network 
requirements. 
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There is a large body of literature dealing with the technical problems that result from 
connecting DG to the distribution network and the costs this entails, e.g. power quality 
issues (e.g., Ackermann 2004: 222-239; Jenkins et al. 2000: 133-149; Dispower 2006; 
Ackermann 2004). Distributed plants are not just smaller plants, but plants connected to 
a network level that was not designed for that purpose. They therefore affect the system 
in novel ways and require DSOs, who are usually neither used nor equipped to handle 
large amounts of generation on their network, to deal with new problems.  
Given that distribution networks have generally not been designed to accommodate DG, 
it is not surprising that connecting DG to this network level can entail additional costs 
(Cao et al. 2006). In addition to the connection costs themselves, there are costs for rein-
forcing the grid beyond the point of connection to accommodate the additional load, e.g. 
if DG generation exceeds local demand and additional grid capacity is required to ex-
port electricity to the transmission grid, e.g., for Germany see Burges, Twele (2005), for 
Denmark Bach et al. (2003). What should not be neglected are the additional transaction 
costs that DG entails for the DSO. With DG, the DSO needs to deal with additional 
counter-parties, and given the relatively small size and distributed ownership of DG, 
this makes the DSO’s business more complex. 
Reducing the additional costs of DG 
If DG plants are only connected, they are basically treated like passive consumers. In-
stead there are also concepts to integrate them into the system and make them operate 
more in line with system requirements. According to Strbac et al. (2006), “in systems 
with a significant penetration of distributed generation, such as Denmark, there is a 
clear need to make the next step, which is to move away from connecting generators 
under the “fit and forget” basis (with the objective to merely absorb their energy pro-
duction) and move toward integrating this generation in the overall system operation 
and development”. 
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There are different degrees of integrating DG plants into the network. While locating 
DG plants with regard to the resulting network costs represents a first step, integration 
mainly refers to the operational phase. DG plants can be made more ‘system-friendly’ if 
they are designed to provide more flexibility and controllability to be able to react to 
system conditions, e.g. by adapting their output to system load or by participating in 
reactive power management. In Germany, for example, the feed-in-law for renewables 
(EEG) requires renewable plants to dispose of “a technical facility for reducing the 
feed-in in the event of grid overload” (article 4/3). Also, the plants’ protection system 
can be designed so as to allow them to keep operating when the system experiences 
disturbances, rather than being disconnected, thereby potentially exacerbating the prob-
lem.  
Integrating DG into network operation has repercussions on the way in which DG plants 
are designed and operated, but also requires changes on the network side. If DG plants 
are to contribute to system security, managing constraints and balancing, the infrastruc-
ture needs to be in place to enable DG operators to make this contribution. The more 
DG capacity increases, the more the network needs to adapt to be able to accommodate 
these generators (cf. L'Abbate et al. 2008).  
Various innovative network concepts are under discussion that go beyond removing 
barriers for individual plants and aim at upgrading the network to accommodate an in-
creasing share of DG (Varming et al. 2002; EA Technology Ltd 2001; Strbac et al. 
2007; Coll-Mayor et al. 2006; Strbac 2006; Strbac et al. 2006; Econnect 2006; BERR 
2007; Bayod-Rújula 2009; European Commission 2003). 
For example, van Overbeeke and Roberts (2002) have proposed the "active networks" 
concept. In this approach the current passive distribution networks that simply transport 
electricity from the transmission grid to the final customers will be replaced by actively 
managed networks. An important feature of active networks is that they interact with 
their customers, i.e. DG plants can be controlled to adapt to the network situation. Net-
work constraints are not resolved in a conventional way, through preventive control 
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based on network capacity, but controllable DG capabilities are used to control flows on 
the network, similar to what is already done on the transmission level.  
Van Overbeeke and Roberts argue that this is both technically and economically the 
best way to facilitate DG in a deregulated electricity market. The following table pro-
vides an overview of different concepts under discussion: 
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Table 2: Overview of innovative network concepts5 
 Active distribu-
tion networks 
Virtual power 
plants 
Power cells 
(Denmark) 
Microgrids 
Objective Connect more DG 
to existing net-
work assets 
Increase utilisa-
tion of existing 
networks 
DG to trade on 
markets and pro-
vide network 
control and sys-
tem support  
Integrate DG into 
system operation 
to achieve a higher 
level of DG within 
the existing infra-
structure 
Utilise DG to reduce 
the requirement for 
Transmission and 
High Voltage distri-
bution assets 
How? Real-time network 
analysis and con-
trol of voltage, 
flows and fault 
levels 
Make distribution 
more intelligent, 
instead of invest-
ing in network 
primary plants 
(wires) 
 
Aggregation of 
DG plants, in-
creasing diversity 
and predictability 
Decentralisation of 
control, DSOs 
operate local con-
trol areas and 
provide system 
services with the 
help of DG 
Individual micro 
grids are able to 
operate autono-
mously in the case 
of loss of supply 
from the higher 
voltage networks 
(islanding) 
Source: Based on Strbac (2006) and Strbac et al. (2007), see also L’Abbate et al. (2008; Strbac et al. 
2007; Strbac et al. 2007; 2007) 
If plants are not just connected to the existing grid, but actively integrated into the sys-
tem the additional network costs that result from connecting DG, for instance due to 
necessary network expansions, can be reduced.  
                                                 
5 While these innovations mainly pertain to the distribution network, there are also innovative solutions 
for the transmission network (IEA 2008: 25-26). An example is the FACTS technology (Flexible Al-
ternating Current Transmission Systems) to improve the power flows and voltages on the transmission 
system. 
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For example, in a case study conducted in Austria Prüggler et al. (2008) compare con-
ventional grid extension strategies based on new cables with alternative solutions that 
actively use DG as well as network assets to perform voltage control in the distribution 
network. They show that in this case all innovative strategies applied are significantly 
more economical than the conventional grid reinforcement approach.  
While in the Austrian case study grid reinforcement is the most expensive option, Cao 
et al. (2006) have analysed different cases in the UK and Finland, again with different 
DG penetration levels, densities and distinguishing between rural and urban networks. 
They come to the conclusion that traditional network reinforcement can be the most 
economical option in some cases. Yet overall, their results confirm that active manage-
ment can reduce the network costs caused by DG, as shown in scenario 3 in Figure 3. 
Reduction of overall network costs through DG 
As we have seen, DG is often discussed as a new problem and in terms of additional 
costs for the network and how these can be reduced. However, there can also be benefits 
to the system and there is also research on the potential of DG to reduce network costs 
(cf. scenario 4 in Figure 3). According to this argument, DG does not increase costs 
because the network needs to be expanded to accommodate DG, but DG becomes an 
alternative to the use of some parts of the network in both the transmission and distribu-
tion grid, generating electricity locally and thus replacing or deferring the need for net-
work investments. This also requires DG to be integrated into network operation.  
Especially in the USA a number of studies on the costs and benefits of DG have been 
conducted (Gumerman et al. 2003; Iannucci et al. 2003; DoE 2007: section 3.6; Arthur 
D.Little Inc. 1999). These studies all stress the benefits of deferred investment in both 
transmission and distribution networks as DG can be a substitute for new lines. For ex-
ample, Arthur D. Little (1999) have estimated typical grid-side benefits at US$ 30/kW 
per year for the deferral of transmission and distribution upgrades. Yet this potential 
benefit is highly case-specific and critically depends on whether network capacity is 
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already sufficient. If it is, then the installation of DG generally has no major cost bene-
fits, as network costs are largely sunk costs. If, however, new DG can avoid or defer 
network expansion, it may be the more economical option. Mendez et al. (2006) have 
proposed a methodology for assessing the impact of DG on investment deferral. They 
show how this effect depends amongst other things on the DG technology and the con-
centration of DG plants. 
Using DG as an alternative to network investment requires these plants to be integrated 
into overall system operation to provide capacity rather than energy only, i.e. they need 
to generate power when needed by the system (e.g. because demand is high). Otherwise 
back-up power would need to be provided by central plants and via the grid. This addi-
tional value of DG is often referred to as distributed capacity (Ackermann et al. 2001: 
201). Again, this may require changes not just on the plant side, but also on the network 
side. The potential of DG to replace network investment has been translated into article 
14/7 of the 2003 EU electricity directive that requires DSOs to consider DG as an alter-
native to network expansion. 
Beyond individual networks 
The innovative network concepts presented above can in principle be implemented in 
one distribution network, while other distribution networks can continue to operate in a 
conventional way, i.e. some networks may choose to integrate DG through network 
expansion while others may decide to implement innovative control technologies. Be-
yond these individual innovations in single distribution networks, there is a discussion 
about the transformation of the overall grid structure being necessary if electricity gen-
eration is to become distributed and more sustainable. The electricity network infra-
structure thus becomes an example of system transformation as presented in the previ-
ous chapter.  
With an increasing share of DG, the distribution grid is expected to become more simi-
lar to the transmission grid, controlling generation and connecting generation and load. 
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This is not just about resolving local network constraints, but about overall system con-
trol, including the balancing system. DG may entail a shift in the control philosophy 
from entirely central control to some control taken over by the distribution system op-
erators. For example, such a shift is implied in the cell concept presented in Table 2. 
This will affect the interaction between transmission and distribution network and will 
eventually entail changes in the overall infrastructure architecture (cf. European Com-
mission 2006: 18).  
There are different scenarios describing potential future development paths of the sys-
tem as a whole, including scenarios where the current top-down grid architecture is 
largely maintained, scenarios where long-range electricity transport for example from 
Northern Africa to Europe becomes more important or where offshore-wind plants will 
generate a significant amount of electricity with important repercussions on the grid 
structure or scenarios that foresee a mainly decentralised network and control structure 
(Thielens, Vaessen 2005). 
The International Energy Agency (IEA 2002a) has sketched out the increasing penetra-
tion of DG and the potential system impacts this entails in three stages: accommodation, 
decentralisation and dispersal. Against the background of the above discussion, I inter-
pret these stages as follows: 
In the first stage, ‘accommodation’, DG is introduced into the existing system with cen-
tralised control over network remaining in place. This stage is about ‘technical fixes’ 
allowing distributed power plants to be connected to the existing grid, while the overall 
technical structure remain virtually unchanged.  
In the second stage, ‘decentralisation’, with a higher share of DG, new communication 
systems for controlling the network and the plants connected to it will be used, i.e. in-
stead of just connecting DG to the existing network the infrastructure is adapted to the 
changing requirements. 
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Finally in the stage of ‘dispersal’ DG becomes dominant in the electricity market, based 
on ‘microgrids’ that can operate independently of the transmission grid and may be 
connected to other networks for back-up purposes only. The top-down structure of the 
traditional grid is transformed into a decentralised system architecture. Rather than only 
introducing individual new technologies in the existing system to upgrade it as in the 
previous stage, the overall system architecture is transformed: “Distribution operates 
more like a coordinating agent between separate systems rather than controller of the 
system” (IEA 2002a: 98). 
3.1.3 Summary of the DG and network discussion 
This chapter started off by stating that the infrastructure that connects supply and de-
mand is moving to the centre stage. The discussion on DG has shown how small-scale 
plants connected to the distribution network have become a network issue. Summarising 
this discussion, the interaction between DG and the network can be divided into several 
dimensions. The technical and economic discussion of DG in the context of the electric-
ity network ranges from ‘simple’ connection issues to ‘visions’ of future network struc-
tures that replace the existing top-down network. As a basis for the further analysis I 
propose to structure the debate as follows: 
First, there is a debate on the technical and economic issues arising from connecting DG 
to the network. As DG penetration increases and in order to reduce costs, it becomes 
necessary to not just connect plants to the network, but to integrate them into network 
operation. In other words, DG can not merely feed electricity into the grid, but can pro-
vide capacity and replace network investments wherever possible. Connecting new 
plants to the existing grid may require network expansions, but leaves the basic network 
structure largely unchanged. However, in order to integrate DG, it is not just for the DG 
plants to adapt to the network, but the network needs to adapt, too. There will therefore 
be an increasing need and scope for network innovations and a number of innovative 
network concepts are under development, i.e. based on new control technologies. Fi-
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nally, transformation refers to a more comprehensive change of the system architecture, 
linking up and going beyond incremental innovations in individual parts of the network, 
to achieve an overall transformation of the system structure and control, covering both 
the distribution and the transmission system.  
The following table summarises the interaction between distributed generation and elec-
tricity network in four stages.  
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Table 3:  From DG network connection to system transformation 
 
Connection Integration Innovation Transformation 
‘Technical’ 
issues 
Connection of 
DG to distribu-
tion level of 
existing net-
work (incl. 
network ex-
pansions) 
DG contributes 
energy 
Integration of 
DG into op-
eration of 
existing net-
work (load 
and voltage 
management) 
DG takes over 
responsibility 
for system 
support 
DG contrib-
utes capacity 
See Integration; 
Development 
and deployment 
of innovative 
network tech-
nologies to inte-
grate DG into 
network opera-
tion 
Transformation of net-
work structure beyond 
innovations in individual 
parts of the network, 
including overall system 
design and control 
(transmission and dis-
tribution) 
Economic 
issues  
DG entails 
additional net-
work costs 
Additional 
network costs 
of DG can be 
reduced; 
DG can help 
reduce net-
work costs 
See Integration; 
Additional costs 
and benefits of 
RD&D 
Costs and benefits of 
transforming the net-
work architecture  
Usefulness of cost-
benefit less clear for the 
analysis of system 
transformation 
Is coordination of differ-
ent actors and innova-
tion activities through 
price signal sufficient? 
 
In practice these stages may be difficult to separate, for example when innovative con-
cepts are applied to improve network connections and especially network integration. 
Especially integration and innovation are likely to be closely intertwined, as integration 
of DG into distribution networks is itself an innovative concept. Nevertheless, the above 
stages can provide a useful heuristic for the analysis of governance mechanisms in gen-
eral and network regulation in particular. A system where DG connection is the main 
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issue is likely to require different governance mechanisms compared to a system where 
innovative distribution networks are being developed.  
3.2 Network regulation 
The previous section 3.1 has explained how networks in general and the integration of 
distributed generation into networks in particular have become an important issue in 
electricity systems. Within the standard model of electricity system liberalisation out-
lined in chapter 2, the dominant governance model to deal with the natural monopoly 
that still exists in electricity networks is ‘economic network regulation’. This section 
explains the main features of this standard governance approach for electricity net-
works. It explains what exactly is meant by regulation in this context, why networks 
still need to be regulated and how the standard model proposes to go about this.  
It may seem strange that the analysis of the standard model of liberalisation focuses on 
network regulation. The standard model proposes competitive markets and market 
prices as the main governance mechanisms, while in the regulated part of the sector, the 
regulator is the main governance mechanism and prices are not set through the market. 
However, network regulation is an important element of liberalisation. Much in line 
with the overall liberalisation model, the main objective of the standard model of net-
work regulation is to promote competition and efficiency, and it has been designed to 
mimic the market mechanism for the network monopoly. It is therefore a relevant ex-
ample to analysis the potential of the standard model of liberalisation to promote new 
objectives. 
3.2.1 Network regulation in the context of the regulatory state 
Before explaining the standard model of network regulation, it should be briefly placed 
in the context of a broader debate on regulation (cf. Jordana, Levi-Faur 2004). Estab-
lishing a regulator to set the rules for the privately-owned electricity network is a devel-
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opment that is specific neither to the electricity sector nor liberalised infrastructure sec-
tors in general. Regulation, or in other words the increasing emphasis of ‘rule-making’ 
by the state, is rather seen by some as the major aspect in the development of govern-
ance in capitalist economies since the 1980s. In any case, it is something that has gained 
more prominence (Majone 1997). This development has been condensed into the notion 
of the ‘regulatory state’. The regulatory state can be defined as a "[...] rule making state, 
with [...] a predilection for judicial or quasi-judicial solutions" (McGowan, Wallace 
1996: 563). The regulatory state is mainly contrasted with the welfare state that is based 
on taxing and spending as well as re-distributional objectives on the one hand and pub-
lic ownership on the other hand. 
The following graph shows four different meanings of regulation in four circles, with 
the most precise meaning, which is applied in this study, in the inner circle (meaning I). 
The development towards the regulatory state is captured in meaning II, which de-
scribes a specific form of governance based on rule-making. In contrast, regulation ac-
cording to meaning III also includes mechanisms such as taxation, subsidies, redistribu-
tion and public ownership. In the outer circle, regulation refers to all mechanisms of 
social control, rather than simply those used by the state.  
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Figure 4: Different meanings of regulation 
Economic regulation
of monopolies
Regulation as specific form of 
governance: a set of 
authoritative rules, often 
accompanied by some 
administrative agency, for 
monitoring and enforcing 
compliance
Regulation as 
governance in a 
general sense: the 
aggregate efforts 
by state agencies 
to steer economy
Regulation in its
widest sense: all 
mechanisms of 
social control
I
II
III
IV
 
Source: Adapted from Baldwin et al. (1998), quoted in Jordana, Levi-Faur (2004) 
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Regulation according to meaning II can target different market failures in different pol-
icy areas and can make use of different kinds of rules. As indicated it has indeed been 
assessed that the ‘regulatory state’ has been expanding to include an increasing number 
of issues. There is for example environmental and social regulation, including health 
and safety regulation and consumer protection, which targets externalities or informa-
tion deficits and sets for example standards in the respective field. 
The focus of this thesis is on economic regulation of natural monopolies, which regu-
lates the prices companies are allowed to charge (meaning I in the figure above). This 
represents one specific regulatory field within the broader concept of the regulatory 
state. In the case of electricity as well as other utility industries, privatisation and regula-
tion of private companies has in many cases replaced the state as an owner that was 
steering through public ownership and acting directly as a service provider. 
Economic regulation is generally embedded in a specific governance arrangement ac-
cording to meaning II, based on a specialised and independent agency. The ‘regulatory 
state’ is not only characterised by placing more emphasis on rule-making; rather there is 
also a specific institutional set-up proposed for that purpose. It is one of the main char-
acteristics of the regulatory state that it delegates a large part of its rule-making func-
tions to agencies. As compared to traditional bureaucracies, these are specialised in a 
narrow range of policy issues, are staffed by experts in that field and are to be inde-
pendent of politics (Majone 1997; Pollitt et al. 2001).  
This attempt to separate policy and regulation is also part of a broader effort – often 
labelled ‘New Public Management’ – to organise public administration much like a 
business and perform it as a mainly technical task based on scientific evidence (Hood 
1991; Gray, Jenkins 1995). 
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3.2.2 The standard model of economic regulation 
Chapter 2 has provided a brief overview of the standard model of liberalised electricity 
markets. This model comprises a standard way of dealing with the residual natural mo-
nopoly in electricity networks. Its principles are rooted in the liberalisation paradigm 
presented in the previous chapter. This means that regulation is justified by market fail-
ures and has the objective of promoting competition and mimicking the market in the 
network monopoly as much as possible. As with electricity liberalisation in general, the 
standard model of economic network regulation was pioneered in the UK. The follow-
ing sections explain why regulation is necessary in the liberalisation paradigm, spells 
out the theoretical foundations of the standard model and describes its main elements. 
3.2.2.1 Why is network regulation needed? 
The reason why networks are still regulated while the rest of the electricity sector has 
been opened up for competition is that the network is a natural monopoly with irreversi-
ble or sunk costs – a combination that leads to a ‘monopolistic bottleneck’ with stable 
market power (Knieps 2001). 
In one product markets, natural monopolies are always characterized by economies of 
scale, resulting from continuously declining average costs, i.e. marginal costs are al-
ways below average costs. A more general and more recent definition refers to subaddi-
tivity of costs, i.e. in a natural monopoly the production by a single firm minimises cost. 
This may also result from economies of scope. As a consequence, a single firm can sup-
ply the market at lower costs than more than one firm. In a natural monopoly market, 
competition is therefore not sustainable and usually inefficient. Furthermore, irreversi-
ble costs represent an entry barrier and prevent potential new entrants from contesting 
the natural monopoly. 
In the electricity network, high upfront capital investment requirements lead to econo-
mies of scale as network costs are mainly fixed, with relatively low marginal costs. 
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Since these have no alternative use they represent irreversible costs (WRR 2008; 
Baldick, Kahn 1993). 
Besides economies of scale there are also economies of scope in the electricity network 
as an integrated network benefits from diversified loads, increased security of supply 
and reduced reserve requirements. As a consequence of these characteristics, competi-
tion between separate network operators would be less efficient than having networks 
run by one company and there is no threat of entry for the incumbent.  
There are two main rationales for regulating the monopoly: firstly, without regulation 
the monopoly company would be free to set prices to extract a monopoly rent, leading 
to welfare losses. Before liberalisation, this argument could be applied to the entire sec-
tor. In the formerly monopolistic markets, most electricity companies were vertically 
integrated from generation through to supply. There were virtually no companies whose 
business was limited to networks. The vertically integrated companies were treated as 
natural monopolies and were either state-owned, like the former CEGB in the UK 
(Surrey 1996) or EdF in France (Finon 2001), or their integrated business was regulated 
as a whole, like RWE in Germany (Mez 1997). With the introduction of competition in 
generation and supply, it is only the residual network monopoly that needs to be subject 
to this kind of regulation. 
The introduction of competition in the other parts provides a second rationale for regu-
lating the network. In a liberalised environment, regulation of the network becomes 
necessary because competition in generation and supply depends on all market partici-
pants having equal access to the network bottleneck – the network becomes an ‘essen-
tial facility’ for companies and customers to get access to the market and thus for com-
petition to work. 
If the network company is not completely unbundled from generation and supply, as for 
example in Germany, regulation becomes even more necessary to avoid control over 
bottleneck facilities being utilised to keep competitors out of the market. Network regu-
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lation is often regarded as a two-dimensional approach that comprises ‘structural regula-
tion’ to separate competitive and regulated businesses and ‘tariff regulation’ to deter-
mine the prices of the residual monopoly (Brunekreeft 2003).  
For the above reasons, the introduction of competition in electricity generation and re-
tail requires some sort of governance mechanism to deal with the market failures in the 
residual network monopoly, i.e. to provide for the efficient and reliable operation of the 
network infrastructure, and for non-discriminatory access to the electricity grid, com-
bined with an appropriate tariff structure. This governance mechanism is provided by 
the standard model of regulation. 
3.2.2.2 The principles of the standard model 
How does the standard model of network regulation work? Networks are generally run 
by privately-owned, profit-oriented network operators that are unbundled from other 
parts of the industry and the governance of electricity networks is based on economic 
network regulation through independent, sector-specific regulatory authorities.  
Generally, a number of alternative models are available: Even within a competitive 
electricity market it would be possible to operate the network infrastructure by the pub-
lic sector. In other sectors, like the UK railway sector for example, a degree of competi-
tion is introduced through periodical tenders for operating franchise businesses. 
Within the standard model, a major innovation that has developed is the so-called ‘in-
centive regulation’ (Joskow 2006a). This has become the dominant regulatory approach 
proposed by the standard model and adopted in most countries and network bound sec-
tors, replacing the previously predominant cost-based regulation. Incentive regulation 
explicitly seeks to mimic the incentive structure of competitive markets, to make up for 
the lack of competition in the network monopoly. The core of incentive regulation is to 
provide companies with an economic incentive to improve efficiency by temporarily 
(i.e. within one regulatory period of three to five years) decoupling prices network com-
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panies are allowed to charge from costs. To that end, the regulator sets a price- or reve-
nue-cap for a regulatory period that is fixed ex-ante  
New economics of regulation 
The standard model emerged in the wake of the liberalisation agenda and is often asso-
ciated with Stephen Littlechild proposing the RPI-X framework for the regulation of the 
privatised British network industries and especially telecommunication (Pollitt 1999: 
10). However, the standard model is also rooted in more general economic theory, pro-
viding the foundation for this approach. Seminal work has been contributed by Laffont 
and Tirol (1993). The main characteristic of ‘modern regulatory economics’ or ‘new 
economics of regulation’ is that it leaves behind the notion that regulation is a com-
mand-and-control-instrument and the regulator directly influences corporate decisions 
through licences and sanctions. This is in line with a broader debate on the limited ca-
pability of the state to steer the society, often expressed as a shift ‘from government to 
governance’ (Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1996). 
The new economics of regulation emphasises that companies pursue their own objec-
tives that are different from the ones that the regulator wants to achieve (Laffont, Tirole 
1993: 34-35). The relationship between the regulator and company is characterised by 
strategic behaviour, with the company having an advantage due to an information 
asymmetry (Laffont, Tirole 1993: 1-2). This means that the company has better access 
to the relevant information, namely the efficient costs of its network. Information eco-
nomics and a principal-agent-framework, with the regulator being the principal and the 
company the agent, is thus at the heart of modern regulatory economics (Agrell, Boge-
toft 2004: 5).  
Since the regulator does not have full access to cost information, it has to deal with the 
trade-off between putting pressure on costs with the danger to drive the company out of 
business or relaxing that pressure with the danger to accept costs that are above efficient 
levels and entail undue profits. It therefore wants to give companies an incentive to be-
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come more efficient. However, it then has to deal with the “basic trade-off between 
incentives and rent extraction” (Laffont, Tirole 1993: 39). 
Incentives for efficiency 
These economic insights have made their way into the standard model of network regu-
lation (Brunekreeft 2003: 69-88; Joskow 2006a). In order to give companies incentives 
to become more efficient, they are allowed to keep some of the profits resulting from 
efficiency improvements during a regulatory period. In other words, the regulator ac-
knowledges the information asymmetry and concedes companies a rent on their infor-
mational advantage. Hence, productive efficiency gains through which a company can 
reduce its costs are at least temporarily promoted at the expense of allocative inefficien-
cies, with prices lying above marginal costs. 
The following figure shows how incentive regulation works in principle and how the 
incentive to become more efficient is set. The regulator sets a revenue cap (or price cap) 
for typically between three to five years that must not be exceeded by the company. It is 
an important innovation of incentive-based regulation that it explicitly fixes the regula-
tory period in what can be regarded as a regulatory contract between the regulator and 
the regulated company (Beesley, Littlechild 1989: 460) This is done ex-ante and the 
length of the regulatory period is not adapted with regard to the actual cost develop-
ment.  
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Figure 5:  Incentive regulation: How does it work? 
t
€
Allowed revenue („revenue cap“) = starting revenue * 
(1+inflation rate – Xgeneral – Xindividual)
Actual costs
Starting revenue
Network company‘s
additional (or reduced) profit
Regulatory period
 
Source: Author’s own illustration. This is a typical illustration of incentive regulation, a similar figure 
can be found for example in (Boltz 2005) 
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This mechanism should give companies an incentive to increase efficiency in two ways:  
Firstly, during a regulatory period, the cap imposed by the regulator usually decreases. 
This is widely known as the RPI-X formula. This reflects the fact that the regulator ex-
pects companies to become more efficient – either because there is a legacy of ineffi-
ciency or because there is a frontier shift whereby even the most efficient company can 
reduce costs in the future. There is therefore both a general efficiency target for the in-
dustry as a whole and one for individual companies. Companies which are less efficient 
than others may face a steeper decrease of their cap to make them catch up with more 
efficient companies as a result. 
Secondly, if companies beat the regulator’s efficiency target and reduce their costs fur-
ther below the cap, these will increase their profits, at least during a regulatory period. 
At the same time, if a company’s costs exceed the revenue allowed by the cap, they will 
lose money. 
As opposed to this, under cost-based regulation, network tariffs are not fixed ex-ante, 
but are in principle always adjusted to the development of network costs. This means 
there is a guaranteed rate-of-return and no incentive to reduce costs. 
A main task of the regulator will typically be to regulate the network tariffs which net-
work companies are allowed to charge. However, it is important to note that although 
the standard model and contemporary regulatory economics are mainly about providing 
regulated companies with financial incentives, regulation in practice is not only based 
on incentives. Rather, there are also other mechanisms such as licences that require 
network operators to comply with certain standards (e.g. technical or service standards) 
and connect plants to their network, etc. (for an overview of different 'regulatory strate-
gies' see Baldwin, Cave 1999: 34-62). These command-and-control type-of instruments 
could in principle replace economic incentives, yet the different types of instruments 
can also be employed to complement and reinforce each other. As Baldwin and Cave 
have pointed out (1999: 57), “in most regulatory contexts combinations of regulatory 
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methods tend to be employed”. For example in the context of network regulation a li-
cence requirement on the DSO to connect DG can be combined with a financial incen-
tive to do so. In this thesis, the focus is on economic incentives, which is at the heart of 
the standard model. 
The regulatory process 
Having described the main rationale and functionality of the standard model, this sec-
tion goes on to outline briefly the regulatory process in the standard model. Setting use-
of-system tariffs usually includes the following steps (see Figure 6), 
1) Determination of an “acceptable” cost base, consisting of (foreseeable) operational 
costs (OPEX) and capital costs (CAPEX) for the duration of the regulatory period. 
2) Determination of possible reductions of the (controllable) cost base on the basis of a 
comparative efficiency analysis or benchmarking procedure. As it is one of the core 
ideas of incentive regulation to decouple prices from costs, a method needs to be de-
signed to determine the prices a company is allowed to charge. This is usually based 
on a comparative cost analysis, where regulated companies are benchmarked against 
each other. One potential drawback of this approach is that the cost peculiarities of 
individual companies are neglected and prices deviate too much from costs, al-
though higher costs may be justified for the individual company. 
3) Determination of starting values of use-of system tariffs on the basis of the reviewed 
cost base, including cost pass-throughs. 
4) Automatic adaptation of initial values in a defined regulatory cycle based on an in-
centive regulation formula. 
5) After the regulatory period: start again with step one. 
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Figure 6: The procedure for setting use-of-system tariffs 
 
Source: (Bauknecht et al. 2007) 
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Sector-specific, independent regulators 
Besides the incentive mechanisms described above, another component of network 
regulation is to determine who should be in charge of regulation (Baldwin, Cave 1999: 
63-75). There are a number of ‘traditional’ organisations that could in principle take 
over this role, such as the government department that is in charge of energy or the anti-
trust authority. As noted before, the regulatory state is characterised by rule-making 
functions being delegated to specialised agencies (meaning II in Figure 4). This is also 
part of the standard model of network regulation. Many countries have followed the 
standard model and have set up independent, sector-specific regulatory authorities to 
oversee network monopolies (IEA 2001b). The idea is to separate government and poli-
tics on the one hand from the concrete implementation and management of network 
access rules on the other hand. A prominent example is the UK energy regulator Ofgem. 
The main rationale for the independence of the regulator, at least from the normative 
perspective of the textbook model, is to overcome the problem that it is difficult for pol-
icy-makers to credibly commit themselves to a long-term strategy (Majone 1997). 
While preferences of policy makers are likely to change over time (often referred as 
time-inconsistency problem), a stable framework is needed to provide network op-
eretors with an efficiency incentive. It is supposed to be easier for an independent 
agency with a clear economic objective to adhere to a regulatory decision than would be 
the case for policy makers in the face of various trade-offs, changing political circum-
stances, upcoming elections and the temptation to exploit decisions by regulated parties 
ex post.  
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4 Research question and methodology 
Having presented the research topic and the literature on liberalisation and transforma-
tion of electricity systems in general and distributed generation and network regulation 
in particular in chapters 2 and 3, I can now elaborate on the research question that was 
briefly introduced in chapter 1, as well as the methodology and research design. 
4.1 Research question: Governance of DG integration and network trans-
formation 
4.1.1 Research question 
At a general level, the study analyses to what extent the standard model of liberalised 
electricity markets that was developed to increase the efficiency of electricity supply 
can deal with new objectives, namely in terms of making the sector more sustainable 
and reducing its climate impact. How can the standard model be adapted for that pur-
pose and to what extent can insights from the system transformation literature be inte-
grated into the standard model? 
Against the background of governance mechanisms in liberalised electricity markets 
more generally and the question of how the market mechanisms can and must be com-
plemented by other coordination mechanisms, the study focuses on the development of 
the electricity network infrastructure and the integration of distributed generation.  
In the standard model of liberalised electricity markets, the governance of the network 
infrastructure is mainly based on network regulation in the form of incentive regulation 
by an independent, economic and sector-specific regulator.  
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Thus, the main question of my research is how DG integration and network develop-
ment can be integrated into this governance regime and whether and how the regulatory 
framework needs to evolve.  
Chapter 2 has presented the liberalisation and transformation literatures as two alterna-
tive perspectives on the governance of the electricity system. The starting point of the 
analysis in this thesis is the liberalisation perspective. The main question therefore is not 
whether the liberalisation or the transformation model is better suited to promoting the 
network integration of DG, but rather whether and how the standard model can be 
adapted. The liberalisation model is used as a starting point for the following reasons: 
1) Liberalisation and the standard model of economic regulation is currently the domi-
nant regime with clearly spelt-out governance mechanisms for the electricity net-
work. It therefore provides a clear reference point for the analyses, both for the con-
ceptual part and the case studies. 
2) The transformation literature has delivered a number of governance proposals, but 
has not put forward a comprehensive alternative concept for the governance of elec-
tricity systems or networks. Rather, it can be regarded as an ‘add-on’, providing 
governance mechanisms to complement the standard model or shift the focus within 
the standard model. 
The transformation perspective is used as a basis for challenging the standard model. It 
helps to think ‘outside the box’ of the standard model and can provide ideas for the fur-
ther development of the standard model. 
In order to analyse the research question in this thesis, it will be broken down according 
to both different governance issues that need to be addressed and different governance 
levels where these issues can be addressed. This structure will be explained in the fol-
lowing two sections. 
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4.1.2 How the standard model of regulation is defined in this thesis 
The main object of the analysis carried out in this thesis is the standard model of regula-
tion that was introduced in chapter 3. The thesis asks how this governance model needs 
to evolve to accommodate DG. Before explaining in more detail the methodology ap-
plied to answer this question, a few words need to be said about the scope of the stan-
dard model under investigation, based on the overview of the standard model in chapter 
3. 
Chapter 3 has shown that price or revenue cap regulation to increase efficiency in the 
network is a core element of the standard model of regulation in liberalised electricity 
markets, both in terms of the theoretical foundations and in terms of practical imple-
mentation in the regulatory process (e.g. benchmarking procedures). Yet if in this thesis 
the standard model was limited from the outset to this narrow understanding in terms of 
objectives and instruments, this would imply that any governance mechanism to pro-
mote additional objectives like DG or network transformation would need to be located 
outside the standard model. Based on this definition, the thesis could still analyse any 
negative effects of the standard model on DG, but should not attempt to analyse how the 
standard model can be adapted to pursue DG objectives. However, the further analysis 
in this thesis is based on a broader understanding of the standard model beyond the nar-
row definition that was outlined in the previous paragraph. This comprises two dimen-
sions. 
First, in terms of economic incentive mechanisms, the broader definition of the standard 
model put forward by this thesis does not limit the incentive mechanisms to price- or 
revenue cap mechanisms to increase efficiency. Rather, based on the economic founda-
tions outlined in chapter 3 the standard model can also be understood more generally as 
a regulatory approach to deal with the principal-agent problem between the regulator 
and the regulated company, irrespective of the objectives that are to be pursued. The 
standard model offers a toolbox for the regulator to design incentive mechanisms. The 
objectives pursued with the help of these mechanisms can go beyond efficiency objec-
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tives and are not necessarily only based on price or revenue caps. Such mechanisms are 
still located within the standard model if they are drawn up by the regulator as one ele-
ment of regulating network tariffs. 
Second, there is more to the standard model than economic incentives to mimick the 
market mechanism. Rather, the standard model can also be understood as a broader 
governance arrangement that relies on incentives-based mechanisms, but also comprises 
other governance mechanisms (see for example the command-and-control mechanisms  
mentioned in section 3.2.2.2. It is based on ‘independent regulators’ that determine net-
work tariffs and other rules for the network operators. This understanding of the stan-
dard model does not only include meaning I in Figure 4 (‘economic regulation of mo-
nopolies’), but extends to meaning II (‘Regulation as a specific form of governance’).  
Based on this broad definition of the standard model, the following sections outline the 
further research process on how the standard model can evolve. The broad definition 
will be elaborated throughout the thesis. In section 5.2.2 the first dimension of the 
broader definition of the broad understanding is explained in more detail, which pro-
vides the basis for the detailed discussion of various incentive mechanisms in chapters 
5and 6. In chapter 7, the second dimension of the broad definition is analysed. 
4.1.3 Governance issues 
Chapter 3 has presented four stages of interaction between DG and network, which dif-
ferentiate between connection, integration, innovation and transformation (Table 3). 
This was mainly based on the technical discussions on DG integration. 
These different forms of interaction between DG and the network are likely to have dif-
ferent implications for the governance of the electricity network. Therefore, this table 
makes it possible to operationalise the overall research question in different steps. It will 
be used as a heuristic device to structure the analysis of the standard model of network 
regulation and its potential to integrate DG as a new objective. 
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This structure enables a differentiated view on the standard model as well as on the 
comparison between the liberalisation and transformation literatures in chapter 2. For 
example, it may well be that the standard model economic regulation may be suited to 
promote DG connection and integration, yet when it comes to innovation and system 
transformation additional mechanisms as proposed by the transformation literature may 
be required. 
4.1.4 Governance levels 
Having presented the connection-to-transformation framework as one dimension struc-
turing the analysis, the governance levels which this thesis seeks to address need to be 
clarified. The standard model of network regulation generally focuses on the relation-
ship between the regulator and the regulated, i.e. the distribution system operator in this 
case. 
However, when discussing DG integration, the relationship between the DSO and the 
DG plant operator are of similar relevance. The principal-agent framework that the 
standard model generally applies to the relationship between regulator and the DSO can 
be extended to include the relationship between the DSO and the DG operator, with the 
DSO as the principal and the DG operator as the agent (Jamasb et al. 2005: 6). In other 
words, what is relevant are both the regulatory incentives for the DSO towards DG, and 
the mechanisms to coordinate network and generation and the (short-and long-term) 
signals DG operators receive through the structure of network charges. 
Furthermore, the independent regulator that is a core element of the standard model is 
embedded in the broader institutional context of energy policy-making, so that the regu-
latory structure is two-tiered, including the regulator on the one hand and government, 
parliament, etc. on the other hand that draw up the energy policy framework within 
which the regulator operates and supervise the regulator. Again, this relationship is of-
ten portrayed in principal-agent terms (Laffont, Tirole 1993: 477; Majone 1997: 154). 
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Thus, four different levels and the relationships between them can be distinguished 
overall: 
1) General energy policy 
2) Economic network regulation through an independent regulator 
3) Distribution system operators 
4) DG plant operator 
On all of these levels, the connection-integration-innovation-transformation heuristic 
can be applied. 
This thesis focuses on the relationship between the regulator and distribution system 
operator. It also analyses the relationship between regulation and the wider institutional 
context and asks whether DG integration affects the policy-regulation relationship. The 
DSO-DG relationship will only be examined in as far as it is relevant to the other levels 
of interaction. More information on this aspect can be found for example in (Vogel 
2009; Brunekreeft, Ehlers 2006; Jamasb et al. 2005; Späth et al. 2006; Bauknecht, 
Brunekreeft 2008). 
4.1.5 Overview on research framework 
The following table summarises the different dimensions of the research question as 
explained above. The horizontal dimension shows the connection-integration-
innovation-transformation heuristic, the vertical dimension the different governance 
levels. The thesis analyses the first two levels highlighted in yellow. 
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Table 4:  Framework for analysis of the governance of network and DG  
 Connection Integration Innovation Transformation
Network   
regulation in the 
political context 
Is DG just an additional problem for 
efficiency-oriented economic regula-
tion (level playing field)? 
Or is regulation to support additional 
energy policy goals? 
What kind of 
innovations 
should regula-
tion promote? 
Transformation 
in which direc-
tion?  
Is transforma-
tion still a tech-
nical question 
that can be 
addressed by 
an independent 
regulator? 
Regulation –  
DSO 
Connection incen-
tives for DSOs 
Integration 
incentives for 
DSOs 
Innovation in-
centives for 
DSOs 
How to coordi-
nate different 
actors and in-
novation activi-
ties to achieve 
overall system 
transformation? 
DSO – DG Coordination 
mechanisms be-
tween DG invest-
ment decision and 
network require-
ments/development 
Coordination 
mechanisms 
between DG 
operation and 
network re-
quirements 
Coordination 
between DG 
and DSO inno-
vation 
 
 
Based on the horizontal and vertical dimensions discussed above as well as the broad 
definition of the standard model outlined in section 4.1.2, the overall research question 
can be specified as follows: 
The first step is to analyse (incentive) regulation mechanisms with regard to DG and 
mechanisms to promote DG connection in this framework. This is followed by an 
analysis of how the regulatory framework can facilitate DG integration. In chapter 5, 
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connection and integration will be analysed jointly, as both rely on the same mecha-
nisms within the incentive regulation framework.  
Taking into account the policy-regulation interface, the rationale of the regulator to in-
clude DG into its regulatory framework needs to be explored: Is DG included because it 
is a new market actor that needs to get access to the network or is it because DG is an 
energy policy objective? 
If DG capacity increases, the regulatory challenge is not merely to reduce connection 
barriers for DG and integrate DG into the existing network, but also to introduce inno-
vative network concepts. The impact of the standard model on innovation and the possi-
bility to incentivise DSO innovation through the regulatory framework are analysed in 
chapter 6. Again, the political dimension of innovation support needs to be taken into 
account. 
Chapter 7 asks whether the standard model of incentive regulation is sufficient when it 
comes to transforming the network and generation structure, rather than ‘simply’ maxi-
mising the efficiency of the existing system or introducing innovations in individual 
networks. 
Using the insights from chapters 5 and 6, this chapter also discusses the policy-
regulation interface and how it is affected by the different steps in the connection-
integration-innovation-transformation heuristic. 
It is important to note that this thesis is not so much about developing detailed guide-
lines or proposals for adapting the standard model. Rather, it explores the principle 
mechanisms for taking into account DG. It analyses the potential of the standard model 
for integrating DG as a new issue, as well as its limits. 
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4.2 Research design and method 
Following the presentation of the research question in the previous section, this section 
presents the research design and the methods of data collection and analysis. 
4.2.1 Overview 
The research question will be analysed from two angles: Firstly, part two of the thesis 
consists of a mainly theoretical analysis of the standard model of network regulation 
and its potential to accommodate DG as well as network innovation and transformation. 
Various approaches to amending the standard model of network regulation are dis-
cussed.  
Secondly, while the conceptual part analyses design options, part three contains two 
country case studies of the actual development of network regulation in the UK and 
Denmark, complementing the analysis in part two. The structure of both the chapters in 
part two as well as the case studies is based on the ‘connection, integration, innovation 
and transformation’ heuristic presented earlier.  
Combining the conceptual analysis in part two and the case studies in part three is a 
form of triangulation in a double sense: The research question is approached from two 
different perspectives and two different methods are used (Flick 2006: 108-109).  
Part two asks how the standard model could be adapted in principle and part three 
analysis two empirical cases to find out how the standard model is applied and adapted 
in practice. Part two provides a conceptual discussion mainly based on the economic 
literature on regulation as well as the system transformation literature, while part three 
applies a case study approach. 
The distinction between the analysis of the model and its implementation is relevant to 
answer the research question, because the standard model must prove its adaptability 
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both in conceptual terms as well as in concrete political contexts. Network regulation in 
practice is not simply a result of functional requirements, but develops in a political 
process. Adaptations of the standard model always need to fit into specific political con-
texts. As was pointed out in chapter 2, the development of the standard model is an on-
going process and a multi-country experiment. The case studies analyse how this ex-
periment deals with DG in two different countries and studies different patterns of the 
development of the standard model. 
At the same time, the conceptual part analyses the potential of the standard model, 
which may not be completely visible in the case studies due to the specific political con-
text and process, because design options have only partly been implemented in practice 
and because the case studies can only examine two cases. The conceptual part also pro-
vides an input for the case study analysis, as the case study findings can be compared 
against the design options discussed in the conceptual part. 
The following figure shows how part two and three relate to each other as well as to the 
research question. 
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Figure 7: Triangulation through conceptual analysis and case studies 
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Overall, the conceptual part and the case studies complement each other and their com-
bination renders their respective weakness less severe. The case study results them-
selves based on only two cases make it difficult to draw conclusions about the standard 
model or even the potential development of network regulation in other countries. Yet 
together with the conceptual part they can contribute to the evaluation of the standard 
model and its development. The conceptual part does not take into account ‘real-life’ 
settings. It is therefore useful to check its findings in the case studies. 
4.2.2 Conceptual part 
The conceptual part does not analyse the implementation and development of the stan-
dard model in the context of specific countries, but analyses the principle effects of the 
standard model and possible design options to adapt this model. This will be illustrated 
by country-specific examples where appropriate. 
The conceptual analysis is partly based on the economic literature on regulation, and 
partly on the insights found in the transformation literature. 
In the conceptual part, the following aspects will be analysed:  
1) how the standard model affects the new objectives (DG connection and integration, 
innovation and transformation), 
2) how the mechanisms provided by the standard model can be applied to pursue these 
new objectives, and 
3) what the limits of the standard model are. 
This is based on: 
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1) a review of the relevant literature, including academic literature, the results of na-
tional and international research projects on DG integration and various consultancy 
documents, and 
2) examples of relevant governance mechanisms implemented in different electricity 
systems. 
Based on these, this part of the thesis provides a discussion of the standard model and 
its development options. As previous studies have focused on technical issues or indi-
vidual aspects of governance mechanisms or have analysed the standard model with 
regard to more traditional questions like network investment, this study contributes a 
comprehensive analysis of the standard model’s potential to adapt to new issues and 
objectives.  
4.2.3 Case studies 
The second main part of this thesis is made up of two detailed case studies. The case 
studies analyse governance mechanisms on a country level because these mechanisms 
for the network are usually put in place for a country as a whole. In Denmark, it needs 
to be taken into account that there is a difference between the eastern and western part 
of the country, both in the development of DG penetration as well as the traditional 
structure of the electricity system. 
The case studies investigate what kind of governance mechanisms addressing connec-
tion, integration, innovation and transformation are emerging in the two countries. More 
specifically, the case studies analyse the extent to which DG integration and network 
transformation are being integrated into the standard model of network regulation, 
whether and how the regulatory framework evolves and the extent to which other gov-
ernance mechanisms can be observed that go beyond adaptations in incentive regula-
tion. This analysis is compared with the more conceptual analysis in part two.  
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As compared to the conceptual part, the case studies to some extent include a process 
perspective. This means that they do not just analyse a snap-shot of governance mecha-
nisms, but their development process, too. This is important for understanding the 
adaptability of the standard model and how it evolves. However, the case studies do not 
include a full-blown policy analysis that seeks to identify all the factors that have driven 
this development in the specific context of the case study, including the interests and 
influence of different actors and their interaction with the institutional context. 
Both case studies provide a qualitative analysis of governance mechanisms. The main 
period of study is between 2000, when DG started to become a network issue in both 
countries, until 2007.  
4.2.3.1 Selection of case studies 
The selection criteria for the case studies are based on the research question: “How can 
the standard model of network regulation adapt to enable an increasing share of DG?” 
Selection criteria are thus the share of DG and the role of standard model in the respec-
tive country. 
The case studies should exhibit a certain degree of similarity in that DG should be a 
relevant issue and the standard model should be implemented in both countries. How-
ever, there should also be differences, as the main reason for the case study approach is 
to find out how the standard model is adapted. Therefore, the reason for analysing two 
case studies is to generate a broader variety of insights into different governance pat-
terns in different implementation contexts of the standard model. Based on these crite-
ria, I have chosen to study Denmark and the UK.  
In terms of the first criteria (share of DG), DG has become an issue in both countries 
and the share of DG has been increasing, so the two countries neatly tally with the gen-
eral problem description in chapter 3. Despite the difficulties of comparing DG statistics 
mentioned in chapter 3, it can be argued that Denmark is well ahead of other industrial-
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ised countries in terms of its share of DG. This is confirmed by the data from WADE 
shown in Figure 8, the overview of different DG studies by Ackermann (2007) as well 
as the IEA country review on Denmark (IEA 2002b: 5, 99), according to which Den-
mark has the highest share both in wind and CHP. 
At the same time, Denmark has started to develop a new system architecture and can be 
regarded as a “laboratory for the future electricity grids in Europe” (Bach et al. 2003). 
Denmark, having a share of DG that is over 50%, is a pioneering country when it comes 
to implementing and testing new network concepts. 
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Figure 8:  Share of DG in electricity generation in 2005 
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The UK on the other hand has a relatively low share of DG, but has political objectives 
to increase its share, so that the standard model of network regulation has been con-
fronted with this new objective, yet in a different way than in Denmark. 
In terms of implementing the standard model, both countries have in principle put into 
practice the same standard model of network regulation. The UK has been a pioneer in 
developing governance mechanisms for liberalised electricity markets in general and in 
terms of network regulation in particular and has been said to represent the “gold stan-
dard of effective incentive or performance-based network regulation” (Joskow 2006b: 
17). 
In principle, Denmark has subscribed to the same standard model of liberalised electric-
ity markets and network regulation. However, while the standard model has to a large 
extent been developed in the UK, Denmark has adopted it from the outside and has 
adapted it to its own governance context. 
The case study selection can be summarised as follows: on the one hand the UK is ana-
lysed as the pioneer of the standard model, in which DG has become a relevant issue. 
Denmark, on the other hand, is analysed as the pioneer of DG development, which has 
adopted and adapted the standard model. Hence, in both countries the governance 
mechanisms which have developed to integrate DG based on the standard model can be 
analysed, albeit with different perspectives. 
4.2.3.2 Data collection 
The data collection was structured by the research framework presented in Table 4, 
which allows for data on different governance mechanisms to be categorised, either 
because these mechanisms have explicitly been put in place to achieve connection, inte-
gration, innovation or transformation, or because they aim at the technical challenges 
presented in Table 3 in chapter 3. 
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Using the standard model as a reference point has also facilitated the data collection 
process as any governance mechanisms could be contrasted with the governance ap-
proach proposed by the standard model. 
Besides data that describes these governance mechanisms, data was collected on the 
reasons for the development of these mechanisms in a process perspective as explained 
above, as well as data that allows evaluating these mechanisms. Regarding the latter 
aspect, the aim was not a comprehensive evaluation, but rather to find at least some in-
dications of their functioning in practice in order to complement the conceptual analy-
sis.  
The data is mainly qualitative since the main objective was to describe the governance 
mechanisms applied and their development process. In some cases, quantitative data 
was used to describe the governance mechanisms, especially because economic regula-
tion is to a certain extent about getting the numbers right, and evaluate their outcomes. 
The data collection for the case studies relies on different data sources (Yin 2003: 97-
101), partly because this was necessary to obtain a comprehensive picture and partly 
because different sources allow for cross-checking or data triangulation. Data sources 
consist mainly of written material, i.e. primary documents published in the regulatory or 
policy process (e.g. published by the regulator) as well as studies on different aspects of 
network regulation.  
This is complemented by semi-structured interviews with various stakeholders. Inter-
viewees were chosen based on their proximity to the governance process under exami-
nation as well as the need to cover a broad range of stakeholders and perspectives (regu-
lators, network and DG operators, industry associations, government departments, 
equipment manufacturers, research). A total of twenty-three semi-structured interviews 
were conducted. A list of interviewees can be found in the reference section.  
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It became clear at an early stage of the research process that Denmark has adopted the 
standard model, but when it comes to DG integration and transformation it heavily re-
lies on a number of governance mechanisms which lie outside of the standard model. In 
contrast, in the UK the standard model plays a key role also with regard to the new ob-
jectives. This difference between the two cases needs to be reflected in the research 
strategy and therefore also in the questionnaires for the two countries: The questionnaire 
for the UK interviewees places more emphasis on the development of the standard 
model whereas the Danish questionnaire gives more room to other governance mecha-
nisms while still including questions about the standard model (for the questionnaire see 
appendix). 
This difference between the two countries is also reflected in the availability of data. In 
the UK, the standard model and the regulator Ofgem represent a clear institutional focus 
of the regulatory process. The development and implementation of network regulation is 
relatively well documented and largely based on public stakeholder consultations that 
provide a rich source of material. In some cases, minutes or summaries of relevant 
meetings are available.  
In Denmark, it has been more difficult to access the relevant information, partly because 
governance structures are more dispersed and sometimes less explicit, partly because 
the Danish discourse seems to be more technically-oriented, and partly because of lan-
guage problems. Interviews have therefore been a more important data source for the 
Denmark case study.  
Having presented the research question and methodology based on the literature review 
in chapters 2 and 3 the following part two of the thesis goes on to present a conceptual 
analysis of the standard model. This will be complemented by the two country case 
studies in part III.  
  
 
Part II: 
Conceptual analysis 
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5 Network regulation and DG 
In chapter 3, the standard model of network regulation was presented as part of the lib-
eralised market model. How incentive regulation was designed to reduce the costs of 
electricity networks in order to support the efficiency objective of liberalisation was 
shown. In chapter 3, I have also discussed literature which argues that DG can increase 
the costs of the electricity network. Thus, DG clearly runs counter to the objective of 
reducing costs.  
This chapter deals with connection and integration of DG as shown in table (chapter 4). 
The chapter consists of three sections: The first section elaborates on the potential con-
flict between the incentives provided by the standard model on the one hand and the 
objective of connecting more DG on the other hand. The second section discusses the 
relationship between efficiency and the DG objective. It presents a differentiated view 
on the standard model in order to move beyond the incentive regulation vs. cost-plus 
regulation dichotomy. Finally, the third section presents design options for integrating 
the DG objective into the standard model framework. 
5.1 DSO incentives resulting from DG 
This section provides an overview of the mechanisms through which DSOs are affected 
by DG and how this translates into economic costs or benefits for the DSO under differ-
ent regulatory regimes. 
DG can have the following effects on the network and the network operator: 
 DG can cause additional costs, both operational and capital expenditure (Opex 
and Capex), 
 DG can reduce the volume of electricity sold over the network; and 
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 DG can entail network benefits, e.g. it can replace or defer network investments. 
This section provides a generic overview. Country-specific studies can be found in 
(Späth et al. 2006; Connor, Mitchell 2002; Frey et al. 2008; Skytte, Ropenus 2005). 
5.1.1 Additional network costs 
Additional costs do not hurt the DSO under a cost-plus approach, assuming that they are 
accepted by the regulator. However, the cost-cutting environment that is being estab-
lished in most liberalised markets through the standard model can be detrimental for 
DG. Under this type of regulation, the incentive for the DSO is to cut costs (see chapter 
3.2). As a result, the DSO under pure price-based regulation will want to avoid addi-
tional costs caused by DG.  
It is sometimes argued that price- and revenue-cap regulations have different effects 
with regard to DG and that “price cap regulation generally discourages distributed re-
sources. Revenue cap regulation does not” (Moskovitz 2000: 3). While this argument 
can be valid with regard to the volume reduction caused by DG (see 5.1.2), the argu-
ment that a revenue-cap (as opposed to a price-cap) allows the network company to in-
crease network tariffs if DG causes additional costs (Ackermann 2004: 285) does not 
hold. As revenues are capped, increased costs cannot be offset through higher revenues, 
at least not during one regulatory period. Consequently, both price- and revenue cap 
regulation tend to provide an incentive against DG.  
When analysing the costs of DG and the way in which they affect the DSO, it is impor-
tant to differentiate between different cost categories, namely between operational costs 
(Opex) and capital costs (Capex). Depending on the regulatory treatment of these cost 
categories, the DSO may benefit from shifting costs between them. This is likely to in-
fluence its attitude and strategy towards DG. Separate treatment of Opex and Capex 
tends to focus on incentivising operating cost efficiency, while Capex is often still sub-
Transforming the Grid Part II: Conceptual analysis  
 
-89- 
ject to cost-based regulation. The separate treatment of Opex and Capex is likely to 
promote network investment but also to distort overall cost optimisation. 
If the network is upgraded to accommodate additional DG, Capex will increase. Other 
approaches to network management (see chapter 3) can reduce the need for network 
upgrades and hence Capex, but can entail additional Opex, especially if the lower net-
work capacity needs to be managed actively. If Opex is subject to price-based regulation 
and Capex is not, the DSO is likely to be in favour of the more capital-intensive option, 
even though the overall costs can be higher. Price-based regulation with a focus on 
Opex reduction can thus have a similar effect on the DSO’s choice as rate-of-return 
regulation with its incentive against capital-saving investments. The separate treatment 
of Capex and Opex in the UK is a case in point (Mitchell, Connor 2002: 12). 
The following graph shows how the revenue- or price-cap develops in the standard 
model within one regulatory period for a DSO without DG and one with DG. The as-
sumption is that the regulator accepts the costs of DG in the company’s cost base, but 
does not take them into account when determining the company’s efficiency. DG costs 
are essentially treated as inefficient costs which are not necessary to run the network in 
order to supply electricity customers. The revenue path for the DSO with DG forces the 
company to reduce its costs to those of a network without DG within one regulatory 
period. The DSO with DG would be even worse off if the regulator did not even accept 
the DG costs in the cost base. In this case, its revenue path would match the one shown 
for the network without DG. 
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Figure 9: Development of the revenue if DG costs are not taken into account 
 
Source: Author’s own, first published in German in (Frey et al. 2008: 194)  
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5.1.2 Load reduction through DG 
Another concern for network operators with regard to DG is that it reduces the electric-
ity volume and/or the peak load on their network. Reducing the load on the network 
indeed runs counter to efforts to increase the load factor that has driven the development 
of the electricity system from the very beginning (Davies 1995; Hughes 1987). In those 
cases where DG reduces network utilisation, it can be seen as a new competitor to the 
network that can lead to stranded network assets.  
The incentive to maximise the load factor is further increased under incentive regulation 
because – as Newberry (2001: 51) has pointed out – it is a distinctive feature of this type 
of regulation “that the utility receives no return on unutilised capacity”. This is closely 
related to the objective of incentive regulation to reduce costs. A reduction of the num-
bers of kWh sold over the network has negative effects on the revenue of DSOs. As 
network costs are largely fixed costs, reducing the electricity volume distributed over 
the network does not entail a significant decrease in network costs. If DSOs cannot in-
crease the revenue per kWh, profits will be diminished accordingly.  
Exactly how the deployment of DG reduces the utilisation of the network depends on 
the specific case. For an analysis of generic cases see Ackermann (2004: 186-210). Es-
pecially if DG is installed on the customer-side of the meter and mainly provides on-site 
power production, DSO sales are adversely affected (RAP 2000). Developments that 
enable the deployment of micro-generation by small consumers or microgrids serving a 
specific area, and where the meter is situated between the utility network and the micro-
grid, could exacerbate this problem for the DSOs. In Germany, for example, there have 
been extensive discussions as to whether local networks have a right to be connected to 
the medium- rather than the low-voltage network (Mevert, Hobbeling 2004). This could 
increase the attractiveness of these local networks and reduce the revenue of the DSOs. 
While revenue- or price-cap approaches have the same effect with regard to additional 
costs of DG (see 5.1.1), the reduced utilisation of the network can have different reper-
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cussions under the two regimes. Under a price cap, the network operator is not allowed 
to offset a volume reduction that is due to DG with higher tariffs. In contrast to a price-
cap regime, this would in principle be possible under a revenue cap. This gives the 
company an additional degree of freedom besides cost reduction. However, the com-
pany may prefer in practice to meet the volume forecast that was made at the beginning 
of the regulatory period rather than to increase tariffs. Under a price cap, DSOs will 
therefore try to maximise sales,while under a revenue cap it will at least try to meet the 
volume forecast. 
5.1.3 Network benefits 
As compared to a rate-of-return regime, incentive regulation in principle increases the 
incentive for DSOs to utilise DG to reduce network costs since the DSO can keep part 
of the efficiency gains to itself. In practice, however, it may be difficult for the DSO to 
actually benefit from DG having a positive effect on the network. 
The first problem is that once DG has been connected it may be used to reduce network 
costs. Yet taking into account the connection costs DG will often still increase the over-
all costs, which is clearly a problem under price-based regulation (see figure in chapter 
3) 
For the DSO to be able to reap the associated benefits, it is important that DG is not 
only connected, but also integrated into network operation and operated in line with 
network requirements. While costs will be incurred simply by connecting DG, benefits 
will only become visible in many cases if the system adapts. Additional costs may thus 
be incurred upfront but cost savings only emerge much later and are uncertain (e.g. be-
cause this also depends on overall system development). This is particularly problematic 
because incentive regulation gives an incentive to reduce short-term costs at the expense 
of long-term benefits. 
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Integrating DG often also means that costs are reduced. Yet at the same time costs are 
shifted between cost categories or new types of costs become necessary, which may also 
be at odds with the regulatory process. For example, in Germany there have been prob-
lems with regard to the DSOs gaining the regulator’s acceptance for new DG-related 
costs (Frey et al. 2008) 
The regulatory problems with cost reductions through DG become particularly visible in 
cases where DG can replace network investments. It is often claimed (e.g. the studies 
mentioned in chapter 3 by A.D. Little (1999), Iannucci et al. (2003), Gumerman et al. 
(2003)) that one of the main advantages of DG is that it can replace or defer network 
investment that becomes necessary either because old network equipment needs to be 
replaced or because demand increases in a network area and can no longer be covered 
by the existing capacity. Instead of building additional network capacity, a DG plant 
could provide the generation capacity locally, provided that it meets certain reliability 
requirements. Article 14/7 of the 2003 EU Electricity Directive (Directive 2003/54/EC) 
requires DSOs to consider DG as an alternative to network expansion. 
Although this is clearly a potential network-related benefit of DG, the DSO may be op-
posed to it. Under pure cost-based regulation, it is clear that the DSO has no incentives 
to reduce costs. If it can earn a fixed rate-of-return on its network assets, the DSO would 
not want to replace its own network assets with other companies’ assets. 
With incentive regulation a DSO can stand to benefit from reducing costs by deferring 
or replacing network investments. Yet even with this regime replacing the network with 
DG also means replacing the DSO’s business with the generator’s business, introducing 
a form of competition to the network. For the DSO, this will be particularly problematic 
if the DSO is unbundled from other functions and can therefore not invest in DG itself 
and has to leave this up to third-party generators (Brunekreeft, Ehlers 2006). 
As increasing DG to replace network assets would reduce Capex but increase Opex 
costs, the incentives of the DSO also depend on whether these cost categories are 
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treated in a way that allows for overall optimisation. If Capex regulation is still cost-
based, there would be a disincentive to shift costs from a cost-based into a price-based 
regime. 
Furthermore, on top of shifting costs from Capex to Opex a network solution can lead to 
new costs and risks that may not be taken into account by the regulator. For example the 
DSO may have to remunerate the DG operator for adapting plant operation to network 
requirements. Relying on third parties and assets that typically have a lower lifetime 
than network assets also increases the risk for DSOs. These new costs also need to be 
reflected as an additional cost in the regulatory process. 
5.1.4 Summary 
Table 5 summarises the effects of DG on the DSO under different regulatory regimes. 
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Table 5: The effect of DG on the DSO under different regulatory regimes 
Mechanism to determine the level of network tariffs  
Potential network 
effect of DG 
Cost-based regu-
lation 
Price-based regu-
lation (Price-cap) 
Price-based regulation 
(Revenue-cap) 
If DG causes addi-
tional costs 
(Capex/Opex) 
No incentives 
against costs of 
DG. 
In principle incen-
tive to increase 
capital base 
through DG. 
Higher costs lead to lower profits/losses during 
the regulatory period. 
->Incentive against DG 
If only Opex is benchmarked, incentive to shift 
Opex to Capex (e.g. expand network instead of 
using DG to improve network operation). 
If the load on net-
work is reduced 
through DG 
Lower volume can 
be offset with higher 
tariffs to meet profit 
target. 
Lower volume 
leads to lower 
revenue 
->incentive against 
DG 
DSO may be able to offset 
volume reduction through a 
price increase. 
No incentive to 
reduce costs 
through DG. 
DSO can benefit from reduced costs through DG.  
Long-term benefits may entail short-term costs. 
Incentive regulation can give an incentive to re-
duce short-term costs at the expense of long-term 
benefits. 
If DG causes net-
work benefits 
If DG replaces 
network invest-
ments 
Against DSO’s in-
centive to maximise 
rate-base. 
Reducing or deferring costs can be attractive, but 
DSO may not like to shift costs from Capex to 
Opex. New costs and risks may not be taken into 
account by the regulator. 
Source: Adapted from (Bauknecht, Brunekreeft 2008) 
Overall, it can be stated that there is a mismatch between the incentives to reduce costs 
provided by the standard model on the one hand and the additional costs of DG and the 
stranded network assets DG can entail on the other hand. In those cases where DG bene-
fits could be used by the DSO to reduce costs and thus meet the objective of the stan-
dard model, this may not be facilitated by the regulatory process. 
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5.2 Integrating new objectives and incentives into the standard model 
The previous section has shown how the objective of the standard model to increase the 
efficiency of networks can run counter to the objective of integrating DG. Before dis-
cussing various options for designing DG incentives within incentive regulation, more 
detail needs to be given on why the regulator should deal with DG as well as on the re-
lationship between the efficiency objective and the DG objective. Also, a more differen-
tiated view on the cost-based vs. incentive regulation paradigm is needed. This shows 
that the main question is not to choose between the two, but within these paradigms 
there is room for designing specific incentives. 
5.2.1 Regulatory objectives beyond efficiency 
5.2.1.1 Rationale for considering DG within network regulation 
The DSOs’ incentives against DG that result from incentive regulation will be a signifi-
cant barrier for DG. Assuming that DSOs are profit-maximising companies, this re-
mains the case even if the DSOs have a statutory obligation to connect DG. The fact 
that obligations are generally not sufficient for implementing regulatory objectives was 
the very reason for introducing incentive regulation in the first place (Weisman, 
Pfeifenberger 2003). 
But why should the regulator consider DG as an issue, given that its objective is to in-
crease the efficiency of the network? There are two options: Firstly, DG can increase 
overall efficiency despite higher short-term costs in the network. In this case, DG is 
used as a means to support the efficiency objective. Secondly, DG is introduced as an 
additional objective, alongside the efficiency objective. 
In terms of the first option, DG may be able to support the efficiency objective despite 
higher short-term costs in the network for two reasons: Firstly, within the network, it 
could be argued that DG leads to higher network costs in the short term, but can poten-
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tially reduce network costs in the long term, thereby contributing to the efficiency ob-
jective in the network. However, this is rather uncertain and requires the regulator to 
deal with the trade-off between short-term and long-term costs. Moreover, it is scarcely 
possible to analyse the resulting long-term network costs on a case-by-case basis for 
individual DG connections; rather, an assessment of the benefits of a new, more decen-
tralised electricity system compared to the traditional centralised one would be required. 
This would go beyond the objective to increase efficiency and beyond the remit of an 
economic regulator to evaluate and promote decisions by individual network operators. 
Therefore a political decision on the future network infrastructure is required. For these 
reasons, as well as the political expectation that there is a short-term potential for cost 
reductions resulting from the monopolistic era, this trade-off between short- and long-
term costs will eventually become a political decision. 
Secondly, higher costs in the network may be outweighed by more competition in the 
generation market, with lower overall cost. The rationale for the regulator to consider 
DG can in principle be derived from the objective to provide the network as a level 
playing field for different market players in the competitive part of the market, includ-
ing DG. Introducing a regulatory framework that provides incentives against DG is not 
in line with the requirement of providing non-discriminatory access. If this rationale is 
applied, higher costs in the network would essentially be justified by lower generation 
costs due to stronger competition.  
This means that the level playing field approach would be broadened so that it is no 
longer restricted to providing access to the existing network, but also includes access for 
technologies that require a different network, at least as long as this increases overall 
system efficiency. Again, the net benefits of DG are rather uncertain. Moreover, this 
approach requires the regulator to deal with the trade-off between the benefits of com-
petition in the national market and additional costs in individual networks. 
As for the second option, if DG is introduced as an additional objective, this would go 
beyond the remit of the regulator in the standard model and could only be based on a 
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political decision. As discussed in chapter 3, a main driver for DG in practice has been 
political objectives rather than economic benefits. It can be argued that it would be 
counterproductive to provide political support for these technologies on the one hand 
and incentivise network operators against DG on the other hand. Integrating DG into the 
standard model thus becomes a matter of policy integration.  
However, this should not be confused with setting up a support scheme for DG within 
network regulation. With this approach, support for DG technologies as such would still 
be located outside network regulation. Yet network regulation would ensure that the 
network can accommodate these plants and enable network connection and integration 
of DG, rather than providing incentives against DG within the standard model.  
In summary, DG can in principle be taken up by the regulator as part of its efficiency 
objective even if it increases network costs. However, if DG is only seen as a way to 
support the efficiency objective and the level-playing field approach, regulation of DG 
costs would only take into account DG plants that contribute to this objective. All other 
plants would not be considered. Moreover, it is difficult in practice for regulators to deal 
with the cost trade-offs this involves. Therefore, regulators will most likely require po-
litical backing even though this approach in principle remains within the remit of the 
regulator. Irrespective of the cost savings that can be achieved through DG, DG regula-
tion requires the introduction of DG as an additional regulatory objective. In this case, 
DG is no longer treated within the ‘apolitical’ efficiency framework of the standard 
model; rather a political mandate is needed for the regulator to design DG-specific in-
struments and deal with the economic constraints of DG deployment. 
5.2.1.2 The relationship between the efficiency and the DG objective 
How does such an additional DG objective relate to the original efficiency objective? Is 
the DG objective, which will lead to higher network costs in many cases at least in the 
short term, contradictory to the efficiency objective? Importantly, incentive regulation 
was introduced to increase network efficiency, but efficiency is not an end in itself. 
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Rather, the objective was to increase the efficiency of supplying electricity consumers 
via the network. If efficiency or cost reduction becomes an end in itself, this can under-
mine the supply objective and threaten the quality of electricity supply. This has led to 
the debate on quality regulation that needs to complement incentive regulation (Ajodhia, 
Hakvoort 2005). At the same time, increasing the share of DG and adapting the network 
accordingly should not lead to a waste of resources, either. Therefore, the efficiency 
objective should apply to DG, too. 
The tension outlined in section 5.1 does not occur between the efficiency and the DG 
objective, but between supplying electricity via the network in an efficient way and in-
creasing the share of DG in an efficient way. Both objectives are to be reached via the 
same network, but for different target groups. Increasing the efficiency of electricity 
supply via the network is an objective that is internal to the network and its customers 
whereas increasing the share of DG for political reasons (or to promote competition) is 
external to the individual distribution network. If more DG in one distribution network 
contributes to meeting political objectives, society as a whole would benefit. Yet from a 
supply perspective in the individual network, the costs will appear as inefficient, even if 
DG is connected in an efficient way. 
While this general mismatch between internal and external objectives cannot be over-
come within the regulation of individual network companies, what regulation can do is 
to remove the disincentives for the DSO to help reach the external objectives. However, 
within the framework of economic regulation, this means shifting the costs to the cus-
tomers of this individual network company.  
The following sections on the design of DG mechanisms are mainly based on the as-
sumption that DG is introduced as an additional objective. 
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5.2.1.3 Principles for the design of DG mechanisms 
Having analysed the general relationship between the DG and the efficiency objective, 
this section puts forward a number of principles on which the design of regulatory in-
struments should be based. 
Section 5.1 presented three different effects of DG on the DSO. The discussion on de-
signing DG incentives in section 5.3 will focus on how additional costs of DG (see 
5.1.1) that are likely to prevail in the short term can be dealt with in the regulatory 
framework. As for the other aspects, the volume reduction (section 5.1.2) is considered 
less of a problem, at least as long as most DG plants are connected directly to the DSO’s 
network. I have already pointed out that a revenue cap is in principle superior to a price 
cap for dealing with this issue. Other options discussed in the literature are compensa-
tion for volume reductions through, for example, regulatory accounts or multiple-driver 
cap schemes (Bundesnetzagentur 2006; Thomas 2001; Takahashi et al. 2005). In the 
case of network benefits of DG (section 5.1.3), the regulatory process needs to take into 
account additional cost categories that enable net benefits, e.g. remunerations for DG 
because the plants are operated in line with network requirements. 
Assuming that a network operator with a higher share of DG connected to its system has 
to bear higher short- or mid-term costs, the question arises as to how these additional 
costs can be taken into account. Combining the DG and efficiency objective, the follow-
ing principles should apply: 
 The DSO should not be penalised if there is a lot of DG connected to the net-
work, leading to higher network costs. For example, the high network costs may 
be due to a lot of primary energy potential for renewables in this network area. 
Otherwise, DSOs will be opposed to DG. DG-related costs should therefore ex-
plicitly be recognised in the regulation of allowed network tariffs/revenues. As 
explained in the previous section, this entails an increase of network tariffs for 
the customers in the respective network area. 
Transforming the Grid Part II: Conceptual analysis  
 
-101- 
 The DSO should connect a given amount of DG as efficiently as possible. While 
the number and type of DG connections in a network area are exogenous to the 
DSO, the DSO does have an influence on the costs of individual connections and 
reinforcements of the network that become necessary due to DG. DG integration 
can further reduce network costs. 
Given these objectives, it is clear that DG-related network costs should be included in 
the calculation of allowed revenues or tariffs, but a DSO should not simply be reim-
bursed for all the costs which it declares. A balance must be struck between the connec-
tion incentive and the efficiency incentive. Before discussing mechanisms to achieve 
this in section 5.3, the following section provides a basis to this end by putting forward 
a differentiated view of the dichotomy between cost-based vs. incentive regulation.  
5.2.2 A differentiated view of the cost-based vs. incentive regulation paradigm 
The standard model I have presented in chapter 3 is often called ‘incentive regulation’ 
and contrasted with previous models like cost-plus or rate-of-return regulation. A few 
points need to be made about this distinction that I consider particularly important for 
the further analysis of the potential to integrate DG into the standard model.  
This relates to the broader definition of the standard model that was introduced in sec-
tion 4.1.2 as part of the research framework. While the implementation of the standard 
model in liberalised electricity markets is typically equated with the introduction of 
price- or revenue cap-mechanisms to increase efficiency, the standard model can also be 
understood as a framework for designing incentive mechanisms, irrespective of the ob-
jectives. 
First of all, although the new regulatory paradigm is called “incentive regulation”, it is 
important to note that every regulatory approach creates certain incentives for the regu-
lated company. Indeed, even without regulation, the company would have certain incen-
tives, e.g. to set tariffs so as to maximise its profit. The most well-known unintended 
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incentive resulting from rate-of-return regulation is the so-called Averch-Johnson effect 
whereby companies have an incentive to overspend on capital (Averch, Johnson 1962). 
Similarly, an incentive regulation framework that does not take into account DG is not 
neutral towards DG, but rather incentivises the DSO to avoid DG as discussed in section 
5.1. 
Secondly, although every regulatory framework leads to specific incentives, there is 
nevertheless a good reason for why “incentive regulation” is an appropriate term for the 
standard model. As opposed to previous approaches, the standard model was deliber-
ately designed to give the network operators specific incentives, namely the incentive to 
become more efficient. More generally, based on new regulatory economics (see chap-
ter 3), the standard model provides a framework within which specific incentives can be 
explicitly designed. Yet the approach also recognises that the ultimate incentive of the 
regulated companies is to increase their profit and acknowledges the shortcomings of a 
simple command-and-control approach which neglects the companies’ self-interest. The 
regulator can thus only set incentives and try to make use of the companies’ profit in-
centive. 
Thirdly, incentive regulation as applied in the standard model is in essence a price-based 
approach while prior to liberalisation cost-based approaches were more prominent. 
Cost-based approaches determine network tariffs on the basis of each company’s indi-
vidual costs and are mainly concerned with avoiding monopoly rents. In contrast, price-
based regulation decouples prices from costs and sets the tariffs for all companies irre-
spective of individual costs. This is the mechanism that is to mimic the competitive 
market and give companies an efficiency incentive.  
Fourthly, price-based regulation and cost-based regulation represent two theoretical 
polar cases that tend to be mixed both within the standard model and its predecessors. 
Although the standard model does represent a new regulatory paradigm, incentive regu-
lation in practice has significant overlap with cost-based approaches (Joskow 2006a). 
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Incentive regulation does shift the emphasis towards price-based mechanisms, but there 
are still cost-based elements. While it was one of the core ideas of price and revenue 
cap-regulation to decouple prices from costs, this is only carried out for one regulatory 
period. At the beginning of each regulatory period, the cap is adjusted to a company’s 
new cost level which was achieved at the end of the previous period. Also, even under 
predominantly price-based regimes, certain costs can be passed-through to customers on 
a cost basis. For example, as (Joskow 2006a: 21) has pointed out that “although it is not 
discussed too much in the empirical literature, the development of the parameters of 
price cap mechanisms using statistical benchmarking methods have typically focused 
primarily on operating costs only, with capital cost allowances established through 
more traditional utility planning and cost-of-service regulatory accounting methods 
including the specification of a rate base”. There are also profit-sharing rules, establish-
ing a band of maximum and minimum profits, so that pre-determined tariffs can be ad-
justed if profits become either too large or too small. All this can add a cost-based ele-
ment to ‘incentive regulation’. 
Similarly, approaches like rate-of-return regulation which are primarily cost-based can 
include price-based elements. Under incentive regulation, there is a regulatory period 
that is fixed ex-ante; cost-based approaches also tend to be characterised by a regulatory 
lag between rate cases. This is usually shorter than the regulatory period and rate cases 
will eventually be triggered by cost changes. Nevertheless, during a regulatory lag 
prices can deviate from the fair rate-of-return determined by the regulator. Also, even 
under the previous cost-based regime, regulators did not normally accept all costs, but 
adopted mechanisms like use-and-useful clauses, stipulating that the costs of an invest-
ment can be passed through to network tariffs only if the investment is used and is use-
ful (for the U.S. see Joskow 1989: 161). In order to decide whether or not to accept cer-
tain costs, the regulator will typically look at other companies, with the result that the 
pure cost-based approach is complemented by some form of benchmarking which is 
typical for price-based regulation. 
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Fifthly, and summarising the previous points, incentive regulation can have a broader 
meaning and is not just about replacing cost-based regulation with price-based regula-
tion to increase efficiency. Rather, it refers to a regulatory framework where incentives 
for the regulated company are explicitly designed to pursue specific objectives. These 
objectives can be broader than just efficiency and the menu of regulatory options be-
comes broader, too. Generally speaking, the incentive resulting from cost- and price-
based elements can be explicitly combined to create an appropriate incentive structure. 
This means that incentive regulation in this sense contains cost-based elements not just 
because the shift to price-based regulation has not yet been completed or because cost-
based mechanisms have crept in during the practical implementation of incentive regu-
lation. Rather, the incentives properties of cost-based elements can deliberately be used 
to pursue certain objectives. For example, with this understanding of incentive regula-
tion cost-based regulation would be deliberately applied to capital expenditures (see 
quote from Joskow above) to give companies an incentive to invest – rather than just 
being a relict that the regulator has not yet got around to replacing with price-based 
regulation. 
The following figure illustrates the above analysis. The horizontal dimension shows 
price-based and cost-based regulation as two distinct regulatory mechanisms, opening 
up the space of potential regulatory regimes. Incentive regulation as applied in the stan-
dard model and cost-plus regulation are shown as two distinct regulatory paradigms. 
However, comparing them in terms of price- and cost-based regulation, they appear less 
distinct, but with significant overlap. Finally, “incentive regulation in a broader sense” 
uses the whole range of both cost- and price-based mechanisms to design incentives to 
pursue its objectives. 
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Figure 10: Incentive regulation vs. cost-plus regulation 
Cost-based regulation Price-based regulation
Cost-plus regulation paradigm
Incentive regulation paradigm
Incentive regulation in a broader sense
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In summary, the standard model was initially designed to promote efficiency in the ex-
isting network (narrow understanding of the standard model). Yet it also provides a 
framework to explicitly design incentives for network companies to pursue certain ob-
jectives set by the regulator or the policy process – not just incentives for efficiency 
(broader understanding of the standard model). Incentives can be designed using a mix 
of cost- and price-based elements. 
This differentiated view of incentive regulation is helpful for the following discussion 
on the concrete design of regulatory schemes to promote the objectives discussed in the 
previous section. 
5.3 Designing DG incentives for DSOs 
Having presented the main problems with regard to DG connections to the network un-
der different regulatory regimes as well as general regulatory objectives, this section 
presents possible solutions for giving DSOs incentives to connect DG as efficiently as 
possible. The section builds on the distinction between cost- and price-based approaches 
as well as the regulatory objectives presented in the previous section. 
5.3.1 Cost-based approaches 
A well-known mechanism within incentive regulation is the so-called z-factor (for a 
brief overview see RAP 2000; for a practical example taken from the US see Jamasb, 
Pollitt 2000). The z-factor is an adjustment factor outside the incentive regulation 
mechanism used to deal with extra costs beyond the control of the DSO, such as costs 
resulting from changes in laws, taxes or extreme weather conditions. It is essentially a 
cost-based mechanism that can be used to exempt certain costs from price-based regula-
tion within the standard model. The rationale for this approach is that the efficiency 
incentive of price-based regulation should not be applied to costs that cannot be con-
trolled by the DSO and where the DSO cannot therefore increase efficiency. The z-
Transforming the Grid Part II: Conceptual analysis  
 
-107- 
factor can also be regarded as a mechanism for allocating risk between DSOs and net-
work customers. If a 100% z-factor is applied, risk is fully passed to customers.  
The z-factor can also be applied to the costs of DG in order to address the problems of 
additional costs of DG described in section 5.1.1. With a z-factor, the regulator not only 
accepts the costs in the DSOs’ cost base as shown in Figure 9, but also introduces a 
separate mechanism for these costs. Under a full cost pass-through mechanism, the 
revenue cap of DSOs is directly linked to the costs incurred as a result of DG. 
There is a difference between applying a z-factor to, for example, tax changes on the 
one hand and DG on the other hand. In the case of tax changes the DSO cannot possibly 
increase the efficiency of these costs and it would therefore be unfair to impose an effi-
ciency objective on the DSOs for them. In the case of DG, the introduction of a z-factor 
is based on the analysis in section 5.1.1: Incentive regulation without any allowances for 
DG provides a disincentive against DG. While in the case of tax changes the z-factor is 
indeed about exempting costs from incentive regulation, the z-factor in the case of DG 
aims at changing the incentives for DSOs. This refers to the broader meaning of incen-
tive regulation discussed in section 5.2.2. 
If a z-factor is applied, the assumption is that DSOs cannot influence DG connection 
costs. This is only partly true. On the one hand, DG costs may differ between DSOs 
because the volume of DG differs. It will also be easier for some DSOs to connect DG 
plants than for others – for example, because the DG potential in a network area is more 
in line with the existing network structure. Both aspects cannot be controlled by the 
DSO and therefore justify a z-factor. However, on the other hand, the DSO can influ-
ence how efficiently a given DG potential is connected to the network and whether in-
telligent solutions like active management are chosen when it is more cost-effective. A 
full cost pass-through does not incentivise the DSOs to look for more efficient connec-
tion options or to integrate DG into network operation, as described in chapter 3. 
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If DSOs can simply pass through any DG-related costs they incur, they do not carry any 
risk, either upside or downside. Therefore, they would lack the incentive for efficient 
DG connections. With a cost-based approach DSOs may no longer resist DG, but they 
would not actively promote DG either. In terms of network connection and integration, 
DSOs may willingly connect DG, but are unlikely to make any effort regarding the in-
tegration of DG to reduce the network costs of DG or regarding its use as a solution to 
network problems (see Figure 3). 
Moreover, the DSOs will be tempted to game. They will try and label costs that do not 
involve DG as DG-related costs and shift costs from the general price-based mechanism 
to the separate DG regime. Therefore, a full cost-pass through would not be appropriate. 
The following graph compares the development of the price- or revenue cap for three 
different scenarios: first, a DSO without DG or where the regulator does not even accept 
the costs of DG in the cost base and thus the revenue cap; second, a regulatory regime 
where the regulator accepts the costs of DG but treats them as inefficient (see section 
5.1.1); and finally the situation discussed in this section whereby DG costs are subject to 
a cost-based regime and the cap is increased accordingly. 
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Figure 11: Revenue- or price-cap with cost-based regulation 
 
Source: Author’s own, first published in German in (Frey et al. 2008: 200)  
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5.3.2 Price-based approaches 
In contrast to cost-based approaches, price-based approaches are not based on the actual 
costs that a network operator incurs when connecting DG. Rather, the regulator deter-
mines a fixed price or revenue for connecting DG to the network. This is not specific to 
individual companies, but the maximum which all companies can charge their custom-
ers. 
In line with the general principles of incentive regulation the DSO carries the risk of 
exceeding or outperforming the cap, as it is exposed to the difference between the cap 
and its actual costs. The more the costs of a DG connection remain below the general 
cap, the higher will be the additional profit of the DSO. Above the cap, the DSO would 
lose money from connecting DG. While a cost-based approach only neutralises incen-
tives against DG, the DSO can make a business out of DG on the basis of price-based 
approaches if the company manages to outperform the cap. At the same time, there is 
still an incentive against DG with network costs above the cap. 
If a price-based mechanism is applied, the DSO is incentivised to reduce connection 
costs below the cap. This can be done by: 
 improving the efficiency of connecting a DG plant to achieve connection costs 
below the cap.  
 integrating DG into network operation to reduce the overall network effects of a 
DG project or even generate network benefits. 
 ‘cherry-picking’, i.e. preventing DG projects that entail network costs above the 
cap. 
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The first two incentives are clearly positive while the third one biases the DSO against 
projects with high network costs, even though these may be viable from an overall eco-
nomic point of view or may be needed to meet political targets. 
Note that the positive incentive resulting from price-based approaches also establishes 
DG integration as an attractive option for the DSO. DG integration can enable addi-
tional efficiency gains and price-based approaches allow the DSO to benefit from these. 
This refers to the argument that neutralising incentives against DG is not sufficient and 
DSOs should have an opportunity to earn an extra profit from DG connections. For ex-
ample, Edison Electric Institute and NERA (2006) have argued that “utility involvement 
in distributed resources cannot be optimized or maximized merely by the removal of 
disincentives or barriers. This removal is a necessary step, but it is not sufficient. To 
elicit the commitment of time, energy, and creativity needed to fully exploit the potential 
for efficient distributed resource development, utilities must be allowed to make a busi-
ness out of DR”. It can be argued that positive incentives are necessary to overcome 
organisational path dependencies of DSOs and help them evolve from organisations 
whose planning routines and know-how are geared towards running the passive end of 
central systems to “active DSOs” that facilitate optimal network development, taking 
into account distributed resources. 
With price-based mechanisms DSOs can make a business out of DG. However, such a 
mechanism should not be confused with simply providing additional funding for DSOs 
that connect DG. Rather, price-based mechanisms do allow the DSO to benefit from 
efficient connections and DG integration that reduce their network costs. Thus, it is in 
line with the general mechanism of incentive regulation where companies are rewarded 
for achieving objectives in an efficient way, reflecting the information asymmetry be-
tween the DSO and the regulator (see chapter 3). Nevertheless, the potential benefits for 
DSOs can help stimulate their commitment and promote the transformation of the or-
ganisational set-up of DSOs. 
Transforming the Grid Part II: Conceptual analysis  
 
-112- 
With a cost-based approach the main task for the regulator is to come up with an appro-
priate representation of the DSO’s costs. A price-based approach has the advantage that 
the regulator does not need to determine the costs of each individual company. In a 
price-based regime, the regulator needs to take a stance on the efficient costs of con-
necting DG in order to determine an appropriate cap. This means that two decisions 
need to be taken.  
Firstly, a price-based approach requires pre-defined network parameters on the basis of 
which the overall price- or revenue-cap is adjusted to take into account DG. A parame-
ter that suggests itself in this context is the DG capacity connected to the network. A 
more sophisticated set of parameters could also, for example, account for the type or 
size of DG or their generation output, but this would require further analysis. Further 
elaborating and differentiating the cost drivers would move the price-based approach 
closer to cost-based regulation. It could help to reduce the risk for DSOs and reduce a 
preference for low-cost DG (‘cherry-picking’), but would also render the regulatory 
process more complicated. 
Secondly, given these parameters it needs to be decided what the cost target should be 
which the DSOs have to meet. For example, the cap could be calibrated to reflect the 
average incremental costs of connecting DG. 
On the one hand, the cap should not be set too low to allow the DSOs to recover their 
costs and at the same time provide an efficiency incentive. The higher the cap, the more 
attractive DG becomes for DSOs. On the other hand, the cap should not be set too high, 
either, as this would lead to excessive rents for the companies at the expense of network 
customers.  
A related question is how a general cap can account for genuine cost differences be-
tween companies. A low cap would exacerbate the cherry-picking problem described 
above and would frustrate a large share of DG projects. If the cap is set at the upper end 
of the efficient cost range so as to ensure that all efficient costs are recovered, this could 
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mitigate the cherry-picking problem and would allow companies with high cost DG to 
connect these plants, but would also lead to high rents for DSOs with DG at lower costs. 
The regulator faces the problem that it wants to introduce a price cap to counter the in-
formation asymmetry between itself and the regulated companies. Yet if the efficient 
costs vary widely between companies a generic price cap across all companies leads to 
the above-mentioned distortions. 
Two different price-based approaches can be distinguished: setting up a standardised 
revenue driver and including DG in the general benchmarking of DSOs. 
5.3.2.1 Standardised revenue driver 
The allowed price or revenue can be directly linked to a set of DG-related parameters as 
mentioned above. In other words, the regulator determines standardised costs across all 
network operators that result from a certain DG structure defined by these parameters. 
For example, if the DG capacity connected to the network is used as a parameter, the 
allowed revenue or price directly increases depending on the amount of kW connected. 
Both steps – the definition of parameters and appropriate costs – are taken out of the 
normal regulatory process and need to be completed before the start of the regulatory 
process to determine the cap for each company. This can be seen as an advantage of this 
approach because the price cap for the DG objective is established separately from the 
price cap for the supply objective. It thus becomes more transparent for the DSO in 
terms of what is regarded as an efficient DG connection, rather than mixing the effi-
ciency of the DG objective with the supply efficiency. This transparency should have a 
positive effect on the incentives for the DSOs. 
In order to establish an appropriate level for the cap, the regulator could use a bench-
marking process. A revenue driver approach was adopted as part of the UK DG hybrid 
incentive (see UK case study in chapter 8). 
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5.3.2.2 Including DG in the comparative efficiency analysis 
As an alternative to a standardised revenue driver the DG costs could also be included 
in the general comparative efficiency analysis or benchmarking. While the standardised 
revenue driver approach requires the efficient costs to be determined ex-ante, i.e. before 
the regulatory process starts, the benchmarking approach would determine the efficient 
costs of DG in combination with the efficient costs of providing the network in general.  
If the costs of DG are included in the benchmarking, the DG-related cost drivers need to 
be included, too. Otherwise the DG costs appear as inefficient, as discussed before. If 
both costs and cost drivers are accounted for in the benchmarking process, a DSO with 
additional costs due to DG is not automatically penalised because of these additional 
costs, but rather only if the DG-related costs themselves are inefficient.  
Integrating DG as an additional cost driver into the general benchmarking procedure 
carries the risk that the number of parameters used as cost drivers to calculate a com-
pany’s efficiency becomes too large. As a consequence, the benchmarking procedure 
may become too complex and intransparent, without increasing its accuracy (Jamasb, 
Pollitt 2008b: 1792).  
Little practical experience has been gathered to date in terms of the inclusion of DG in 
benchmarking procedures. In Germany, the ordinance which lays down the detailed 
incentive regulation rules (“Anreizregulierungsverordnung”) stipulates that the DG ca-
pacity can be taken into account by the regulator as an optional benchmarking parame-
ter, which the regulator decided to do. Some network operators have argued that a 
broader set of parameters would be needed to capture the costs of DG. As it would be 
difficult to further increase the number of parameters used in the efficiency analysis, 
one option would be to combine different cost drivers in one parameter for the effi-
ciency analysis, although a method for aggregating cost drivers would still need to be 
developed (Frey et al. 2008: 230). 
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Overall, designing an appropriate set of parameters to take into account the costs of DG 
is more straightforward and the results are easier to comprehend in the revenue driver 
approach. A further difference between the two approaches is that the revenue driver 
approach is completely price-based, i.e. the price cap is imposed from the very begin-
ning of the regulatory period. In contrast, under a benchmarking regime the DSO typi-
cally has some time to reduce its costs to the efficient cost level, e.g. over one regula-
tory period. The revenue driver approach therefore involves a higher risk for the DSO. 
5.3.3 Hybrid mechanisms 
5.3.3.1 Combining cost-based and price-based elements 
The previous sections presented cost- and price-based mechanisms to include the costs 
of DG in the standard model. The main difference between the two approaches is the 
distribution of the cost risk of DG connections between the DSO and its customers. 
While a cost-based approach shifts the entire risk to the customers, price-based ap-
proaches leave it with the DSO. Both approaches exhibit shortcomings: The cost-based 
approach assumes that the costs of DG connections are completely exogenous to the 
DSO, which is not the case, as discussed in chapter 3. The price-based approach as-
sumes that the DSO has total control over the DG-related costs in its network. However, 
this is also not the case because the type of DG that wants to connect to the network and 
the network impacts are likely to vary widely between network operators, leading to 
broad range of costs (Frontier Economics 2003; for on overview on relevant references 
see Bauknecht, Brunekreeft 2008). 
This cost diversity makes it difficult to standardise the DG-related costs in a price-based 
approach. A cost-based approach removes the cost risk for the DSO, but also any effi-
ciency incentive. A price-based approach can turn DG into a business opportunity for 
the DSO, but makes it also riskier, especially if the cost diversity is not reflected in the 
methodology to determine the cap, as described earlier.  
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Given the advantages and disadvantages of cost- and price-based approaches, a further 
option is to combine the two in order to balance the incentives for the DSO. As dis-
cussed in section 5.2.2, price- and cost approaches are theoretical extremes that can be 
explicitly combined to create an appropriate incentive structure. This is often referred to 
as a hybrid mechanism or sliding scale regulation. It enables the development of an in-
centive scheme for DSOs which balances different incentives. This can be done for the 
general supply objective of network operators, but also for the DG objective.  
Combining the two approaches means that part of the costs can be directly passed 
through to customers and part of costs need to be recovered through a revenue driver 
that increases the price cap. Recovering part of the costs that are not passed through 
directly through the benchmarking procedure would make it even more difficult to 
comprehend the results of this process. This is a further argument for the revenue driver 
approach discussed in section 5.3.2. 
The price or revenue cap resulting from a hybrid approach is shown by the continuous 
line in Figure 12. In this example, the price-based element is based on the costs per kW 
of DG connected. While the dotted lines show a pure price- and cost-based mechanism 
respectively, the dashed lines represent the (reduced) price- and cost-based elements 
that together make up the hybrid mechanism. The cost-based element reduces the risk 
for the DSO and takes into account the cost differences between networks resulting 
from DG connections. The price-based element ensures that there is still an efficiency 
incentive. 
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Figure 12:  Combining cost- and price-based elements  
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5.3.3.2 Menu of sliding scales 
With a combination of cost and price elements the regulator can design a balanced in-
centive scheme. However, the question remains as to how exactly the two elements are 
to be combined. The hybrid mechanism presented in the previous section mitigates the 
problem of a price-based approach in the face of cost differences between networks, but 
still represents a one-size-fits-all approach. On the one hand, for some network compa-
nies a hybrid mechanism with a strong price-based element may be better suited to 
stimulating efficiency improvements, while for companies with relatively high DG con-
nection costs this may render DG unattractive. On the other hand, a strong cost-based 
element reduces the risk for high-cost companies, but reduces the efficiency incentive 
across all companies. 
Given these problems, Bauknecht and Brunekreeft (2008) have proposed the use of a 
menu-of-sliding-scale approach to the regulation of DG costs. This mechanism was 
proposed by Laffont and Tirole (1993; see also Joskow 2006a). A practical implementa-
tion can be found in the UK for the regulation of electricity network investments under 
the 2005 price control review (Crouch 2006). 
Under such a scheme, the regulator offers the regulated company a menu with different 
combinations of cost- and price-based elements: the higher the cost pass-through ele-
ment, the lower the revenue driver element. The regulator leaves it up to the individual 
company to decide which combination best fits the company’s cost structure.  
As firms can choose themselves, they will reveal their DG related cost structure. If in a 
network area there is a potential for low cost DG or the DSO has potential to connect 
DG efficiently, this DSO will choose a price cap; thereby it selects the incentives to be 
efficient and connect low cost DG. If, on the other hand, in a network area there is high 
cost DG or the DSO knows it will not be able to connect DG at low costs, it will opt for 
a cost-pass through. Thus, the hybrid scheme is geared to each company’s cost structure 
without the regulator needing to know the individual cost structures.  
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The benefit of this approach is that there are no excessive rents for low cost companies, 
while high cost companies do not face a price cap that is too low and can therefore still 
recover their costs. However, as a consequence high cost companies which choose a 
high cost pass-through element are no longer incentivised to strive for efficient DG in-
tegration. This can be seen as the price that the regulator has to “pay” in order to avoid 
excessive rents for low-cost companies, while still enabling high-cost companies to 
connect DG.  
However, this is particularly problematic if a significant number of companies are high-
cost. A further problem arises if companies with high DG connection costs, which 
would choose a high cost-based element, have a particularly high potential for cost re-
duction, e.g. through DG integration. This potential would be lost if the menu approach 
guarantees an efficiency incentive for low-cost companies, but provides no such incen-
tive for high cost companies. 
For example, a DSO with many small-scale and highly distributed photovoltaic plants 
connected to its network may have high costs per DG capacity connected compared to 
another company that connects one large wind farm. With a menu of sliding scale ap-
proach, this company will opt for a high cost-based element because it cannot cover its 
cost with the price-based element that is geared towards the low-cost companies. How-
ever, despite its overall high costs, there may be significant potential for this company 
to better integrate the PV plants. Indeed the potential for cost reduction relative to the 
costs without any integration measures may be even higher than in the case of the low 
cost company with the large-scale wind park connected. 
The fact that the efficiency potential and the absolute cost level do not necessarily corre-
late in the case of DG connections is an argument for differentiating the regulatory 
scheme based on a broader set of parameters, as proposed in section 5.3.2. In the above 
example, the revenue driver would distinguish between the costs of connecting PV and 
the costs of connecting wind, or the costs of connecting small-scale and large-scale 
schemes.  
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5.3.4 Rationale for DG integration and regulatory design 
Having discussed various mechanisms for including the DG objective in the standard 
model, I now briefly come back to the rationale for the regulator to integrate DG into 
network regulation, which was mentioned in section 5.2.1. The question is how the dif-
ferent arguments to include the additional costs of DG in network regulation affect the 
design of the regulatory mechanism discussed earlier in this section.  
As discussed before, DG can in principle be taken into account within the efficiency 
objective of the regulator if this is extended to the competitive part of the market or fu-
ture network costs. If DG regulation is justified on the grounds that DG leads to more 
competition and thus reduces overall costs, the regulator could in principle set the cap 
based on the expected cost savings in the competitive market – although it will be diffi-
cult in practice to quantify this value. A price-based approach would be sufficient; a 
hybrid mechanism or even a cost-based approach would not be necessary, as the value 
of DG would only be assessed in efficiency terms. DG with connection costs below the 
benefits in the competitive part of the market would get connected while other DG 
plants would be neglected.  
A similar argument can be applied if lower short-term network costs are justified by 
lower long-term costs. However, in this case, it would be even more difficult to define 
an appropriate cap. While in the case of competition it can be assumed that all DG have 
the same effect on competition in principle, the potential of DG to reduce future net-
work costs varies widely and cannot be determined on a case-by-case basis, as it very 
much depends on the future network structure.  
The mechanisms presented above and especially the combination of cost- and price-
based mechanisms to balance connection and efficiency incentives are chiefly relevant 
when DG is introduced as an additional objective. It is only then that a price-based DG 
element cannot ‘simply’ be based on the assumed efficiency benefits resulting from DG. 
A regulatory mechanism to support DG as an additional objective requires a balance to 
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be struck between the connection and efficiency incentive and can use price-based ele-
ments to make DG more attractive for DSOs. 
Designing a regulatory mechanism to support DG as an additional objective not only 
presupposes a political decision to introduce the DG objective in the first place. Rather, 
the regulatory design itself also involves political decisions to be taken. Setting the vari-
ous parameters described above and especially the combination of price- and cost-based 
elements represents a decision on the costs that are acceptable for increasing the politi-
cally desired connection of DG. 
5.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the potential of the standard model of network regulation to 
accommodate DG connection and integration as a new issue. It has shown the mecha-
nisms through which distribution network operators are affected by DG and how this 
translates into economic costs or benefits for the DSO under different regulatory re-
gimes. In particular it has shown how incentive regulation makes it difficult for DSO to 
connect DG and recover the resulting costs.  
At the same time, this chapter has argued that DG can be integrated into the standard 
model. In terms of the additional network costs resulting from DG, these may be taken 
into account by the regulator within its efficiency remit. In this case the incentives of 
DSO against DG would not be tackled because they represent a barrier against the fur-
ther deployment of DG capacity, but rather because they undermine the efficiency ob-
jective. With this approach, there would be no generic connection incentive for DG, but 
only for those plants that contribute to overall system efficiency.  
However, if the objective is to increase the share of DG, then DG needs to be introduced 
as an additional regulatory objective, which in the end requires a political decision to 
broaden the remit of the regulator. Although at first sight, such an additional DG objec-
tive seems to be at odds with the efficiency objective, a closer look reveals that effi-
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ciency should serve as a guideline both for the supply of electricity via the network as 
well as the integration of DG. The apparent tension between the efficiency and the DG 
objective results from diverging target groups: a more efficient network benefits net-
work customers in one network area, whereas a higher share of DG can benefit society 
as a whole. 
Importantly, a broader understanding of incentive regulation was put forward, which is 
no longer based on price-based approaches that are applied to increase efficiency. 
Rather it comprises both cost- and price-based approaches that can be combined in dif-
ferent ways to achieve other targets, too. Thus, the basic idea of the standard model – 
that the regulated companies have an information advantage and decisions should there-
fore be guided by economic incentives – can be extended to the DG objective. 
Based on this understanding of incentive regulation, it is proposed that the very mecha-
nisms of the standard model be used to overcome the problems that the standard causes 
for DG. Different options have been discussed for taking into account the additional 
network costs of DG in the regulatory framework, namely a full cost pass-through, 
price-based approaches using a separate revenue driver or DG as a benchmarking pa-
rameter as well as a combination of both. The latter is preferable to both individual in-
struments as it can combine connection and efficiency incentives. Efficiency incentives 
become particularly relevant when there is potential for cost reduction via network inte-
gration of DG. 
A central problem faced by the regulator is the cost differences between network opera-
tors that are difficult to capture with a generic approach. A DG-specific menu-of-sliding 
approach has been proposed. However, it removes any efficiency incentive for high-cost 
DSOs that may have a high potential for cost reduction through DG integration. An al-
ternative would be a differentiated set of cost drivers which takes into account cost dif-
ferences, e.g. between different DG technologies. If DG is an additional objective, the 
fine-tuning of these instruments involves political decisions, too. 
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Overall, the chapter has shown the potential of the standard model to integrate new ob-
jectives, at least in terms of incentive regulation mechanisms. The policy-regulation 
interface and how it is affected by DG as a new objective will be discussed further in 
chapter 7. 
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6 Network regulation and innovation 
The previous chapter discussed various mechanisms through which network regulation 
can provide incentives for DSOs to connect DG plants. Such a general DG-oriented 
regulatory framework may also promote network innovations if it leads to more DG 
activity which makes DSOs think about how these plants can be best integrated. 
Nevertheless, in order to promote the innovations necessary for an efficient large-scale 
deployment of DG, the question is whether network regulation should provide addi-
tional tailor-made instruments for DSOs to get involved in RD&D and try out new ap-
proaches to running their network and how this could be done.  
This chapter is structured as follows: The first section provides a brief introduction to a 
number of general issues involving regulation and innovation. The second section ex-
amines how cost-based and price-based regulatory schemes influence RD&D by regu-
lated companies. This section picks up on what was said in chapter 2 about the poten-
tially detrimental effects of the standard model of liberalisation on innovation. Clearly, 
on the generation side, RD&D is conducted under competitive conditions with potential 
market failures associated with RD&D that are very different from the regulated envi-
ronment in which network companies operate. Against the background of the general 
debate on liberalisation, the section therefore contributes to a disaggregated analysis of 
the innovation effects of standard model of liberalisation, focusing on the regulated part. 
This is followed by a discussion of various regulatory instruments to stimulate innova-
tion. The fourth section provides a more general discussion of the ins and outs of pro-
moting network innovations in general and innovative network concepts to cope with 
DG in particular. 
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6.1 Network innovation: some basics and definitions 
6.1.1 Process or product innovation and innovation externalities 
In chapter 3, it has already been shown that electricity networks have become much 
more dynamic than they used to be, and that a range of innovative network concepts are 
under development. Before analysing the effects of regulation on these innovations, 
network innovations to promote DG will be briefly categorised. They include both tech-
nical and institutional innovations. 
Innovations can be classified as either product or process innovations (Tidd et al. 1997: 
6). Product innovations enable a company to offer new products while process innova-
tions reduce the costs of producing existing products or make it possible to increase 
their output. Incentive regulation generally aims at making processes within the network 
company more efficient in order to reduce costs. 
In many cases DG-related network innovations aim to accommodate a higher share of 
DG at lower costs where more conventional network upgrades would otherwise be nec-
essary. In that sense, they can be seen as process innovations. Nevertheless it is impor-
tant to bear in mind that the network innovations sketched out in chapter 3 can go be-
yond improving the processes within the current infrastructure to accommodate DG at 
lower costs, but can lead to a new type of infrastructure. 
Importantly, even if we regard the network innovations under discussion in this thesis as 
cost-reducing process innovations, they do not necessarily reduce the costs of the tradi-
tional objective of distribution networks, i.e. to serve network customers with electric-
ity. Rather, they aim to reduce the costs of a new objective, i.e. to accommodate DG. 
These costs may still be higher than the network costs of a network that serves only de-
mand customers without any DG connected to it (see Figure 3). The innovations can be 
seen as cost-reducing process innovations to pursue new objectives at lower costs. If 
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these objectives are not part of the objectives a network operator is to pursue, the bene-
fits of these innovations appear as externalities for the network operator. 
6.1.2 Market structure and innovation 
Since this chapter deals with innovations in a monopolistic market, it should be noted 
that there has been a long-running debate on the effect of market structure on innova-
tion. This debate is often associated with Schumpeter on the one hand who argued that 
large firms and monopolies favour innovation and Arrow on the other hand who took 
the opposite view that competition stimulates innovation. They have triggered numerous 
studies on the issue, which have not yielded conclusive evidence, but have shown that a 
more differentiated view is necessary, e.g. much depends on property rights (for an 
overview see Gilbert 2006). 
Given the monopolistic nature of electricity networks, this thesis focuses on the regula-
tion of these monopolies and on how regulation can be amended to promote innovation, 
instead of comparing the pros and cons of different market structures. 
6.1.3 Regulation and innovation in general 
The effect of regulation on innovation is discussed in this chapter for the specific case 
of economic network regulation. It is worth noting that there is also a more general de-
bate about the effects of regulation on innovation; it has been argued that regulation 
both promotes and constrains innovation (Eifert, Hoffmann-Riem 2009).  
A prominent example is the debate on environmental regulation which is often associ-
ated with the so-called “Porter hypothesis” (Porter 1991; Porter, van der Linde 1995). It 
suggests that environmental regulation can improve the international competitiveness of 
domestic firms by stimulating innovation. This hypothesis has been very contentious, 
and empirical counter-evidence has been provided by Jaffe and Palmer (1997). A more 
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normative strand of literature has examined how regulation can be designed to promote 
innovations and guide them in certain directions, especially in the case of environmental 
regulations (Hemmelskamp et al. 2000). 
In contrast to the debate on the Porter hypothesis and more in line with the approach 
mentioned above, the following analysis on the innovation effects of economic network 
regulation does not focus on the pros and cons of regulation with regard to innovation. 
Rather, it takes regulation of network monopolies as given and analyses specific regula-
tory arrangements and their potential to promote innovation that facilitates the integra-
tion of DG. 
6.1.4 Network innovations and innovation networks 
Finally, when discussing the innovation effects of economic regulation, it should be 
noted that RD&D efforts by regulated network monopolies are embedded in broader 
innovation networks with other actors who are not subject to economic regulation, e.g. 
suppliers of network equipment (Heyes, Liston-Heyes 1998). 
The question may be asked why network operators should get involved in developing 
innovations themselves. While they are indeed unlikely to take part in more basic re-
search activities, it can be crucial for DSOs to get involved in applied research activi-
ties. This can be important to establish a link between research and the needs of the 
DSOs as well as to further develop and test innovations under real network conditions. 
This requires DSOs to participate in research projects and set up demonstration projects 
on their networks. Furthermore, it can be argued that companies need to have at least 
some RD&D capabilities in-house to be able to appropriate the results of external 
RD&D. 
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6.2 The effect of different regulatory mechanisms on innovation 
In this section, cost-based and price-based regulation of network tariffs as the two theo-
retical polar cases (see chapter 5) are analysed with regard to their effect on network 
innovations. The main mechanisms through which they affect the innovation activities 
of DSOs are discussed. The focus of this section is on cost-saving process innovations 
in order to understand the basic mechanisms.  
6.2.1 Cost-based regulation 
One type of regulation is cost-based regulation. The effect of regulation on innovation 
has traditionally received less attention than the impact of the market structure on inno-
vation in the literature (Mayo, Flynn: footnote 1). In the 1970s and 1980s there were 
some studies on the effects of regulation on innovation, mainly in the US (Bailey 1974; 
Müller, Vogelsang 1979; Sweeney 1981; Schoppe, Wass von Czege 1984; Mayo, Flynn 
1988); for an overview from an electricity sector perspective, see Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2008a). They examined the cost-based regulation that was predominant at the time. The 
focus of most studies on innovation under regulation has been on vertically-integrated 
monopolies rather than unbundled networks in liberalised markets.  
In its pure (theoretical) form, cost-based regulation constantly monitors a company’s 
costs and revises the tariffs a company can charge accordingly. The effect of this ex-
treme type of cost-based regulation on innovation can be summarised as follows: It 
would enable companies to conduct RD&D as companies would not bear any cost risk 
and additional costs would be immediately reflected in higher tariffs. However, it gives 
them no incentives to do so since any cost savings arising from RD&D would directly 
lead to lower tariffs. There are no additional profits arising for the company. As a con-
sequence, engineers or managers that are keen to develop innovations and work in an 
innovative company will find a low-risk environment to try out new things under cost-
based regulation. But from a profit point of view there is no reason for the company to 
make any effort to venture into new technologies or processes. This is in line with the 
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more general point that cost-based regulation does not give the company any incentive 
to become more efficient. 
In contrast to this theoretical extreme, where all costs are accepted and tariffs instanta-
neously adjusted, cost-based regulation in practice normally means that the regulator 
does not blindly accept all costs, but will evaluate costs, e.g. based on “used and useful 
tests” (for the US see Joskow 1989: 161). 
More importantly in the context of this discussion, cost-based regulation is normally 
characterised by a regulatory lag, i.e. adjustments by the regulator of the company’s 
allowed revenue or tariffs due to changes in its cost base lags behind these cost changes. 
To the extent to which the regulator does not require an ex-post refund at the regulatory 
review, efficiency gains can therefore be kept by the company for some time, thus pro-
viding an incentive for the company to engage in RD&D (Bailey 1974). 
This adds an element of price-based regulation. Assuming that RD&D costs have been 
included in the company’s cost base, the regulatory lag allows the company to earn ex-
tra profits if its RD&D efforts are successful while there is still no downside risk if an 
innovation fails.  
At the end of the regulatory lag, when the regulator reviews the company’s costs, tariffs 
will be adjusted and cost-savings passed on to consumers so that the rate-of-return a 
company can earn on its RD&D investments is capped. 
Overall, this version of cost-based regulation provides stronger incentives for a com-
pany to carry out research than the pure cost-based approach described above. 
The following graph summarises the effects of cost-based regulation (cf. Mayo, Flynn 
1988). It assumes that the net cost savings resulting from RD&D, i.e. innovation bene-
fits minus innovation costs, follows a normal distribution. In some cases the net benefits 
will be negative, with the result that RD&D costs are higher than the savings achieved, 
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partly due to the risky nature of innovation. However, it is assumed that there is a posi-
tive outcome overall. 
Since costs can be passed on to consumers under cost-based regulation, a company is 
not exposed to losses, even if innovation costs exceed the benefits of innovation. Area A 
in Figure 13 is therefore not relevant for the company’s rate-of-return distribution re-
sulting from RD&D. Capping the downside risk for the company will be referred to as 
lower-end truncation in the following. At the same time, some of the innovation benefits 
will be passed on to consumers too, with the result that the net benefits are reduced from 
the company’s point of view. This is represented by area C in Figure 13 and will be re-
ferred to as upper-end truncation. Together lower- and upper-end truncation determine 
the ability as well as the incentive of the regulated company to innovate. 
If the regulator capitalises RD&D expenditures, the lower-end truncation would be even 
stronger as the company could always earn a positive rate-of-return on RD&D. This is 
shown by the shaded area B in Figure 13 (Mayo, Flynn 1988; see section 
“Capitalisation of RD&D costs”, page 147). Under pure cost-based regulation, the entire 
area under the curve would be ‘truncated’ as the company would not be exposed to any 
risk, neither upside or downside.  
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Figure 13: Truncation effects under cost-based regulation 
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6.2.2 Price-based regulation 
Against the background of the innovation effects of cost-based regulation, I now turn to 
price-based regulation, which has become the dominant regulatory regime in the elec-
tricity sector and beyond. When price-based regulation as we know it today or ‘incen-
tive regulation’ was first proposed by Littlechild in 1983, the assumption was that it is 
superior to cost-based regulation both in promoting productive efficiency and innova-
tion (Armstrong et al. 1994: 167; Littlechild 2006a: 2). The main argument is that com-
panies benefit from cost reductions they can achieve, including cost reductions from 
process innovations, and would therefore make an effort to innovate. However, the ef-
fects of price-based regulation on innovation are more ambiguous, both theoretically 
and empirically, than many promoters of price-based regulation have suggested. This 
ambiguity can be seen in the literature, but will also be derived from an analysis of the 
truncation effects of price-based regulation. 
6.2.2.1 Evidence from the literature 
Most studies on regulation and innovation are either not related to a specific sector or 
focus on the telecommunications sector (for an overview see Bourreau, Dogan 2001; 
Gerpott 2006). Especially price-based regulation in the telecommunications sector has 
received more attention compared to the electricity sector. It was introduced in this sec-
tor before the electricity sector and in fact, price-based or ‘incentive regulation’ in the 
form of ‘RPI-X’ was first developed to regulate British Telecom after privatisation. 
More importantly, while in the electricity sector, the network has not changed much 
since liberalisation and network innovations have not been an issue until very recently, 
the telecommunications sector has seen a highly dynamic development of its network 
infrastructure and innovations abound. One of the main rationales of liberalisation in 
this sector was indeed to foster technical change and network innovations. 
The telecommunications sector therefore provides useful material for the analysis of 
economic regulation and lessons can be drawn for the electricity sector. However, the 
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sector also exhibits a number of peculiarities we need to bear in mind. Most impor-
tantly, the majority of telecommunication networks are not natural monopolies anymore 
and the sector is characterised by (potential) infrastructure competition. The interplay 
between incentive regulation and competition is likely to lead to innovation dynamics 
that are different from the ones in the electricity sector, where infrastructure competition 
is only a fringe issue. In the telecommunications sector, innovation can be a way for 
companies to gain market shares whereas in the monopolistic electricity network, this 
will not drive companies to innovate. In the UK, for example, RD&D intensity in all 
major utilities sector has been falling except in the case of the telecommunications sec-
tor (Holt 2005a). 
The effect of different types of regulation on innovation has not been studied in much 
detail and the results that are available are ambiguous. Back in 1988, Mayo and Flynn 
(p. 32) concluded that the innovation effects of cost-based regulation have not received 
much attention and “that research to date has shed only limited light on the impact of 
regulation on the innovative propensities of regulated firms” (cf. Müller, Vogelsang 
1979: 91-92). More than a decade later and after much more research has been carried 
out on regulation in general, Bourreau and Dogan (2001: 170) still find that “the litera-
ture on regulation, in particular for an oligopolistic setting, is inadequate in presenting 
general results of the effect of ex ante regulation on the incentives for innovation”. Re-
garding the comparison between cost-based and price-based innovation, Jamasb and 
Pollitt (2008a: 1005) conclude that “the effect of ROR [rate-of-return] versus price cap 
regulation on the rate of technical change has not been studied in detail”.  
There are arguments that price-based regulation promotes innovation (Magat 1976; 
Clemenz 1991)6, but there is also the opposite reasoning (Kahn et al. 1999). Although 
                                                 
6 Magat analysed price ceilings already in 1976, which was later to become one important element of 
Littlechild’s ‘incentive regulation’ mechanism. 
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incentive regulation in principle provides a framework for efficiency improvements 
including efficiency improvements through technical change, it can undermine the de-
velopment of innovations at the same time. 
In empirical terms, it is clear that the introduction of price-based regulation in the tele-
communications sector coincides with a surge of new technologies. However, this has 
not been the case in the electricity sector; it would therefore be difficult to ascribe the 
innovation in telecommunications solely to the introduction of price-based regulation. 
There may be many other factors; as Ai and Sappington (2002: 134) have pointed out in 
their empirical study of the telecommunications sector, “the task of isolating the impact 
of incentive regulation in a dynamic, complex industry like the telecommunications in-
dustry is a difficult one”. 
In a detailed overview on studies that have analysed the empirical effects of price-based 
regulation in the telecommunications sector, Gerpott (2006: 145-148) comes to the con-
clusion that the introduction of price-based regulation coincides with a significant in-
crease in investments into network modernisation and increasing productive efficiency 
by incumbents. However, there is no conclusive empirical evidence of the effects of 
price-based regulation on RD&D and the innovation output by the industry. For the 
electricity sector, there is some evidence that price-based regulatory regimes have con-
tributed to a decline in RD&D and innovation (Holt 2005a; Jamasb, Pollitt 2008a). 
6.2.2.2 Main effects of price-based regulation 
While the literature on price-based regulation and innovation is not conclusive, it is still 
possible to summarise the main arguments in this section and identify the main mecha-
nisms through which price-based regulation can affect RD&D and innovation in a regu-
lated industry. I use the discussion above on cost-based regulation as a reference point 
and once again differentiate between upper-end and lower-end truncation of risk.  
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Upper-end truncation 
In terms of upper-end truncation, price-based regulation generally allows the company 
to retain a higher share of the innovation gains as compared to cost-based regulation. 
This is basically the main argument in the literature as to why price-based regulation is 
more innovation-friendly.  
This is certainly true compared to pure cost-based regulation where tariffs are instanta-
neously adjusted. But also in comparison with ‘regulatory lag’ cost-based regulation 
described above, price-based regulation tends to leave a higher share of any innovation 
gains to the company. Area D in Figure 14 therefore tends to be smaller than area C in 
Figure 13. 
The differences in the upper-end truncation are due to the following reasons. Firstly, the 
regulatory period under price-based regulation tends to be longer than the regulatory lag 
under cost-based regulation, giving the company more time to appropriate any benefits. 
Secondly, the regulatory period is fixed ex-ante. This increases the certainty for the 
company as to how long it can benefit. Fixing the regulatory period ex-ante in a regula-
tory contract also protects the company against the regulator initiating a regulatory re-
view precisely because the company has become more efficient due to innovations, 
which could potentially reduce the benefits for the company. In a cost-based regime, the 
regulator will generally be more inclined to introduce some kind of profit-sharing 
whereby the rate-of-return is capped and excessive profits have to be refunded to cus-
tomers.  
Overall, upper-end truncation under price-based regulation will be lower than in the 
case of cost-based regulation, i.e. a company can keep a higher share of the innovation 
gain it has generated. Nevertheless, companies under price-based regulation still face a 
truncation of innovation gains. While the rate-of-return is in principle not limited during 
a regulatory period, the truncation occurs at the next regulatory review. Upper-end trun-
cation after the regulatory period can be especially significant if innovation gains accrue 
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over a long time period. It may then be difficult for a DSO to recover the costs of an 
innovation within one regulatory period.  
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Figure 14: Truncation effects under price-based regulation 
probability
D
net benefits through RD&D
E
net costs through RD&D
C
figure 13
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Lower-end truncation 
With price-based regulation, truncation of benefits is generally lower than under cost-
based regulation. However, the remaining truncation of benefits can be problematic if it 
is not matched by a corresponding lower-end truncation, through which the company 
does not only share innovation benefits, but also costs with its customers. With cost-
based regulation, the upper-end truncation is combined with lower-end truncation: com-
panies are not exposed to any significant cost-risk as additional costs will lead to higher 
tariffs. As a result, companies will not lose out if their RD&D efforts fail. If RD&D 
costs are treated as capital expenditures there may be even a positive rate-of-return on 
any RD&D costs, irrespective of the innovation outcome.  
This lower-end truncation ceases to apply under price-based regulation. Under pure 
price-based regulation, RD&D costs in principle need to be recovered through resulting 
efficiency improvements.7 As a consequence RD&D efforts that do not generate enough 
benefits will entail losses for the company (area E in Figure 14). With price-cap regula-
tion companies thus face the problem that they need to recover RD&D costs through 
efficiency gains, but those are still shared with customers after the regulatory period. 
Overall effect of price-based regulation 
Overall, price-based regulation has the following effects: Firstly, it introduces a higher 
upside and downside risk for companies compared to cost-based regulation. It generally 
allows a higher rate-of-return, but a company can also lose money. The probability dis-
tribution of additional returns that can be earned through RD&D becomes broader under 
                                                 
7 In practice, the company may be able to recover some of the costs directly, e.g. if RD&D costs result 
in the company being classified as inefficient in a comparative efficiency analysis, but needs to reduce 
this inefficiency only over a certain time period, or if other companies also spend on RD&D, and the 
related costs therefore do not show up as inefficient when companies are benchmarked against each 
other. 
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price-based regulation, and the lower end can become negative. While under cost-based 
regulation, companies can normally earn a reasonable rate of return within a certain 
range, the rate-of-return can vary more widely with price-based regulation. This feature 
of price-based regulation becomes particularly relevant in the case of RD&D where the 
risk distribution is inherently higher. 
Secondly, the mean of the rate-of-return distribution can be reduced from a company 
point of view compared to cost-based regulation. This is the case if price-cap regulation 
changes the truncation of the upside- and downside risk asymmetrically, i.e. if compa-
nies on the one hand bear the entire cost risk of RD&D, but on the other hand still have 
to share innovation gains with their customers relatively quickly. 
In principle this problem applies to all cost-saving efforts undertaken by a company, not 
just RD&D. However, in the case of ‘normal’ cost-saving efforts, there is more certainty 
for the company in terms of the savings that can be achieved. It is also easier to calcu-
late the net present value based on the costs, the savings that can be achieved and the 
proportion of savings it can retain. The company can counter the regulatory upper-end 
truncation by not carrying out measures that are not profitable anymore given this up-
per-end truncation.  
In the case of innovation, there is inherently more downside risk as RD&D results are 
more uncertain. This however is not reflected in the upper-end truncation as the regula-
tor does not normally differentiate between cost savings resulting from ‘standard effi-
ciency improvements’ and those that have been achieved through riskier RD&D; in both 
cases savings will be shared with customers according to the same rules. 
These arguments show how RD&D becomes riskier under price-based regulation; com-
panies may therefore not spend on RD&D. At the same time, under price-based regula-
tion companies are forced to reduce costs since the regulator generally imposes a reve-
nue path which declines over a regulatory period and is partly based on benchmarking 
network operators against each other. On top of that, companies can increase their prof-
Transforming the Grid Part II: Conceptual analysis  
 
-140- 
its in the short term if they manage to outperform this revenue path. This gives compa-
nies an incentive to reduce costs in the short term, including RD&D costs. As a result, 
the static efficiency improvements that can be prompted by incentive regulation may 
run counter to dynamic efficiency improvements through technical change that can be 
achieved in the medium to long term, but require short-term expenditures.  
Taking away the lower-end truncation and exposing the company to the cost of RD&D 
means that price-based regulation comes closer to a competitive market where compa-
nies also do not have the possibility of passing on any costs of RD&D to consumers. 
However, in terms of upper-end truncation, a competitive market with protection of 
property rights through patents can impose a weaker upper-end truncation on compa-
nies, with patents protecting innovation benefits for up to 20 years. Under price-based 
regulation, upper-end truncation is set by the length of the regulatory period, which is 
geared towards normal efficiency improvements rather than innovations. 
6.2.3 Conclusion 
Price-based regulation was thought to overcome the problems of cost-based regulation, 
not least of all with regard to innovation. However, both theoretically and empirically, 
there are only ambivalent and rather tenuous results regarding the effect of regulation on 
innovation, for cost- as well as price-based approaches. Price-based regulation is not 
necessarily superior to cost-based regulation. There are a number of arguments and also 
some empirical evidence that price-based regulation can stifle innovative activities. 
Also, even if price-based regulation as such provided stronger incentives for regulation 
than cost-based regulation, it may still not be enough to match the innovation require-
ments, for example those resulting from the increasing share of DG.  
What is certainly positive about price-based regulation is that it shifts the focus from 
RD&D inputs to innovation outputs, which may lead to more effective and efficient 
RD&D. However, the other side of the coin is that price-based regulation increases the 
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risk for the regulated company: it exposes the companies to the RD&D costs while still 
truncating the innovation benefits. 
These findings are reminiscent of the general argument made about the standard model 
of electricity liberalisation in chapter 2, namely that the model may encounter more 
problems in achieving objectives beyond short-term efficiency, including innovation, 
than has been previously envisaged. 
The arguments made in this chapter can be applied to cost-saving process innovations 
that help DSOs to become more efficient and thus meet or outperform the regulator’s 
efficiency targets. It has become clear that even for these innovations, price-based regu-
lation may weaken the incentives for RD&D; it may be more attractive for DSOs to 
reduce RD&D expenditures to meet the efficiency targets, rather than trying to reduce 
its costs through innovations. 
The innovation incentives become even more ambiguous once the innovations not only 
aim at reducing the network costs, but also at enabling other objectives outside the net-
work or at meeting these objectives at lower costs, as in the case of DG-related innova-
tions discussed in this thesis. In this case, at least part of the innovation benefits emerge 
as externalities for the DSOs and the innovations facilitate a development that may in-
crease the overall network costs. It is clear that in a regime in which innovations costs 
need to be recovered through innovations benefits, the fact that at least some of the 
benefits are external to the DSOs further reduce the incentive for the DSOs to engage in 
such innovative activities. 
The practical effects of the regulatory regimes under discussion and the actual lower- 
and upper-end truncation will depend on a number of parameters that need to be set by 
the regulator (e.g. which costs are accepted, what the short-term efficiency improve-
ments demanded by the regulator are). How the different mechanisms I have identified 
interact in a real-life regulatory setting, is an empirical question. Overall, it is more use-
ful in this context to move beyond comparisons of cost-based and price-based regula-
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tory regimes and examine how these regimes can be designed in practice to promote 
innovation.  
6.3 Regulatory approaches to innovation 
Having looked at the way standard regulatory approaches affect innovation, I now turn 
to specific mechanisms to make network regulation more innovation-friendly. This is 
not a question of comparing both and choosing between cost-based or price-based re-
gimes for the regulation of network tariffs, but of adapting these regimes to the re-
quirements of RD&D and innovation by introducing specific instruments to promote 
RD&D and mixing cost- and price-based elements for that purpose (see chapter 5.2.2 on 
price- and cost based mechanisms within price- and cost-based regimes). However, as 
regulatory regimes are generally price-based nowadays, the focus is on how various 
innovation-specific mechanisms, partly cost-based and partly price-based, can be added 
to this regime. 
The literature on this issue is even more incomplete than the above-mentioned literature 
on the innovation effects of regulation. In terms of practical regulation, there are hardly 
any examples of regulators that have addressed this issue. The only major exception is 
the UK, which will be analysed in the case study in chapter 8. The section attempts to 
structure different proposals that have been made and discusses the pros and cons. 
When discussing instruments to promote innovation activities, one should bear in mind 
that there can also be too much innovation efforts and that RD&D can be inefficient 
from the point of view of social welfare. For example, capitalising RD&D costs as dis-
cussed below can lead to ‘gold-plating’ RD&D projects, i.e. spending too much on such 
projects to benefit from the guaranteed rate-of-return. RD&D should not be an end in 
itself and innovations should not just increase efficiency or yield new products or ser-
vices, but rather they should do this in an efficient way. Although it will be impossible 
in this context to determine the right level of RD&D and the necessary costs in practical 
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terms, efficiency should nevertheless inform the debate on regulation and should be 
used as a guideline when designing regulatory instruments. 
There are a number of approaches to regulating RD&D and innovation in networks. In 
the following, I present them and distinguish between cost-based or input-based ap-
proaches on the one hand and price-based or output-based approaches on the other hand. 
Before discussing these approaches, the next section briefly discusses the issue of inno-
vation externalities and additional objectives already mentioned in this chapter. 
6.3.1 Removing innovation externalities for the DSO 
In the previous section it was argued that price-based regulation can provide insufficient 
incentives for DSOs to invest in innovation, even if the innovation increases network 
efficiency and thus contributes to meeting the efficiency objective imposed on the com-
pany by the regulator. If the innovation contributes to meeting other objectives, the in-
novation benefits can appear as externalities for the regulated company, which further 
reduces the incentive to pursue these innovations. If DSOs do not have the objective to 
connect DG, they do not have an incentive to connect them in an innovative way, either.  
This is why incentivising DG connections as discussed in chapter 5 is an important pre-
requisite for promoting innovative DG connections. However, if companies do have an 
incentive to connect DG, they still face the general innovation problems described 
above that can result from regulation in general and price-based regulation in particular. 
It is therefore not sufficient to rely on DG objectives and incentives to promote DG-
related network innovations, just as it is not sufficient to rely on the efficiency objective 
prescribed by incentive regulation to promote innovations that make the network more 
efficient. 
It is therefore not convincing when Abildgaard et al. (2003: 4) propose that in order “to 
prompt active networks and innovation, the revenue should become more dependent on 
network performance/output”. The argument is that this approach would not prescribe 
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the company what to do to meet these performance targets. The regulator would not 
need to judge whether innovations are necessary, but can observe how its performance 
criteria affect RD&D.  
This would clearly simplify the regulatory process, but faces the same problems as in-
centive regulation in general. Under standard incentive regulation the performance crite-
rion is based on efficiency and the regulated company can in principle choose how to 
meet this criterion. However, the asymmetric truncation of costs and benefits can lead to 
a bias towards short-term measures. The same would happen with additional perform-
ance criteria, unless they are set at such a high level that innovations are the only possi-
ble way to meet them. 
What is positive about performance criteria in terms of innovation is that they could be 
one element of a long-term framework spanning several regulatory periods, as DSOs 
would know they will need to improve their performance along the lines of these output 
criteria beyond the next regulatory period, provided the regulator can credibly commit 
to retaining the performance criteria beyond one regulatory period.  
Since removing externalities by adding new performance criteria is not enough, the fol-
lowing sections explore additional mechanisms to promote innovations. 
6.3.2 Input-based mechanisms 
Input-based or cost-based approaches target the costs of RD&D and explicitly include 
them in the regulatory scheme. In line with the discussion in chapter 5, it needs to be 
stressed that such cost-based approaches to innovation can be implemented well within 
a regulatory environment that is generally price-based. In this case, cost-based regula-
tion of RD&D costs exempts these costs from the price-based regime. 
First of all, a cost-based approach requires that the regulator recognises these costs 
when it determines a company’s cost base. This in itself would send a signal to compa-
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nies that the regulator sees innovation as an important issue and expects network opera-
tors to participate in development and demonstration projects. Alternatively, the regula-
tor could argue that network operators should not spend money on developing innova-
tions themselves, that these costs unnecessarily increase network tariffs and are there-
fore not included in the accepted cost base. Clearly, this exacerbates the disincentives 
against innovation compared to the analysis in section 6.2, as there is no truncation of 
costs whatsoever. If the regulator accepts the RD&D costs, then this would make the 
DSO less efficient in a comparative efficiency analysis with other network operators, 
but the less efficient DSOs may still be able to recover some of these “inefficient” costs. 
If the regulator does not accept any RD&D costs, then none of these costs can be recov-
ered. 
Most regulators have not explicitly addressed this issue yet (for the EU-15 see Skytte, 
Ropenus 2005), which in many cases means that companies will find it difficult to get 
RD&D costs accepted in a regulatory review. In the case of Australia, the former regu-
lator for New South Wales, IPART, has explicitly decided not to allow the recovery of 
costs associated with learning by doing in the case of network-related demand-
management projects (IPART 2004). 
If the regulator accepts RD&D costs in principle, the next question is whether RD&D 
costs are accepted, but treated as any other costs, or whether the regulator acknowledges 
that RD&D is not sufficiently incentivised under normal price-based regulation and 
requires special treatment. 
In the latter case, two approaches can be distinguished: firstly, there can be a direct 
pass-through of costs to customers, secondly, research costs can be capitalised and 
treated as investment. They are not entirely separate, but as I discuss below, may be 
combined in different ways, depending on the overall regulatory regime. 
Any separate treatment of RD&D related costs with cost pass-through or capitalisation 
is faced with the problem of how these costs can be clearly separated from other costs 
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and poses the risk that DSOs will seek to shift costs that are not related to innovation 
into this special regime. It is therefore recommendable for the costs that can be passed 
through or capitalised to be capped. 
6.3.2.1 Pass-through of RD&D costs 
The first cost-based approach is a cost pass-through mechanism. In the previous chapter, 
I explained how a cost pass-through can be used to protect a network operator against 
the financial risks of connecting DG. In the same way, this approach can be applied to 
pass the costs of RD&D to customers. Cost pass-throughs are often used for costs which 
a company has no control over by directly including these costs into network tariffs. In 
the case of passing through RD&D costs, the instrument is used to shield DSOs from 
the uncertainty of RD&D. The costs are not subject to any benchmarking, nor is the 
ability of the company to recover these costs capped by a price-based mechanism, even 
if the overall regulatory regime is price-based. In terms of the truncation effects dis-
cussed above, the approach introduces the lower-end truncation that is typical for cost-
based regulation in a price-based regime. 
Cost pass-throughs as specific instruments will typically be employed in a price-based 
environment, because with cost-based regulation all costs are passed through anyway. 
In a price-based environment, however, it represents a special treatment of the respec-
tive costs. 
If RD&D costs are completely included in the pass-through mechanism in a price-based 
environment, RD&D essentially does not increase the company costs it has to recover 
via efficiency improvement. At the same time, the innovation can help the company to 
become more efficient, thereby benefiting from the increased gap between price-cap and 
costs during a regulatory period. In other words, network customers pay for the RD&D 
efforts which then benefit the company, at least partially.  
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This combination of ring-fencing costs from the price-cap mechanism on the one hand 
and on the other hand allowing the company to keep, at least temporarily, the resulting 
benefits under that same price-cap mechanism should give the company an incentive to 
spend on RD&D and try and develop useful innovations. The approach can thus remedy 
the potentially weak innovation incentive in a price-based regime.  
At the same time, however, the approach exhibits at least two potential short-comings: 
Firstly the risk distribution between the network company and its customers is uneven. 
The downside risk if RD&D does not generate any results lies completely with network 
customers, whereas the upside risk of useful innovations is shared between them and the 
network company. Secondly, and as a result of the first point, network companies have 
incentives for useful RD&D, but are not incentivised to be efficient – unless the amount 
of costs that can be passed through is capped. 
6.3.2.2 Capitalisation of RD&D costs 
Under the cost pass-through approach presented in the previous section, a large part of 
RD&D costs will be treated as operational expenditure. Alternatively RD&D costs can 
be categorised as an investment, i.e. RD&D costs are regarded not just as operational 
expenditure, but are capitalised, included in the regulatory asset base (RAB) and depre-
ciated. As a result, the regulated companies can earn a rate-of-return on RD&D expen-
ditures, irrespective of any efficiency or quality improvements resulting from the inno-
vation. 
While a cost pass-through is not an option for promoting innovation in a cost-based en-
vironment (where costs are passed though anyway), capitalisation of costs (that are 
passed-through, but normally treated as operational expenditures) may be applied both 
in a price-based and a cost-based environment to promote innovations. A number of 
studies have analysed RD&D capitalisation in the context of ‘traditional’ cost-based 
regulation in the US (e.g. Mayo, Flynn 1988). 
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In a price-based environment, there are two options. Firstly, if price-based regulation 
applies to OPEX only, with investment still mainly cost-based, capitalisation would 
have a double effect: RD&D costs are both taken out of the price-based regime and the 
company can earn a rate-of-return on these costs. If price-regulation applies to total ex-
penditures, capitalisation would only imply a rate-of-return on costs that were previ-
ously OPEX, but no cost pass-through. In this case, capitalisation would not be a cost-
based mechanism anymore. 
The capitalisation approach raises two questions: Firstly, how can it be justified that 
costs that are normally operational costs in accounting terms, are classified as invest-
ment by the regulator (except that this may serve the objective to promote innovation). 
The second question is whether the capitalisation approach actually promotes innova-
tion? 
Regarding the first question, Holt (2005: 3) has pointed out that, “the economic ration-
ale for capitalising the value of RD&D is that it is likely to generate benefits beyond the 
year in which these expenditures are made. In this respect such expenditure is like in-
vestment in any physical, tangible asset and could be capitalised into the RAB”. In a 
similar vein Damodaran (no date) argues that RD&D expenses should not be treated as 
operating expenses, because they are not incurred to generate income in the current pe-
riod, but to provide benefits over multiple periods. There are examples that such costs 
have been capitalised in other sectors (Competition Commission 2002). 
The second question is whether the capitalisation approach actually promotes innova-
tion. Based on an analysis of empirical data, Mayo and Flynn (1988) find that capitalis-
ing RD&D expenditures into the rate base significantly increases the amount of money 
spent on RD&D by the regulated company. This supports the theoretical argument that 
this approach takes away the downside risk from companies and insures that regardless 
of whether RD&D expenditures lead to innovations and cost reductions sufficient to 
justify the costs of RD&D they will in any case generate the allowed rate-of- return 
(lower-end truncation). 
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Already we arrive at the first problem: Capitalising RD&D expenditure may increase 
the amount of money spent on RD&D, but it should not be equated with an increase in 
useful innovations. In other words, companies have an interest in RD&D, but not neces-
sarily an interest in the productive outcome of innovations. Increasing RD&D expendi-
ture, however, is not an end in itself, and does not necessarily translate into innovations. 
With this approach, there is a danger that capitalising RD&D expenditures can lead to 
an inefficient over-investment in RD&D or ‘gold-plating’ of RD&D projects, similar to 
the more general problem that rate-of-return regulation can lead to excessive capital 
expenditure (Averch-Johnson effect, see section 5.2.2). 
A further problem of capitalising RD&D expenditures can be that it gives companies an 
incentive to declare as many costs as possible as RD&D costs. Since DSOs will not get 
involved in basic research in most cases, but will test how an innovation can be imple-
mented in its network in, for example, demonstration projects, most innovation costs 
will not be incurred in a specialised RD&D centre, but will more likely be linked to 
‘normal business’. In practice it will therefore be difficult to assign costs to the RD&D 
budget that is to be capitalised.  
Under price-based regulation, the positive effect of the capitalisation approach on 
RD&D should be even stronger in principle, because the upper-end truncation is gener-
ally weaker. As opposed to cost-based regulation, this gives companies some incentive 
to aim for useful innovations. 
Finally, if capitalisation increases the amount of money spent on RD&D, it may reflect 
an inefficient RoR set by the regulator. As Holt (2005: 4) has pointed out, “capitalising 
or expensing expenditures should not have any present-value effect for the firm if the 
allowed rate of return is set at the level of the cost of capital (determined by the regula-
tor). Therefore, any additional R&D spending could reflect a generous cost of capital, 
and it would be difficult to determine whether these additional expenditures were ‘effi-
cient’.” 
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6.3.3 Output-based mechanisms 
While the approaches discussed in the previous section tackle the input side of RD&D, I 
now turn to mechanisms that are based on RD&D outputs, i.e. actual innovations. While 
input-based approaches basically take away the cost risk from companies (introducing 
lower-end truncation), output-based approaches make the innovation outputs more at-
tractive for them (relaxing the upper-end truncation). Under these approaches, compa-
nies can only benefit from successful innovations. I present the following output-based 
approaches: 
 including innovation outputs in price-based regulation through additional reve-
nue allowances, raising the cap imposed by the regulator; 
 extending the regulatory period; 
 regulatory holidays, effectively removing the cap on the regulated company for a 
limited period of time. 
One general problem of output-based approaches is that innovation outputs are even 
more difficult for the regulator to define and identify than innovation inputs. 
6.3.3.1 Raising the cap based on output criteria 
In a price-based-environment, companies can generally not directly recover the costs of 
RD&D, but have to recover them through the cost-savings relative to the revenue cap 
imposed by the regulator. If a company develops and introduces an innovation, the 
regulator can raise this cap, thereby allowing the company to recover some of the 
RD&D costs through the resulting higher revenue. As opposed to cost-based ap-
proaches, under a price-based mechanism this additional revenue allowance is not di-
rectly linked to the underlying costs a company has incurred, but is a function of the 
actual innovation, thus assuming an average cost value. The effect for the company 
Transforming the Grid Part II: Conceptual analysis  
 
-151- 
would be that it still carries the downside risk of RD&D, but due to a higher cap the 
upside truncation is less severe and there is a higher potential for the company to benefit 
from successful innovations, at least as long as the costs of developing these innovations 
are matched by the higher cap. 
While input-based approaches have to be based on a sound definition of RD&D costs, 
the main challenge with this approach is to define what exactly should drive the cap, or 
in other words how innovations can be defined. Two approaches to define revenue driv-
ers can be differentiated: 
Firstly, it has been proposed that general innovation-related output criteria such as pat-
ents be used (Holt 2005: 4). While this indicator is relatively easy to measure, the ques-
tion is whether it can adequately reflect RD&D efforts by regulated network operators, 
especially as they will mainly be involved in demonstrating and implementing innova-
tions. Also if the patent is held by a manufacturer outside the regulated industry, but the 
DSO still plays an important role in the innovation process, it would not be covered by 
this indicator. 
Secondly, the regulator can define ex-ante what counts as innovation or rewards innova-
tions in a specific area, e.g. innovative connections of DG. This is the approach that has 
been applied by Ofgem in the UK under the Registered Power Zone scheme (see UK 
case study in chapter 8). While this approach can be more targeted, there is also a sig-
nificant danger of the regulator micro-managing RD&D. 
6.3.3.2 Extending regulatory periods 
During regulatory periods, efficiency gains that exceed the efficiency gains foreseen by 
the regulator at the beginning of the regulatory period lead to higher profits. During 
these periods, companies can appropriate the benefits of innovation. At the beginning of 
the next regulatory period of an incentive scheme, efficiency gains are shifted to con-
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sumers. Under rate-of-return regulation, the regulatory lag has the same effect in princi-
ple. 
While the previous approach “Raising the cap” relaxes the upper-end truncation by al-
lowing the company to increase its revenue and make a higher profit during a regulatory 
period, the approach discussed in this section leaves the revenue cap untouched, but 
gives the company more time to benefit from reducing its costs below this cap. 
It can be argued that the regulatory lag or regulatory period has a similar effect on the 
incentive to innovate as patents, in that it protects the gains made through innovations 
(Schoppe, Wass von Czege 1984: 147; Bailey 1974). While patents protect the innova-
tion from being imitated by competitors for a certain period of time, the regulatory pe-
riod protects the benefits of innovations from being passed on to consumers.  
In a theoretical study, Bailey (1974: 295) has shown for rate-of-return regulation that 
extending the regulatory lag does have a positive effect on RD&D activities: “If regula-
tory lag is short, the firm will adopt a lower level of innovative activity. If the lag is 
longer, then the firm innovates more but society does not obtain as quickly the benefit in 
the form of lower prices”. 
Based on these arguments, Fuckso et al (2004: 38) have proposed for network regula-
tion in Hungary to extend the regulatory period from four to five years. The period be-
tween regulatory reviews would thus be deliberately used by the regulator to influence 
the innovation propensity of regulated companies. Under price-based regulation with its 
regulatory periods that are determined ex ante, this is in principle an option that is avail-
able to the regulator. Under cost-based regulation it may be more difficult for the regu-
lator to commit ex-ante to an extension of the lag. 
While it is plausible that the length of the regulatory period influences a company’s 
propensity to innovate, simply extending the regulatory period to provide innovation 
incentives does not seem to be a solution for at least three reasons. Firstly, the innova-
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tion incentive is not unambiguous. In another theoretical study of cost-based regulation, 
Sweeney (1981) has come to the conclusion that while the regulatory lag does play an 
important role for the incentive to innovate, companies may also have an incentive to 
delay the adoption of innovations due to the lag, as such a delay would also postpone 
the price reduction imposed by the regulator. 
Secondly, as has already been indicated by the citation from Bailey, there is also a 
trade-off between innovation incentives and shifting innovation benefits to consumers. 
In fact, there is a more general trade-off between efficiency incentives for the company 
and allocative efficiency that needs to be taken into account when discussing an exten-
sion of the regulatory period. In other words, an extension cannot solely be judged from 
an innovation perspective. The longer the regulatory period, the more a company can 
benefit from improved efficiency, yet the more the prices deviate from the costs. Also, a 
new regulatory period gives regulators the opportunity to fine-tune and adapt regulatory 
mechanisms based on the experiences made. As a consequence, the regulatory period 
should not be too long. 
The question arises if given this constraint the regulatory period can be long enough to 
stimulate innovations. Regulatory periods normally are between three and five years. 
Fucsko et al. (2004: 38), when putting forward their proposal to extend the regulatory 
period to promote innovations, concede that a one-year extension does not do much to 
promote innovation. Yet a longer extension does not seem to be feasible, given other 
regulatory objectives and constraints.  
Finally, there is an important difference between patents and regulatory periods. While 
patents protect one specific innovation, extending the regulatory period would not just 
affect innovations developed by a company, but would be valid for the business as a 
whole.  
In order to differentiate between innovation effects and the rest of the business, Holt 
(2005a) has proposed to “allow companies to retain the benefits of efficiency savings 
Transforming the Grid Part II: Conceptual analysis  
 
-154- 
derived as a result of undertaking RD&D for longer than the current five-year period 
for ‘conventional’ efficiency savings”. However, it is doubtful whether this approach is 
feasible in practice. It would require a detailed analysis by the regulator as to which 
efficiency savings can be traced back to a company’s RD&D efforts. The fact that some 
in-house RD&D can lead to efficiency savings by enabling a company to appropriate 
external RD&D results would make this process even more complicated. 
In summary, extending the regulatory period to stimulate RD&D and innovation cannot 
provide strong enough incentives, especially given the constraints of the overall regula-
tory process.  
6.3.3.3 Removing the cap: Regulatory holidays 
Another approach that has been discussed mainly in the telecommunications sector are 
so-called access or regulatory holidays (Holt 2005b; Gans, King 2004). Under this ap-
proach, the cap is not just raised, but a certain part of the network is temporarily ex-
empted from regulation, i.e. the cap is lifted altogether and the network company can in 
principle charge monopoly prices. Again, this is similar to patents in some ways. 
This mechanism seems quite radical compared with the previous mechanisms that seek 
to amend tariff regulation, rather than to intermit it. So why have regulatory holidays 
been proposed? The reason is related to the truncation problem I have discussed earlier.  
An RD&D project (or an investment in general) has a rate-of-return probability distribu-
tion, i.e. the project can fail or be successful in various degrees. Now assume an RD&D 
project is highly successful and generates a high RoR. In their analysis focusing on the 
telecommunications sector, Gans and King argue that the regulator may consider this 
too high and intervene to reduce it to a ‘reasonable’ level, e.g. to avoid any ‘fat cat’ 
claims of excessive profits from the political side or network customers.  
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Ex-post – i.e. once the project has turned out to be successful – the reduced rate of re-
turn may still be sufficient for the company, and leads to lower network tariffs that en-
able efficient use to be made of the network including the innovative facility. However, 
from an ex-ante point-of-view, this additional upper-end truncation of the probability 
distribution would have reduced the average rate of return, and may have made the pro-
ject with this adjusted risk profile unprofitable. In other words, if the company expects 
in advance that the upper end will be truncated, it would not have invested in the first 
place as the regulatory risk further truncates the potential profit. The problem is, as ar-
gued by Gans and King, that the regulator cannot credibly commit ex-ante that it will 
not exploit the company’s sunk costs ex-post. From this perspective, the only way 
around this problem is to introduce regulatory holidays, i.e. the regulator does not com-
mit to adhere to a certain overall rate of return, but commits to discontinuing regulation 
for a certain period of time, allowing the company to fully exploit its investment. 
The analysis that leads to the regulatory holiday proposal is similar to the analysis of 
price-based regulation I have presented in section 6.2.2. The underlying problem is the 
asymmetric truncation of costs and benefits: If the project fails, the company is stuck 
with the costs; if the project is successful, part of the benefits is passed on to consumers 
without taking into account the risk associated with achieving these benefits. In the 
analysis provided by Gans and King the asymmetry results from the fact that the regula-
tor cannot credibly commit to not truncating the upper-end ex-post. In the analysis pro-
vided in section 6.2.2, the asymmetric truncation is due to the fact that the regulator 
cannot distinguish between benefits that result from normal efficiency improvements on 
the one hand and innovative efforts with a higher risk on the other hand. As a result, the 
regulator applies the truncation that is appropriate for normal business to the riskier in-
vestments, too. 
In the telecommunications sector with potential infrastructure competition, the regula-
tory holiday approach may be applied to entirely new networks, like a cable network for 
pay TV, which is the example used by Gans and King, or a VDSL (Very-High-Data-
Rate Digital Subscriber Line) network, which was proposed by the German govern-
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ment. But even in the telecommunications sector, the approach is highly controversial, 
both politically (the German proposal was rejected by the European Commission) and 
theoretically (Blankart et al. 2006). 
In the electricity sector, the approach is even more problematic. Firstly, as there is no 
potential for infrastructure competition, it cannot be argued that network users that face 
monopoly prices during a regulatory holiday can switch to or build up an alternative 
network. Also, as innovations in this sector are typically more embedded in the existing 
network, it would be difficult to identify which part of the network should be exempted. 
Exemption of the whole network in which an innovative company operates could not be 
justified. I could not find any practical examples where electricity regulators have ap-
plied this approach. 
6.3.4 Conclusion 
The discussion in this section has shown that there are mechanisms available within the 
incentive regulation framework to counter the weak innovation incentives of the stan-
dard model and promote innovation. Price-based regulation as such can reduce incen-
tives for innovation as compared to cost-based regulation. However, as an additional 
innovation-oriented mechanism both price-based and cost-based approaches can be de-
signed to promote innovations. The general advantages of incentive regulation – that it 
can help the regulator deal with information asymmetries and can trigger efficiency 
gains – are relevant to the promotion of innovations, too. 
In terms of the individual mechanisms discussed, both the extension of regulatory peri-
ods and regulatory holidays have been found to be inappropriate for the promotion of 
innovations, at least in the electricity sector. For the other mechanisms, specific incen-
tive properties and regulatory issues have been identified. For the design of these inno-
vation mechanisms it is important whether the objective is to trigger efficiency gains or 
to support additional objectives. 
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As I have explained in chapter 5, cost- and price-based approaches are theoretical ex-
tremes cases that can be mixed in different ways. This is not only because in the course 
of practical implementation the boundaries get blurred, but also because elements of 
both approaches are intentionally mixed to give companies certain incentives and 
achieve certain results. Such hybrid mechanisms have already been discussed in chapter 
5 on network regulation and DG integration. Similarly, the input- and output-based 
mechanisms discussed in this section can be combined to promote RD&D and innova-
tion. 
6.4 Beyond the incentive regulation mechanism  
The previous sections have shown that the standard model can provide insufficient in-
centives for innovation, but the very mechanisms of the standard model can be adapted 
to promote innovation. The last section on innovation specific mechanisms was mainly 
concerned with amending the incentive regulation mechanism itself. This final section 
of the innovation chapter broadens the perspective beyond the “incentive regulation 
formula” in two ways: firstly, it discusses whether incentive regulation is the right place 
to promote network innovations; secondly, it discusses the policy-regulation interface 
and how it is affected by innovation mechanisms. 
6.4.1 Is economic regulation the right place to foster innovations? 
Relying on economic regulation to pursue objectives beyond efficiency can be criticised 
both from the standard model perspective as well as from the evolutionary perspective 
put forward in chapter 2.2. 
6.4.1.1 Critique from the perspective within regulatory economics 
Innovation mechanisms have not been a major issue in the standard model literature, but 
proponents of the standard model generally tend to be reluctant to include new mecha-
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nisms in this model to pursue new objectives. This is the case although these can be 
based on the very mechanisms of the standard model. There are several reasons for this 
reluctance:  
Firstly, when the standard model was introduced, it was claimed that it improves the 
conditions for innovations in electricity networks. It is clear that based on this claim, 
additional mechanisms seem unnecessary.  
Secondly, there is the argument that regulatory interventions are unlikely to have the 
desired effect on the innovation outcomes (e.g. Gerpott 2006: 148 on the telecommuni-
cation sector). 
Thirdly, additional mechanisms are assumed to weaken the core efficiency incentives of 
the standard model and lead to negative side effects. For example, Brunekreeft and 
Ehlers (2006: 82-83; cf. Pollitt 2008: xxx) are concerned about the consistency of the 
overall regulatory framework and potential contradictions between different elements if 
new mechanisms to pursue additional objectives are added.  
While this is certainly a serious issue, it is largely a matter of properly designing 
mechanisms, but not a fundamental argument against such additional incentives. We 
also need to bear in mind that additional mechanisms are not necessarily added to a 
hitherto consistent framework. Although economic regulation itself may be consistent, 
there can be significant inconsistencies between ‘pure’ incentive regulation incentivis-
ing DSOs against RD&D (as shown in section 6.2), on the one hand and policies outside 
network regulation that require and/or promote innovations on the other hand. The same 
argument has been made in chapter 5 for the political objective to increase the share of 
DG and the regulatory incentives that undermine this objective. 
A more serious argument against regulatory innovation mechanisms is the fact that ad-
ditional mechanisms within incentive regulation are to be paid by network customers. 
Shifting the innovation costs to customers of individual networks can be problematic 
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especially if the innovations not only benefit network customers in one network area, 
but also help support national policy objectives (see the discussion on internal and ex-
ternal objectives in chapter 5). In this case, it is clear that these objectives should be 
pursued through innovation instruments outside economic regulation.  
For example, in Australia the former regulator for New South Wales, IPART, decided in 
2004 to set up a programme to facilitate “demand-side management”, including “em-
bedded generators”. In this context, the regulator decided not to include costs associated 
with ‘learning by doing’, arguing that it is “inappropriate for customers to bear the 
costs of knowledge-building or experimental demand management activities – rather, 
this is a role for government or the distribution network services providers themselves” 
(IPART 2004: 94). 
If innovations are to be financed via network charges, an alternative to economic incen-
tives for individual companies are public service obligation funded by all customers. 
For example, this approach has been applied in Italy and Denmark (Bauknecht et al. 
2007; see also case study on Denmark). 
However, even if one argues that economic regulation is not the best place to support 
innovations and that RD&D should be mainly supported outside regulation, e.g. through 
public funding, the economic incentives of network companies are still largely influ-
enced by economic regulation. Regulation should therefore at least point into the same 
direction as other instruments outside regulation. This can be achieved by applying the 
mechanisms discussed earlier. The practical design of the instruments should take into 
account any support outside regulation, e.g. when determining the relevant parameters. 
For example, if network companies receive part-funding for RD&D projects through 
research programmes outside regulation this represents a form of lower-end truncation. 
However, economic regulation still needs to take into account the company’s own con-
tribution to the projects funded under this programme and generally support the innova-
tion objectives pursued by the research programme.  
Transforming the Grid Part II: Conceptual analysis  
 
-160- 
In summary, economic regulation should not be the main instrument for providing 
RD&D funding. Yet if ‘pure’ incentive regulation is applied with the innovation incen-
tives analysed earlier, it is likely to be inconsistent with innovation instruments outside 
regulation. Innovation mechanisms within economic regulation are therefore still neces-
sary and need to be consistent with innovation instruments outside regulation.  
6.4.1.2 Critique from the perspective outside regulatory economics: Are revenue 
incentives sufficient? 
In the evolutionary economics literature presented in chapter 2.2, the innovation effects 
of network regulation have received even less attention than in the regulatory economics 
literature. This supports the argument made in chapter 2 that the evolutionary and sys-
tem transformation literature has neglected to link its insights to established policies, i.e. 
the standard model of liberalisation and regulation in the case of the electricity sector.  
Applying the arguments of the literature presented in chapter 2.2, a number of short-
comings of the above discussion on amending the standard model become visible. Most 
importantly, the mechanisms discussed tend to assume that innovation is an optimisa-
tion process performed by individual companies. This means that the company com-
pares known RD&D inputs with known RD&D outputs and decides to spend on RD&D 
projects in order to maximise its RD&D benefits. From this perspective, innovation is 
analysed like an investment made by the network company. With the mechanisms pre-
sented above, the regulator changes the economic parameters of this optimisation proc-
ess in order to influence the innovations outputs or the efficiency of RD&D. 
In contrast to this view, the evolutionary economics literature argues that innovation is 
not a rational optimisation with perfect foresight, but is characterised by bounded ra-
tionality and imperfect information as well as institutional factors that influence a com-
pany’s decision-making. In other words, innovation is no longer regarded as an input-
output relation, with RD&D spending as the most relevant input factor and with upper- 
and lower-end truncation from the company’s perspective. Rather, innovation processes 
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are put into a wider context that constrains and directs the innovation process. In the 
case of network innovations this can include, for example:  
 the RD&D capacity of regulated companies that is a prerequisite to react to ex-
ternal price signals,  
 the RD&D culture and routines within companies that guide the search for new 
solutions, 
 innovation networks, e.g. the link between regulated companies and equipment 
suppliers which is necessary for the regulated companies to introduce innova-
tions in their network (see section 6.1), 
 general visions and expectations of future network developments, e.g. in the sec-
tor itself or in the political realm that guide innovation processes within individ-
ual companies beyond a mere input-output optimisation. 
In this perspective the regulated companies can hardly be characterised as rational, op-
timising actors that adapt their RD&D and innovation strategy more or less instantane-
ously to changes in the economic incentives given by regulation. Nevertheless, eco-
nomic regulation does represent a key factor influencing the decision-making processes 
of regulated companies, including decisions to build up internal RD&D capacities and 
establish links into an innovation network. Applying the terminology of the evolution-
ary perspective on innovations, economic regulation is an important element of the se-
lection environment (see section 2.2) in which innovations develop. 
Therefore, even if amending revenue incentives is not sufficient, it is still necessary – 
not least of all in order to ensure that economic regulation is consistent with other ap-
proaches that are based on evolutionary thinking on innovation. The conclusion from 
this discussion is thus in line with the outcome of the previous section. Incentive regula-
tion is not a neutral instrument, where one can decide whether or not to use it to incen-
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tivise innovations. Rather, even in its ‘pure’ form it provides innovation-related incen-
tives that need to be altered in line with innovation objective and instruments outside 
regulation. 
6.4.2 Policy-Regulation Interface 
The previous section has already highlighted that the discussion on promoting innova-
tions via economic regulation cannot be limited to the incentive regulation mechanism 
itself. Rather, it needs to be seen in broader energy and innovation policy context. This 
is necessary for two reasons: firstly, economic regulation needs to be coordinated with 
other innovation instruments as discussed before; secondly, even if network innovations 
were only facilitated through network regulation, this has a political dimension, too. 
This is the case irrespective of whether innovations increase efficiency or support other 
objectives. 
If the objective of innovation mechanisms is ‘merely’ to promote innovations to further 
increase network efficiency, the design of innovation mechanisms could be left to the 
regulator, provided that innovation was a well-understood optimisation process. In this 
case, the innovation mechanisms could be designed so that their additional costs for 
network customers are justified by the expected innovation benefits. The regulator could 
deal with this additional efficiency potential within its efficiency remit. 
In the traditional regulatory economics literature innovation tends to be portrayed as an 
optimisation process that allows the regulated company to maximise its profits. For ex-
ample, Bailey has modelled regulation based on the firm’s objective “to select that level 
of innovative activity which, for any stated value of the regulatory lag T, maximizes its 
discounted stream of net profits” (Bailey 1974: 286). More recent insights into the in-
novation process like those presented in chapter 2.2 undermine the notion that the com-
pany is able to determine an optimal level of innovation effort. 
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What is more, modern regulatory economics stresses the information asymmetry be-
tween the company and the regulator. As a consequence, any knowledge about the right 
level of RD&D the company may have is not easily accessible to the regulator. Incen-
tive regulation aims at overcoming this information asymmetry. However, while 
benchmarking procedures may give the regulator an idea about efficient network provi-
sion, the benefits of RD&D are much more difficult to assess. It is therefore hardly pos-
sible for the regulator to gain an insight into the right level of RD&D, at least not in the 
sense that this could justify innovation specific mechanisms in the first place. 
The decision to set up regulatory mechanisms for innovations will therefore not be 
based on a computer model or the like that identifies innovations as a way to increase 
efficiency. Rather, it represents a more fundamental decision to shift the regulatory 
agenda based on an overall judgement of the sector and its development potential: from 
short-term efficiency gains to long-term network development and the implementation 
of innovative network concepts at short-term costs. As the benefits of this shift are un-
certain, it basically becomes a decision whether to err on the side of long-term innova-
tion or short-term cost reduction. In a different context Baldwin and Cave (1999: 103-
108) have discussed the issue of regulatory over- and under-inclusiveness. In the con-
text of this discussion, this distinction could be applied to refer to the risk of spending 
too much or too little on innovation. This is ultimately a political decision. 
If innovations are to support objectives beyond efficiency the political dimension be-
comes even more apparent. In this case, the decision to be made is not just about the 
level of innovation, but the additional objectives also determine the direction of innova-
tion, which even more strongly calls for a political decision and needs to be coordinated 
with overall energy policy objectives. If there is a political decision to support DG and 
related network innovations, this can be the basis for the regulator to support these in-
novations and to err on the side of over-inclusiveness. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the effect of incentive regulation on innovation and regulatory 
mechanisms to incentivise network innovations. The results of this chapter correspond 
with the results of the previous chapter 5 in several ways.  
Firstly, while chapter 5 has shown the tension between incentive regulation and the DG 
objective, this chapter has shown the tension between incentive regulation and network 
innovations. This analysis pertains both to innovations that increase network efficiency 
and those that support DG integration. It thus confirms the general argument made in 
chapter 2.1 for the specific case of network regulation: the standard model of electricity 
market liberalisation has been successful in short-term efficiency improvements, but 
exhibits short-comings when it comes to long-term infrastructure developments. This is 
the case especially when infrastructure development is required to reach objectives be-
yond efficiency.  
Secondly, as for the potential of the standard model to integrate DG integration and 
network development as new objectives this chapter has confirmed the results of chapter 
5 with regard to network innovations: The standard model can be amended based on its 
very mechanisms to pursue additional objectives beyond short-term efficiency. Based 
on the broader understanding of incentive regulation put forward in chapter 5, price- and 
cost-based mechanisms represent a powerful toolbox for providing the network com-
pany with incentives for effective and efficient innovations. As with the DG incentives 
discussed in chapter 5, cost- and price-based mechanisms may be combined for that 
purpose. 
Finally, the chapter has also highlighted a number of problems that arise when the dis-
cussion is limited to the incentive regulation mechanisms: Applying the evolutionary 
view on innovations presented in chapter 2.2 calls into question the notion of innovation 
as an optimisation process by rational firms that react to price signals given by regula-
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tion. Amending the incentive formula is necessary to make economic regulation consis-
tent with innovation strategies outside regulation, but not sufficient.  
Moreover, the political dimension, which was already mentioned in chapter 5, has be-
come visible. On the level of the incentive formula the very mechanisms of incentive 
regulation can be applied to reach additional objectives. But this should not obstruct 
acceptance of the fact that these amendments change the relationship between policy-
making and regulation.  
While chapters 5 and 6 have focused on amending the incentive regulation formula, the 
following chapters will build on these latter aspects and discuss the potential of the 
standard model of economic regulation more generally. 
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7 Beyond changes in the incentive formula 
Chapters 5 and 6 analysed regulatory mechanisms for providing DSOs with financial 
incentives to integrate DG and to actively promote network innovations. It was shown 
that these mechanisms fit into the standard model of incentive regulation based on cost- 
and price-based tariff regulation. Although incentive regulation was initially designed to 
promote the efficiency of supplying electricity via the networks, it can be adapted to 
pursue additional objectives like the network integration of DG.  
So far, this analysis supports the general view expressed in liberalisation literature, as 
presented in chapter 2: new objectives can be integrated into the standard model of elec-
tricity market liberalisation. Just like the standard model of market liberalisation is sup-
posed to provide, for example, CO2 reductions at the lowest cost via market-based emis-
sions trading (see chapter 2.1), incentive regulation can be designed to integrate DG into 
the networks at the lowest cost.  
In this chapter it is argued that an incentive regulation mechanism alone is not suffi-
cient. This is the case for three reasons: 
1) Network regulation by itself is not sufficient to promote DG. Regulation is impor-
tant for integrating DG into networks, but is not the right place for dealing with the 
economics of the DG plant itself. Therefore, regulation needs to be complemented 
by support mechanisms that are located outside network regulation. As mentioned in 
chapters 3 and 5, a main driver for DG has been specific support mechanisms like 
feed-in tariffs or quota systems. Considering DG in network regulation should not 
be confused with setting up such a support scheme for DG within network regula-
tion. Moreover, as explained in chapter 6, regulatory mechanisms for promoting in-
novations need to be coordinated with innovation instruments outside regulation. 
However, these complementary instruments will not be discussed further in this 
chapter since the key focus of this thesis is on network regulation. 
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2) Another question is whether network regulation itself should be limited to economic 
incentives, or whether additional instruments should be applied by the regulator. 
This question becomes particularly relevant when regulation is to promote not only 
the efficient connection of DG, but overall infrastructure transformation. For exam-
ple, the European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG 2009: 7) has 
stressed that “it can be argued that incentive regulation alone should ensure that 
new technologies and solutions are pursued by network companies, provided that 
there are regulatory mechanisms in place that provide for quantified evaluation of 
the grid’s “smartness”. However, there is evidence that, while this will apply for in-
cremental innovation, it is much less effective for more radical innovation which re-
quires more substantial regulatory treatment”.  
 
Regulatory options beyond economic incentives will be further explored in section 
7.1 of this chapter. Based on the research framework put forward in chapter 4, this 
section mainly addresses the relationship between the regulator and the regulated 
company, as well as other stakeholders. 
3) Finally, DG and network transformation as a new objective require not only adapta-
tions on the level of regulatory instruments, but make it necessary to rethink the 
overall role and objectives of regulation. This will be discussed in section 7.2 of this 
chapter. Based on the research framework put forward in chapter 4, this section 
mainly concerns the role of regulation in the wider energy policy context. 
It should be noted that there is not much literature which could be used as a basis for 
this chapter. On the one hand, standard model literature has been more concerned with 
phasing out regulation than with adapting it to new challenges. On the other hand, sys-
tem transformation literature has not explained exactly how its proposals can link up 
with the existing governance framework in the electricity sector. There are some studies 
that have reviewed the potential to adapt the standard model of regulation beyond the 
incentive formula in order to contribute to sustainability rather than short-term effi-
ciency alone (cf. Bartle, Vass 2007; Owen 2004). The sustainability perspective is very 
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close to the transformation perspective because it also stresses long-term system effects 
and because transformation has chiefly become a relevant issue due to sustainability 
requirements. 
7.1 Governance mechanisms beyond the incentive formula 
This section reviews the governance mechanisms of the standard model in the light of 
network transformation. It begins by explaining why governance of system transforma-
tion is a relevant issue for electricity network infrastructure. The section then goes on to 
present generic governance requirements in the context of system transformation, based 
on chapter 2.2. In the next step, these governance requirements are contrasted with the 
standard model and a number of adjustments to the standard model are proposed. 
7.1.1 Network transformation and the standard model 
The main question addressed by this thesis is how DG integration and network devel-
opment can be integrated into the standard model of network regulation and whether 
and how the regulatory framework needs to evolve. In chapter 2, the standard model of 
electricity liberalisation was contrasted with system transformation literature. Relevant 
system transformation literature was presented to provide a theoretical basis for chal-
lenging the standard model. 
While the standard model relies on the market mechanism and market-based instru-
ments to correct market failures, system transformation literature stresses the need for 
additional governance mechanisms. Proponents of the standard model will reject the 
very argument that system transformation represents a specific challenge. Instead, they 
will tend to argue that the competitive market will lead to the required changes, includ-
ing structural transformations if necessary. In the case of DG and network regulation, 
this would mean that the financial incentives presented in chapters 5 and 6 are sufficient 
to trigger the required adaptations. 
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For example, in a report for the UK regulator Ofgem discussing regulatory mechanisms 
for dealing with uncertainty Frontier Economics (2003) recognises that DG can cause 
additional uncertainty in the short term. As a new phenomenon, its network costs are 
more uncertain and diverse than those of ‘traditional’ generators. This can be dealt with 
using incentive mechanisms like those discussed in chapter 5. However, according to 
this report, “DG is likely to become a more ‘normal’ part of what DNOs do”, assuming 
that "the network develops towards a transmission role, in which its function is to con-
nect generation to load.” This transmission role involves active balancing of supply and 
demand analogous to the high voltage transmission system, rather than passive distribu-
tion of power to consumers. 
How this long-term transformation towards a ‘transmission role’ will come about, 
whether there are other development options and how these can be influenced, is not 
discussed. This is surprising because it would entail far-reaching changes with repercus-
sions on the business model of distribution network operators, their network control 
paradigm, the relationship between distribution and transmission system operators, and 
the overall commercial framework. 
Although within the standard model system transformation is largely ignored as a spe-
cific challenge, there are a number of reasons as to why the arguments of the system 
transformation literature are relevant for the electricity sector in general and the net-
works in particular. 
Firstly, the standard model was designed to improve efficiency, rather than to provide a 
governance mechanism for structural transformation. It is taken for granted that the 
model is capable of dealing with long-term issues, too. However, chapter 2 has shown 
that the standard model encounters problem when the focus shifts from short-term effi-
ciency to more long-term issues like investment and innovation. This is particularly 
problematic when:  
Transforming the Grid Part II: Conceptual analysis  
 
-170- 
 investment and innovation are not generally framed by the need to maintain and 
improve the current centralised structure of electricity supply based on large-
scale plants, but are building blocks of a system transformation and need to be 
coordinated accordingly, and 
 the main objective of this transformation process is not to increase network effi-
ciency, but to provide the infrastructure to achieve other political targets, as in 
the case with DG integration.  
Secondly, such a system transformation is a relevant issue for the electricity system, 
including electricity networks. In chapter 3, it was shown that the network implications 
of DG can go beyond individual connections or incremental adaptations in individual 
networks. Rather, an overall transformation of the network structure can result from 
DG, covering both the distribution and the transmission system.  
Thirdly, due to the special characteristics of the electricity system in general and the 
network in particular, the system transformation drivers and barriers described in chap-
ter 2.2 are highly relevant for this sector. The electricity system represents a prime ex-
ample of an interlinked system that is prone to lock-in and path dependency (Hughes 
1983; Unruh 2000). This system characteristic is particularly tangible in the case of the 
network infrastructure where wires and the connected elements on the generation and 
demand side constitute an interlinked system. As a consequence one element is difficult 
to change without adapting other elements, too. Applying the concept of socio-technical 
system, this infrastructure system also includes, for example, the network companies, 
their organisational set-up, strategies and planning procedures.  
A further peculiarity of the network infrastructure is that investments are (WRR 2008): 
 highly capital-intensive,  
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 lumpy, i.e. expansions often need to be carried out in big steps, rather than 
gradually, which reduces the flexibility to adapt to new developments, 
 sunk, i.e. investments tend to be irreversible and cannot be used for other pur-
poses; and  
 characterised by a long physical life-span and long depreciation periods. 
This reduces the flexibility of network development and adds to the path dependency 
and potential lock-in. Network companies cannot easily adapt to new objectives and 
requirements, even if economic signals are changed via the incentive formula. 
For example, in chapter 3.1.2.3 it was explained that in some cases DG can be used to 
replace network investments, thus reducing rather than increasing network costs. Pro-
vided the DG plants themselves are economically viable, these plants should be in-
stalled to increase overall efficiency. However, even under incentive regulation, this 
may be problematic, as described in section 5.1.3, if the DSO cannot benefit from the 
savings. This problem may be overcome by additional incentive mechanisms, such as 
those set out in chapter 5. 
But even if the incentive mechanisms are adapted the DSO which employs DG as a 
network solution may face the problem that this requires some sort of “holistic devel-
opment” (Harrison, Wallace 2004) rather than a case-by-case decision. This is partly 
because on a case-by-case basis the path dependency of the existing network layout 
tends to favour traditional network solutions. As de Jong explains in a review of net-
work planning approaches and their effect on using DG as an alternative to network 
upgrades, “network planners need to know in which way they want to develop their 
grids (…). The DNO has to make a choice about the future grid layout, especially about 
the functionality of the medium voltage grid. Since the amount of installed DG/RES is 
still uncertain and the technologies change fast, it is difficult for a DNO to anticipate 
future changes.” 
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An important prerequisite for the DSO using DG as an alternative to network upgrades 
is that it must be able to integrate DG into network operation, i.e. control their genera-
tion. This requires development of the necessary control infrastructure. As this will gen-
erally not be carried out for single DG connections, it represents a lumpy investment 
that is sunk if it turns out that DG cannot be used as a network alternative as expected. 
In such a situation a DSO may prefer conventional network upgrades, even if it is incen-
tivised to promote DG-based solutions. Even if the additional incentive mechanisms 
cover the costs of new solutions and enable the DSO to benefit from network replace-
ments in individual cases, they are unlikely to reflect the uncertainty resulting from 
changing technologies and uncertain future system developments. 
This example illustrates that even for an individual network it will not be sufficient to 
make individual DG projects more attractive by changing the incentive formula. Rather, 
the decision on individual projects needs to be embedded in a general ’vision’ of the 
future share as well as the location of DG and corresponding network developments. It 
is only then that the DSO can overcome the path dependency of conventional network 
development and justify a new investment strategy. This vision depends on the expecta-
tions placed on the development of the network at hand, but is necessarily linked to a 
more general sector vision. 
The coordination requirements become even more important when changes are not lim-
ited to individual networks. The proposed developments may go beyond incremental 
innovations in some parts of the network, developed and implemented by individual 
network operators. Rather, they may require system innovations and lead to an overall 
transformation of the network structure and the way networks are operated.  
This transformation involves a broad range of actors: different network companies on 
the distribution and transmission level, demand and generation customers, equipment 
suppliers as well as other stakeholders. This necessitates close coordination of different 
actors changing different system components.  
Transforming the Grid Part II: Conceptual analysis  
 
-173- 
The innovation incentives discussed in chapter 6 may give the individual DSO an incen-
tive to invest in RD&D so that it can thereby benefit from the cost saving. However, 
even with such incentives in place it is difficult for the individual company to know in 
which direction the system may be heading and how its innovation project links up with 
other innovation projects and the overall system transformation dynamics. The individ-
ual projects may not add up to an overall network configuration which works and can 
integrate the politically desired share of DG at low cost. 
For these reasons, it is not sufficient to deal only with the costs and risks of individual 
DG connections and how these are likely to change due to a transformed system, as is 
the case, for example, in the Frontier Economics report cited above. Rather, the trans-
formation process itself constitutes a challenge for network governance. 
7.1.2 Reflexive governance of system transformation 
The previous section did not present a detailed analysis of the capability of the standard 
model to deal with network transformation. However, it did set out a number of argu-
ments as to why the governance proposals of system transformation literature are worth 
considering for the specific case of network governance. 
In chapter 2.2, two governance approaches were presented to illustrate how the govern-
ance of system transformation literature proposes complementing standard governance 
mechanisms, namely strategic niche management and foresight. In this section, a brief 
but more comprehensive overview on governance mechanisms for system transforma-
tion is presented, based on Voß and Kemp (2006). This will provide a template for the 
following section in which the standard model is contrasted with the requirements of 
system transformation. Voß and Kemp presented their analysis of ‘reflexive govern-
ance’ as a prerequisite for sustainable development. ‘Reflexive governance’ may be 
applied to small-scale problems as well as on a system level. System transformation 
approaches such as transition management follow the principles of ‘reflexive govern-
ance’, as explained by Kemp and Loorbach (2006). 
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Five governance challenges for system transformation and corresponding strategies are 
identified; they are summarised in Table 6. Firstly, in terms of system analysis the con-
sequences of policy interventions are not clearly predictable as they are the result of 
complex interactions between various actors and system components. Secondly, a clear-
cut definition of goals is problematic since these are subject to transformation them-
selves, and conflicts of interest are inherent to the process. To address both of these 
challenges it is necessary, as a first consideration, to include a broad range of different 
actors with diverse interests in the process of system analysis and goal definition so that 
subsequent governance strategies are as robust as possible. To deal with uncertainty 
regarding system behaviour, a portfolio of experiments to explore different approaches 
should be used, e.g. via strategic niche management (see chapter 2). Goals should be re-
examined on a regular basis to see if they are still valid. Moreover, strategies and insti-
tutions should be designed so as to be adaptive and capable of responding to new in-
sights or objectives. As the long-term development of the system will be shaped by to-
day’s actions, it is necessary to anticipate the long-term effects of governance mecha-
nisms, e.g. with the help of foresight (see chapter 2). Moreover, today’s experiments 
should be linked to the anticipation of long-term effects and overall system development 
(Truffer et al. 2003; Geyer, Davies 2000). 
The third governance challenge is linked to the fact that central control over the steering 
process is unrealistic – even more so in a liberalised market. Many actors pulling in dif-
ferent directions influence the transformation process. Liberalisation opens the door for 
new actors and new kinds of actors who can influence the future development of the 
electricity system. As reverting to central planning is not seen as an option, it becomes 
necessary to coordinate and encourage the various actors to make long-term system 
transformation happen. 
The following table provides an overview of the governance challenges and strategies. 
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Table 6: Appropriate strategies for reflexive governance 
Aspect of 
Problem 
treating 
System analysis 
Goal formula-
tion 
Strategy im-
plementation 
Specific 
problem 
features 
Co-evolution 
of heteroge-
neous ele-
ments 
across multi-
ple scales 
(society, 
technology, 
ecology) 
Uncertainty 
and ignorance 
about trans-
formation dy-
namics and 
effects of in-
tervention 
Path-
dependency 
of structural 
change, high 
society im-
pact 
Sustainability 
goals involve 
value trade-
offs, are en-
dogenous to 
transformation 
Capacities to 
influence trans-
formation are 
distributed 
among actors 
Strategy 
requirement 
Trans-
disciplinary 
knowledge 
production 
Experiments 
and adaptivity 
of strategies 
and institutions
Anticipation 
of long-term 
systematic 
effects of 
measures 
Iterative par-
ticipatory goal 
formulation 
Interactive 
strategy devel-
opment 
Source: (Voß, Kemp 2006: 18) 
7.1.3 Network regulation and governance of system transformation 
What are the implications of these governance requirements for the standard model of 
network regulation? At first sight, the standard model seems at odds with the govern-
ance perspective presented in the previous section. 
Firstly, the standard model relies on price signals as the single most important govern-
ance mechanism. The standard model was designed to increase the efficiency of the 
existing network. While regulation is justified based on a market failure, regulation still 
is to mimic the market mechanism. Incentive regulation seeks to emulate the price 
mechanism of the market in that it gives network operators financial incentives to be-
come more efficient or achieve other targets defined by the regulator – the governance 
mechanisms outlined above do not seem to be relevant. 
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Secondly, at a more fundamental level, the standard model of network regulation is 
based on separation whereas governance of system transformation requires integration. 
The standard model focuses on one particular aspect of the energy system – namely the 
economic efficiency of networks. In the standard model, network regulation is regarded 
as a mainly technical exercise that is necessary to provide a stable framework. In con-
trast, governance of system transformation as outlined above requires an integrated ap-
proach, coordinating diverse actors and developments in different parts of the system 
and consideration of long-term structural effects of today’s regulatory actions. 
In this perspective, network regulation fully fits into the standard model of liberalisation 
and seems difficult to reconcile with the governance requirements that have been out-
lined in chapter 2.2 and section 7.1.2 of this chapter. However, there is more to the 
standard model than ‘simply’ mimicking the market. It is market based only in that it 
relies on price signals for the regulated companies. However, the way these price sig-
nals function clearly deviates from the market mechanisms. As Helm (2003: 277-278) 
has put it, “the RPI-X regime is not remotely similar to the way in which prices are set 
in a competitive market.” One reason Helm mentions for this are the fixed regulatory 
periods in which – unlike the situation in a competitive market – regulated companies 
can rely on a fixed price level.  
More importantly in this context, setting the price signal involves an institutional ar-
rangement that cannot be described in terms of markets alone. Rather, it mixes a range 
of different governance mechanisms, including consultation processes and negotiations 
between regulator and companies as well as top-down decision-making by the regulator 
when determining network tariffs. In this sense, it would be too simplistic to portray the 
standard model merely as governance mechanisms based on price signals. 
This relates to the broader definition of the standard model that was introduced in sec-
tion 4.1.2 as part of the research framework. While the implementation of the standard 
model in liberalised electricity markets is typically equated with the introduction of 
price- or revenue cap-mechanisms to increase efficiency, the standard model can also be 
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understood as a broader governance arrangement that relies on incentives-based mecha-
nisms, but also comprises other governance mechanisms. 
At a more fundamental level it is important to note that both the standard model of net-
work regulation and the thinking on governance of system transformation have some 
common roots. Both are based on a dynamic, process-oriented learning perspective that 
has been prominently expressed by the Austrian economic tradition, compared to a 
static perspective that assumes the possibility of rational control (Midttun 2005; Cor-
reljé 2005). The standard model stresses the limits for the regulator to influence the be-
haviour of the regulated companies. Moreover, it has left behind a static efficiency per-
spective in that it provides companies with an incentive to strive for cost reductions. 
The standard model aims at providing a framework for learning, and the development of 
regulation itself is a dynamic learning process.  
There is a difference between the two approaches in that system transformation litera-
ture does not focus on efficiency and does not want to rely on markets only; rather, it 
calls for additional governance mechanisms that can enable system transformation. 
However, similarly to the standard model, it rejects the idea that this transformation can 
be fully designed ex-ante and the implementation be managed in a controlling sense. It 
thus extends the dynamic view on the market process to overall system transformation. 
In general, there are tensions between the governance of system transformation and the 
standard model, but they are less mutually exclusive than it may first appear. In the fol-
lowing, the standard model will be examined in the light of two central themes in the 
governance of system transformation literature, namely: 
 strategies for dealing with uncertainty, and 
 the coordination of a broad range of actors (partly in order to deal with uncer-
tainty) 
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Each section also briefly outlines options based on the governance of system transfor-
mation literature to complement the incentive mechanism in the standard model, with-
out presenting a comprehensive model of how to redesign the standard model.  
7.1.3.1 Regulation under uncertainty 
A key issue in the governance of system transformation as presented in the previous 
section is the uncertainty about future system dynamics and hence the need to anticipate 
possible long-term developments and remain adaptive to these development scenarios. 
How does this relate to the standard model? 
From information asymmetry to systemic uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a key issue for the governance of system transformation and “uncertainty 
is at the heart of the economics of regulation”, too (Frontier Economics 2003: 2). 
Therefore, the two concepts do have some common ground, but the focus is on different 
levels of uncertainty. 
A primary motivation for introducing incentive regulation has been to counter the in-
formation asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated company. The regulated 
company has a better knowledge of its costs and the potential for efficiency than the 
regulator. Therefore the regulator cannot simply set network tariffs at the efficient level, 
but needs to incentivise the regulated company to exploit its efficiency potential. An-
other uncertainty with which the standard model is equipped to deal is the cost uncer-
tainty for the network companies that results from developments like DG. This leads to 
the regulatory mechanisms discussed in chapter 5. Essentially the discussion is about 
how to distribute this cost uncertainty between network companies and network users.  
Thus, the standard model provides a framework that is explicitly designed to deal with 
uncertainty. It acknowledges the bounded rationality of regulators and the limited con-
trol they have over companies. The regulator provides an incentive for the companies to 
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reveal their efficient costs; cost uncertainties resulting from DG can be reflected in the 
network tariffs. 
While connecting DG to the existing system is more or less a well-defined problem (al-
though connection costs can be uncertain and diverse), long-term innovation and trans-
formation entails increasing uncertainty about future development paths and how these 
may be shaped by today’s regulation and investment. With system transformation, the 
lack of information thus becomes a more fundamental problem: The main issue is no 
longer the limited information of the regulator about efficient costs, but the general un-
certainty about innovation potentials and the future development of the network infra-
structure. The regulator, the network companies and other stakeholders are affected by 
this uncertainty.  
In the case of DG connection the companies face a cost risk, but know what to do once 
a DG plant wants to connect to the system. In the case of system transformation, all 
stakeholders face uncertainty as to where the system is heading and how their decisions 
affect and fit into this overall system development. This uncertainty cannot be dealt with 
via network tariffs alone. Even if the regulator allowed the DSOs to pass through any 
cost risk resulting from network transformation to network users, this would not guaran-
tee that network operators would develop a system in time that is best suited to accom-
modating a high share of DG. 
In summary, the standard model is not based on perfect information and control, but 
does acknowledge uncertainty and provides and explicit framework to deal with it. 
However this framework is limited to cost uncertainties. Uncertainties that cannot be 
expressed in terms of costs alone and go beyond the relationship between the regulator 
and the regulated company and which become more relevant with long-term system 
transformation are difficult to incorporate. 
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Anticipation: The time horizon of network regulation 
Another relevant dimension is the time horizon of network regulation. The more we 
move from the connection of DG to system transformation the more the focus shifts 
from short-term operating efficiency to long-term structural change. How can a regula-
tor that was set up to achieve the former contribute to promoting the latter? 
One rationale for regulation through an independent regulator is to enable long-term 
commitment that goes beyond the political time horizon of election periods and is not 
undermined by short-term politics (see chapter 3: Sector-specific, independent regula-
tors). Majone describes independent regulators as a reaction to the short-termism of 
democratic governance that “may produce harm when the problems faced by society 
require long-term solutions” (Majone 1999: 4). Such a long-term perspective is argua-
bly particularly important in infrastructure sectors that require long-term investments.  
Majone’s diagnosis sounds similar to the one put forward by proponents of transition 
management. For example Kemp et al. (2007) describe the need to counter “political 
myopia” with a governance model that can generate long-term solutions. At first sight, 
the standard model seems to be in line with the long-term perspective needed in the con-
text of system transformation.  
Yet a closer analysis reveals a number of tensions. First of all, it is not definite that set-
ting up an independent regulator by itself can provide long-term solutions. One problem 
is that even for an independent regulator it is not straightforward to commit itself to its 
regulatory contract with network operators. While Majone presents the introduction of 
independent agencies alone as a solution to long-term problems, there is a discussion in 
standard model literature as to whether and how the regulator can indeed credibly com-
mit to an agreed rate-of-return and how this affects investment incentives (Brunekreeft, 
McDaniel 2005). 
Secondly, even assuming that the regulator can establish the credibility that is needed to 
overcome the problem of time inconsistency, it does not mean that a comprehensive 
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long-term framework is provided. The standard model establishes, at least implicitly, a 
long-term framework in which companies can expect efficiency improvements to be 
required beyond the current regulatory period. Yet apart from this general efficiency 
objective there are usually no medium- to long-term objectives that can guide the com-
panies’ decision making. When the standard model was developed any problems arising 
from long-term regulation were deliberately ignored (e.g. Scarsi, Petrov , no date: 4). 
Examples for a more long-term framework include: Does the regulator expect compa-
nies to innovate in order to meet the efficiency objective (which does not follow auto-
matically from the efficiency objective, as shown in chapter 6)? How does the regulator 
plan to deal with DG-related investment costs? Even if the regulator can commit to not 
taking advantage of individual investments ex-post, such a long-term framework will be 
important for companies in terms of defining their overall strategy beyond individual 
investments, designing their network planning philosophy or developing the necessary 
RD&D capacity. 
Thirdly, the main rationale for the regulator being independent is to overcome the prob-
lem of time inconsistency and achieve credible policy commitments. Therefore, long-
term commitment does not imply that regulation takes into account potential long-term 
developments. Rather, it means a commitment not to change course. The long-term per-
spective is not based on any institutional arrangements or instruments that would enable 
the regulator to take into account the long-term effects of current regulation. It is there 
to keep politics out of the process and ensure regulated companies that their investment 
will not be exploited once costs are sunk. The model may therefore be well suited to 
providing stability and enabling long-term investments in the current system. However, 
it does not provide a framework for anticipating the long-term systematic effects of 
measures, as requested by governance of transformation literature. 
There have been calls for a more long-term framework both in network regulation lit-
erature and statements from network operators. For example, Jamasb and Pollitt (2007: 
6185) conclude from their review of incentive regulation in Britain that “European elec-
tricity regulators should take into account the power and long-term effects of incentive 
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schemes in influencing the features and behaviour of regulated firms”. In a presentation 
on regulation and innovation Martijn Bongaerts from the Dutch network operator Con-
tinuon Netbeheer said that “there has to be long-term vision where to go” (Bongaerts 
2006). Such a framework can be established with the help of scenarios. It should be 
regarded as complementary to the innovation incentives described in chapter 6. 
In the face of long-term infrastructure transformation, scenario processes can help deal 
with three challenges:  
 anticipating long-term systemic effects 
 formulating iterative participatory goals and 
 identifying areas where further research and development is needed, including 
technological and regulatory developments, e.g. in the EU Technology Platform 
on Smart Grids: http://www.smartgrids.eu. This can provide the basis for devel-
oping alternative options that fit into future development paths, as discussed in 
the next section. 
Firstly, if the focus is no longer restricted to investments in the current system, potential 
future developments become more diverse. The longer the time period under considera-
tion, the more diverse these potential future developments become, with the result that 
more external factors gain relevance, e.g. new technical options and longer term trends 
in supply and demand. The future interaction between network regulation and other 
policies, e.g. innovation policies (see chapter 6) is important, too. 
Scenarios can help to anticipate and scrutinise these development options and identify 
bottlenecks and barriers. They can also help to identify which elements of system trans-
formation might be common to different future pathways for energy systems and net-
works. On this basis regulation can take into account potential long-term effects of in-
centive mechanisms and improve its judgements as to whether short-term regulatory 
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developments are robust in the face of future uncertainty and compatible with long-term 
visions. Thus, scenarios can also provide the basis for regulatory impact assessment that 
goes beyond the immediate impacts on companies and their costs. 
Secondly, if the main objective is no longer to provide a stable framework for efficiency 
improvements and investment in the current system, an alternative vision needs to be 
established. This is the prerequisite for a regulatory framework that extends beyond five 
year regulatory periods and does not only aim at efficiency. Scenarios can help to make 
explicit different development options, promote a common understanding of where to 
go and how to get there and thus coordinate heterogeneous actors.  
Multi-actor scenarios can help coordinate these actors, but can also be a tool for the 
regulator to deal with the increasing complexity of development options, without rely-
ing only on the biased views and interests of network operators or other single stake-
holders. This can help the regulator to reduce the danger of being ‘captured’ by some 
stakeholders and their particular visions. In this sense, the function of scenario processes 
is similar to benchmarking procedures that prevent the regulator from having to rely on 
the costs of individual network operators. 
Importantly, such a scenario process changes the role of the regulator. The innovation 
mechanisms discussed in chapter 6 can in principle be designed so that additional finan-
cial incentives are provided irrespective of what the development options are. However, 
it may not be enough for the regulator to acknowledge that network changes are re-
quired. Rather, the regulator may need to develop an understanding of future develop-
ment options and their implications, just as the regulator needs to understand cost driv-
ers to be able to increase efficiency. Otherwise, the increasing information asymmetry 
between principal and agents can undermine regulatory decision-making. Setting up a 
scenario process means that the regulator becomes more actively involved in discussing 
the direction of innovations in a system context, yet without determining this direction. 
This role is suitable for the regulator due to its detailed sector knowledge and the need 
to link long-term visions with short-term regulation. 
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Adaptability8 
A further requirement that is closely related to the anticipation of long-term develop-
ments is adaptability. Anticipation only makes sense if the results can be reflected in 
today’s institutions and actions. 
As described above, the standard model is not oriented toward long-term network de-
velopment. However, it is a dynamic process that can adapt itself to changing circum-
stances and improved knowledge. This is well expressed by Correljé (2005: 117) who 
describes regulation as “dynamic learning process, evolving over time” with the need to 
establish and manage a “process of regulatory development”. Similarly, Agrell and 
Bogetoft (2003: 19) present a “modern view of regulation and operation under regula-
tion as a learning and discovery process”. As a result of fixed regulatory periods, there 
is a built-in mechanism that makes regulation adaptive, i.e. its effects and instruments 
are reviewed and adapted at regular intervals. This flexibility to adapt also contributes to 
the credibility of the regulator (Crouch 2006: 244). Detailed work on the adaptability of 
the regulatory framework has been carried out by the UK regulator Ofgem (2009a). 
In principle this feature of network regulation is in line with the requirements set out 
earlier. However, as long as the focus of network regulation is on short-term efficiency 
as part of the overall liberalisation paradigm, this feature cannot contribute to aligning 
network regulation with the requirements of system transformation. Its adaptability is 
not coupled with any long-term framework and there is no guidance as to how to adapt 
to achieve certain long-term effects. Regulation is geared towards maximising short-
                                                 
8 While “adaptivity” is used in the literature cited in section 7.1.2, the term “adaptability” may be re-
garded as a more apt expression since it goes beyond the fact of a capacity for adaptation to incorpo-
rate more specifically the ability to adapt (or be adapted) to fit changed circumstances. It is also the 
term used by the UK regulator OFGEM in its communications (Ofgem 2009a). 
Transforming the Grid Part II: Conceptual analysis  
 
-185- 
term efficiency and adapted mainly to improve and balance allocative and productive 
efficiency. 
By limiting its adaptability to these objectives, the standard model can partly by-pass 
the tension between the need for a stable framework as described earlier and the need to 
adapt to a dynamic environment. This is possible in a relatively stable context domi-
nated by investments in the current system. However, the governance of system trans-
formation approach would argue that this tension cannot be avoided, but needs to be 
dealt with somehow.  
Besides regular reviews, having alternative options available is another precondition for 
adaptability. Scenarios can help to identify relevant options. In the context of network 
regulation, this has two dimensions: First of all, the regulator needs to enable the com-
panies to develop such alternatives, i.e. new technological or organisational options. 
The incentive mechanisms presented in chapter 6 can contribute to that. Secondly, the 
regulator itself needs to develop regulatory mechanisms so that it can remain flexible. 
Just as new technological solutions do not just ‘fall out of the sky’ once they are needed, 
but develop within their specific context, this ‘evolutionary’ argument can be extended 
to regulatory instruments. 
For example, the EU Technology Platform SmartGrids (European Commission 2006: 
23) pointed out that “there is a strong need for pilot projects, not only in the technical 
sense but also at the markets and organisational level. For example, regulatory regimes 
should be revised, based on new knowledge about how regulation should work to pro-
vide incentives for innovation.” 
One approach to developing new regulatory knowledge and developing and testing new 
regulatory instruments in practice would be to set up “regulatory innovation zones”. 
While the regulatory mechanisms in chapter 6 and the innovation instruments RPZ and 
IFI implemented in the UK (see chapter 8) are designed to promote technical innova-
tions, regulatory innovation zones would provide niches where the regulator can, for 
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example, work with individual network operators to develop and test new regulatory 
instruments for promoting integration of distributed generation in the context of chang-
ing network architectures and control philosophies.  
In Germany, the OPTAN project has developed a concept for a regulatory innovation 
zone and has proposed that the regulator implement it together with a municipal utility. 
However, the proposal was not supported by the regulator which was still in the process 
of establishing its regulatory regime to increase the efficiency of the existing network 
(Frey et al. 2008). 
Even if network regulation becomes more adaptive, we need to bear in mind that it is 
just as important to make the networks themselves more flexible. However, this is in-
herently difficult due to large sunk costs and long asset life times (cf. de Vries 2004: 
216-217 on different network development strategies). 
7.1.3.2 Actor coordination 
Another important issue in the governance of system transformation literature is the 
need to involve a broad range of actors for a number of reasons: to improve the common 
understanding of system dynamics and to deal with value trade-offs and distributed con-
trol capacities. 
In the standard model, the relationship between the regulator and the regulated company 
is analysed in a principal-agent framework. It thus acknowledges the bounded rational-
ity and limited control capacity of the regulator and the need to cooperate with network 
operators. Both the regulator and the regulated companies obviously play an important 
role. However, there are other actors that have a stake in network regulation and these 
tend to be left out of the principal-agent framework. 
The limits of a narrow principal-agent framework have been explained by WRR (2008: 
89-103). According to this analysis, regime change, i.e. liberalisation and corresponding 
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developments in infrastructure sectors leads to heterogeneous actors and rivalry between 
them, multiple principals and splintered arenas. There are also multiple agents, i.e. net-
work operators that the regulator needs to deal with. 
This general analysis becomes even more relevant in the context of new objectives like 
DG that depend on the network, and especially in the case of system transformation. In 
a principal-agent framework regulators are used to dealing with conflicting interests and 
negotiations between themselves and the companies. With DG and system transforma-
tion, this process needs to be extended to a broader and more heterogeneous set of 
stakeholders with different perspectives and interests. For example, both equipment 
manufacturers which provide innovative network solutions and developers of distrib-
uted generation projects have a stake in regulation and are important actors for system 
transformation. 
In general the focus of conflicts is no longer the distribution of efficiency gains but fu-
ture system design and how this affects the position of different stakeholders. Coopera-
tion is therefore inherently more difficult. Summerton and Bradshaw (1991: 33) have 
aptly summarised the regulatory challenges stemming from system transformation as 
follows: 
“When new power producers partly or wholly outside utility operations enter tradi-
tional grid systems (…), far-ranging issues of interorganizational coordination and con-
trol are actualized, potentially giving rise to extensive conflict. Utility and non-utility 
power producers often have strong conflicting organizational interests in relation to 
long-term goals and views of their respective roles in the grid system. (…) The process 
of dispersing a traditional grid system is therefore predictably a process of negotiation 
and renegotiation among involved groups.” 
The question is what kind of role regulators can play in this process. Summerton and 
Bradshaw see the need for them to adopt an “active, problem-solving roles in mediating 
between varying organizations”; Young (2001: 26) describes their role as “arbiters, 
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negotiators and mediators”, thus supporting the view that regulators should not only set 
network tariffs. More recently a similar view has been expressed by the European Regu-
lators’ Group for Electricity and Gas in their position paper on Smart Grids (ERGEG 
2009: 35). The regulators argue that incentive mechanisms are necessary, but not suffi-
cient and “a second priority for regulators should be to have an active role in favouring 
cooperation among stakeholders.”  
As mentioned above, the principal-agent framework represents a good starting point for 
regulators to take on a more active role in promoting cooperation. Regulators also have 
in-depth sector knowledge, so that it would difficult to justify why such a role should be 
left to another organisation. This is especially the case because any cooperation mecha-
nisms should be linked to incentive regulation. Both the scenarios and innovation zone 
presented earlier can be a means to promote cooperation.  
However, any attempts to promote cooperation can be restricted by fundamentally dif-
ferent interests of stakeholders and their resources to realise them as well as by the fact 
that they still operate in a competitive environment. 
7.1.4 Conclusion 
In summary, it would be too narrow to portray the standard model of regulation simply 
as mimicking the market mechanism. The previous section has shown that there are 
tensions between the standard model and the governance of system transformation, but 
the two approaches also have some features in common. The standard model acknowl-
edges bounded rationality and uncertainty, the need to remain adaptive and the limited 
control capacity of the regulator, but is geared towards the short-term and tends to ne-
glect long-term systematic effects and heterogeneous actor arenas.  
The mechanisms presented above can complement the incentive mechanisms discussed 
in chapters 5 and 6. However, there is also a potential mismatch between these two ap-
proaches: The instruments discussed in this chapter support a system perspective and 
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coordination between different actors, but can be characterised as rather soft coordina-
tion mechanisms, whereas actual funding for innovations is still provided for individual 
network companies within the mechanisms discussed in chapter 6. Thus, there is likely 
to remain a gap in terms of funding for system innovations. This supports the argument 
put forward in chapter 6 that economic regulation should not be the main instrument for 
providing RD&D funding. Nevertheless, the mechanisms discussed in this chapter can 
help to set the priorities of RD&D funding outside regulation. 
Overall, the standard model offers the potential to evolve from economic regulation to a 
more comprehensive, transformation–based approach. As argued in chapter 2, the link 
between governance mechanisms for transformation and standard policies is often un-
derdeveloped. Therefore, transforming the economic regulator into a ‘transformation 
agency’ can be just as attractive as setting up a new organisation which may only inade-
quately be connected to other mechanisms, including economic regulation. This can be 
one way of avoiding the problem that Kern and Smith (2008: 4098) have observed in 
the case of transition management in the Netherlands: “In summary, so far most observ-
ers do not see a substantial impact of the energy transition on ‘regular’ energy policy. 
Our assessment above highlights this. Core energy policy issues like security of supply, 
liberalisation and affordable prices are not being reframed by the energy transition.”  
Rather than setting up additional governance mechanisms, transformation approaches 
could build upon the standard model. It is clear that such an agency could no longer be 
limited to economic efficiency because the transformation is driven by other objectives. 
The following section explores how DG and network transformation affect the objec-
tives of regulation and the relationship between policy and regulation. 
7.2 Energy policy and regulation 
Chapters 5 and 6 and the first section of this chapter have analysed how the standard 
model can evolve to deal with DG and network transformation, both in terms of addi-
tional incentive mechanisms and governance mechanisms beyond the incentive formula. 
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In both cases, the focus was on the instruments applied by network regulation. How-
ever, it also became apparent that these instruments cannot be discussed without recon-
sidering the overall regulatory framework. Based on these insights this section discusses 
the objectives of regulation and the relationship between policy-making and regulation. 
7.2.1 Additional objectives beyond efficiency 
The standard model involves a narrow remit for regulators. Their objective is to increase 
efficiency, promote competition and ensure a level playing field for all market partici-
pants. The discussion of regulation and DG has shown that it is difficult to integrate DG 
into the standard model without defining DG as an additional regulatory objective. In 
the case of DG connection, chapter 5 has discussed the limited scope of integrating DG 
into the efficiency and level playing field framework of regulation. Therefore, a political 
mandate is needed for the regulator to design DG-specific instruments. 
In the case of DG-related network innovations chapter 6 has argued that innovation in-
struments require political backing even if network efficiency is the primary objective. 
Network innovations become even more political if they aim at other objectives like DG 
integration, and the direction of innovation becomes relevant. 
Similarly, the first section of this chapter has argued that the long-term framework pro-
vided by the independent regulator in the standard model is not sufficient for dealing 
with system transformation. If efficiency is no longer the main objective, guidance is 
needed on the direction in which the system should be heading. This also constitutes an 
important difference between the electricity and the telecom sectors. The latter has ex-
perienced fundamental restructuring, yet the objective was not to meet any politically 
defined objectives beyond providing a high-quality network at low cost. If, additionally, 
networks are required to contribute to additional public values, defining a long-term 
framework is essentially a political task. However, as was explained earlier, the regula-
tor can play an important role in this process, which affects the remit of the regulator 
and its relationship with policy-making. 
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In the standard model economic efficiency tends to be regarded as an apolitical objec-
tive that benefits customers connected to the network. DG reintroduces politically de-
fined public objectives (see section 5.2.1.2). The DG and innovation instruments in 
chapters 5 and 6 are not drawn up to increase network efficiency, but to enable the inte-
gration of DG. This integration should be implemented as efficiently as possible, but 
efficiency is not the primary objective of DG integration. 
Therefore, the objectives of network regulation need to be redefined to integrate DG and 
network transformation. As was shown in chapters 5 to 7, the incentive mechanisms of 
the standard model can accommodate new objectives and there is scope for its institu-
tional design to incorporate governance mechanisms to support transformation. Yet be-
yond the level of regulatory instruments the question remains as to what this implies for 
the paradigm of independent regulation. DG represents one prominent example in the 
debate on additional objectives, which more generally includes environmental and so-
cial policy as well as broader sustainability objectives (Fitzgerald, Waddams Price 
2003). 
7.2.2 Multiple objectives and independence 
How do the additional objectives beyond efficiency fit into the institutional context de-
fined by the standard model? As was pointed out in chapter 3 and the first section of this 
chapter, the standard model of network regulation is characterised by the regulator be-
ing independent of the government. The institutional set-up proposed by the standard 
model is to support its objective, namely to promote the economic efficiency and a sta-
ble investment framework for electricity networks. Other than that the networks do not 
serve to meet any political objectives. Thus, the standard model has essentially depoliti-
cised the networks and regulation is seen as a technical, rather than a political, task. In-
deed, political interference is regarded as counterproductive to meeting the efficiency 
objective. For this reason, regulators are granted the right to operate with some inde-
pendence from policy-making.  
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The concept of independent regulators can be traced back to independent central banks 
that have been set up to commit to an inflation target (Stern et al. 2002). However, it is 
worth noting the difference between central banks and utility regulation (e.g. Corry 
2003: 15). Even within the economic efficiency paradigm of the standard model, there 
can be different objectives and trade-offs between them, notably between increasing the 
efficiency of network operation and investment (productive efficiency) and ensuring 
efficient charges for network users, i.e. avoiding monopoly rents (allocative efficiency). 
Moreover, it is difficult to avoid trade-offs with other policy objectives, as chapter 5 has 
shown for the case of DG. 
The independence of the regulator is directly linked to a narrow remit since it is argua-
bly a prerequisite for the regulator being independent of the political process. As soon 
as the regulator is in charge of a broader set of more political objectives, its independ-
ence can no longer be guaranteed or it leads to problems of democratic accountability 
(Young 2001: 150; Brunekreeft, McDaniel 2005: 124). Thus, there is a tension between 
the additional objectives presented earlier and the institutional principles of the standard 
model. 
The standard model is not supposed to pursue multiple objectives and deal with trade-
offs between them. However, trade-offs necessarily result from multiple objectives. For 
example, if DG integration is introduced as an additional regulatory objective, it is not 
sufficient to simply add this new objective. Rather, the costs which are acceptable for 
specific volumes of DG would still need to be decided. Although calibrating the incen-
tive mechanisms presented in chapter 5 may appear to be a small detail in the regulatory 
process, Frontier Economics (2003: 45-46) have rightly pointed out that “the preferred 
balance between the risk of DG not being connected and the risk of inefficient or 
“gamed” costs being reimbursed through regulated charges (…) is of course a matter 
of policy.” This example shows that multiple objectives render regulation more politi-
cal. Even if the promotion of DG becomes a regulatory objective, this does not provide 
the regulator with any guidance as to how to balance the DG objective with the objec-
tive to reduce costs.  
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Reintroducing political objectives and trade-offs into network regulation leads to the 
following dilemma: On the one hand, depoliticising the regulation of networks has 
made it possible to create a stable framework for private investors – at the expense of 
pretending that networks represent a ‘neutral’ infrastructure, rather than a critical basis 
for implementing political objectives. On the other hand, political objectives can un-
dermine the institutional arrangement of the standard model, although a stable regula-
tory framework is still important for enabling investments by private companies – or 
indeed has become even more important in an environment that is generally riskier due 
to technological change and fundamental restructuring. According to WRR (2008: 55), 
“this is perhaps the most important challenge facing policy makers dealing with infra-
structures today – how to realise broader public objectives without threatening the very 
sources and possibilities of new and private investment.” 
There is a higher level trade-off between clear objectives and a stable, investment-
friendly framework on the one hand and taking into account multiple policy objectives 
and trade-offs between them on the other hand. Due to its focus on economic efficiency, 
the standard model can neglect this trade-off. Similarly, as was pointed out in section 
7.1.3.1, narrow objectives allow the standard to reduce the tension between the need for 
a stable framework as described earlier and the need to adapt to a dynamic environment. 
7.2.3 The relationship between policy and regulation 
As long as the governance of networks is predominantly about efficiency, policy-
making tends to be regarded as a spanner in the works, dominated by short-term elec-
tion periods and political opportunism that can erratically intervene in infrastructures, 
and potentially renege on the agreed rate-of-return, thus reducing economic efficiency 
and preventing investment.  
The situation changes once efficiency is no longer the single most important objective 
(as discussed in the previous section) and networks become an instrument for pursuing 
public objectives beyond distribution of efficiency gains. Policy-making can then no 
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longer be regarded as a disruptive factor, but becomes the very arena where the future of 
networks and their contribution to meeting these public objectives is negotiated. 
As long as the focus is on short-term efficiency, the standard model can manage the 
trade-off between the instabilities of political decision-making and a stable framework 
for efficiency and investment by banning politics. However, new policy objectives like 
DG undermine this strategy. Especially network transformation reveals that the time 
inconsistency problem, which is the main reason for regulatory independence, does not 
simply result from political opportunism and political myopia dominated by short-term 
election periods. Rather, the time inconsistency problem can also stem from a funda-
mental uncertainty about future system developments, distributed control capacities as 
well as value trade-offs that require an iterative process of goal formulation (see section 
7.1.2). 
As a consequence, stability can no longer be provided by locking out policy. What is 
required instead is an embracing of the political challenges of trades-offs and system 
transformation in a transparent political process. Most importantly this requires gearing 
policy-making towards long-term structural change with the help of long-term objec-
tives, underpinned by the strategies outlined in section 7.1.2 (cf. Helm 2004a: 32-33). 
These strategies allow for long-term political trade-offs to be dealt with and can help to 
constrain short-term political opportunism and ad hoc intervention. However, the 
mechanisms through which policy-makers can provide a framework for future infra-
structure development are beyond the remit of this thesis. In terms of establishing a 
closer link between policy trade-offs and regulation, the social and environmental guid-
ance to the regulator Ofgem described in the UK case study in chapter 8 provides an 
example. It has been designed to make policy objectives other than efficiency more 
‚visible’ to the regulatory decision making process. 
Importantly in this context, even when networks are re-established as a basis for policy-
making, it does not render obsolete separate sector regulators, although these were 
originally set up to keep politics at arm’s length. Defining the future of infrastructures 
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and dealing with political trade-offs cannot be left to the regulator, but the regulator can 
still play an important role in this process. 
Firstly, even if the focus shifts from efficiency to politically motivated transformation, 
this process can still benefit from a degree of regulatory independence in terms of pro-
tection from short-term political interference, cf. definition of independence by Ocana 
(2003: 17). This can help to provide consistency over time in implementing the politi-
cally defined strategy.  
Secondly, when drawing up a long-term framework, the government should rely on the 
sector-specific expertise of the regulator. The regulator can contribute to setting up a 
strategic framework and making explicit trade-offs and available options, especially by 
means of the governance mechanisms outlined in section 7.1 (cf. Bartle, Vass 2007: 
268). For example in the Netherlands, this has been recommended by the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy (WRR 2008: 189). In the UK Helm (2004a: 34) has 
proposed the ‘agency model’ as an alternative to the regulatory office model on which 
Ofgem is based. Under this model, the relationship with policy would be more of a two-
way process, with the agency both explicitly advising the government and implementing 
policies.  
Thus, rather than making independent regulators redundant, strengthening the political 
dimension of network governance can entail a more active role for regulators too, both 
in terms of defining and implementing long-term strategies. This does not imply that the 
regulator turns from a neutral referee into a “proactive and interventionist puppeteer 
(…) that knows better and can produce a prescriptive plot for all players” – a dichot-
omy suggested, for example, by Sioshansi (2008b: 11-12). Rather, as outlined in section 
7.1, the regulator should take on the role of a proactive moderator and catalyst. For ex-
ample, setting up a scenario process means that the regulator becomes more actively 
involved in discussing the direction of innovations in a system context, rather than just 
providing economic incentives. However, it does not imply that the regulator deter-
mines the direction of innovation. 
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Thirdly, even if networks become more political and the role of regulators is comple-
mented by additional tasks and instruments, incentive regulation does not become re-
dundant (cf. WRR 2008: 42, 54). Even with additional political objectives, efficiency 
still plays an important role, not the least in implementing these objectives as efficiently 
as possible. Therefore, independent regulators should remain in place to continue apply-
ing economic instruments, as well as to establish a link between the standard model 
instruments and the ones outlined in this chapter. 
7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the standard model from outside the box of incentive mecha-
nisms which are only one element of the standard model. The analysis has covered both 
the governance mechanisms applied by the standard model and its role in a wider en-
ergy policy context.  
There is more to the standard model than emulating the market mechanism with the help 
of economic incentives. There is scope for this model to incorporate governance 
mechanisms that are geared towards infrastructure transformation. 
The model of independent regulators was originally introduced to depoliticise network 
governance. New political objectives like DG and network transformation seem to entail 
a dilemma between political interference that can undermine the model of independent 
regulators on the one hand and the need for a stable framework for private investors on 
the other hand.  
Nevertheless this model is still valid. Regulators can contribute to setting up a strategic 
framework and a degree of independence is still useful when it comes to implementing 
this framework and applying the incentive mechanisms to enable cost-efficient network 
development. 
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Importantly, the results of this chapter complement the analysis provided in chapters 5 
and 6. Regulators should not only rely on incentive mechanisms, but these are still im-
portant, as is the link between the governance mechanisms discussed in this chapter and 
economic incentives. 
There is scope for the standard model regulators to evolve into a ‘transformation 
agency’, which combines the principles of the standard model and the governance 
mechanisms suggested for system transformation. More work is needed on the institu-
tional design of such an agency.  
 
  
Part III: 
Case studies 
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8 Case study UK 
This chapter presents the country case study on the UK. The chapter begins with a brief 
background section (8.1). It is then structured based on the connection-integration-
innovation-transformation heuristic set out in chapter 4 as one element of the methodol-
ogy and which was also the basis for structuring the conceptual analysis in part II. Sec-
tion 8.2 analyses the governance of DG connection and integration, section 8.3 exam-
ines network innovations and section 8.4 describes developments in the regulatory re-
gime that are not limited to the incentive formula. 
8.1 Background: Liberalisation pioneer and DG policy 
The UK has been a pioneer in developing and implementing the standard model in dif-
ferent network sectors. It could even be argued that the approach was to some extent 
tailored to the UK context and only afterwards was it de-contextualised and adapted into 
a standard model that was implemented around the world (Praetorius et al. 2009: 201-
205). In the UK, electricity market liberalisation began in 1990, after other utility sec-
tors such as telecommunications had been liberalised and privatised. For a comprehen-
sive overview of liberalisation and the development of the governance and market struc-
ture in the UK, see Surrey (1996) and Newberry (2006). 
As in most countries the standard model that was introduced in England Wales and with 
some differences in Scotland and Northern Ireland meant a radical shift from the previ-
ous governance structure. In the UK, this process also entailed a major change in the 
industry structure. Before liberalisation, the state-owned Central Electricity Generation 
Board owned all generation and transmission in England and Wales and distribution 
networks and supply were run by 12 Area Boards. There was significant political influ-
ence on the company. In principle, electricity charges were mainly cost-based. With the 
1989 Electricity Act, the standard model of liberalisation that was described in chapter 
2.1 was implemented as follows: the CEGB was privatised; several generation compa-
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nies were set up (horizontal restructuring); vertical unbundling along the supply chain 
was introduced; National Grid became the independent transmission system operator for 
England and Wales; Offer, the Office of Electricity Regulation was set up as the 
independent regulator. The current regulator Ofgem was formed by the merger of the 
Offer and the Office of Gas Supply (Ofgas). In terms of wholesale markets, the Electric-
ity Pool was set up. This was a compulsory day-ahead market that determined the merit 
order and wholesale spot prices. In 1998, wholesale competition was complemented by 
retail competition. The New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) that were intro-
duced in 2001 are an important step in the further evolution of the market design. NETA 
replaced the compulsory Pool by several voluntary markets. 
Compared to Denmark, the pre-liberalisation governance of the sector is less relevant in 
the UK since it was mostly replaced by the standard model. As a consequence, the lib-
eralisation process was not characterised to such a degree by the need to find ways of 
merging the existing governance structures with the standard model. Unlike the Danish 
case study, this chapter does not therefore elaborate on previous industry structures and 
the liberalisation process. 
As the IEA has pointed out, “the UK is among those countries that most rely on market 
actors, responses to price signals and private participation” (IEA 2007b: 9). Although 
the UK has been a champion of the standard model, there have also been significant 
shifts in UK energy policy, from the beginning of the millennium onwards. An impor-
tant milestone was the 2003 Energy White Paper (DTI 2003), which did not focus on 
competition only, but placed a strong emphasis on long-term climate targets 
(MacKerron 2009: 79-83). This is important for understanding the developments within 
the standard model of network regulation analysed in this chapter. 
The UK electricity network is operated by one TSO and nine DSOs running 14 distribu-
tion networks with separate licenses. All network operators are privately owned, profit-
orientated companies. The UK energy regulator Ofgem (and its predecessor Offer, as 
well as other regulators in the UK) has been a forerunner in developing and implement-
Transforming the Grid Part III: Case studies  
 
-201- 
ing incentive regulation mechanisms. During the 1990s, the focus of network regulation 
was very much short-term. Its objective was to increase the operating efficiency of net-
work operators and to bring down network tariffs. This has largely been successful 
(NAO 2002). Network regulation has thus been part of the overall liberalisation para-
digm to improve the efficiency of the existing centralised system. 
Riechmann (2002) distinguishes the following three phases of the development of elec-
tricity network regulation in the UK: 
 1990-1998: the “fat cat” years with high profits for the regulated companies, 
 1998-2002: new Labour government, redistribution of regulatory gains, 
 Since 2002: reform of regulatory approach: balancing incentives, balancing pro-
ductive and allocative efficiency, trying to better anticipate how regulated com-
panies react. 
In contrast to the development of the standard model, the UK has not been a pioneer in 
DG deployment (see chapter 4.2) although both CHP and renewables have more than 
doubled their output between 1995 and 2005. The installed capacity of distributed gen-
eration was estimated at 13.3 GW at the end of 2005 (Econnect 2006), compared to a 
total installed capacity of 81.7 GW. DG plants provided less than 10 % of UK electric-
ity generation (DTI 2006; see chapter 4). DG plants are wind and hydro plants and 
mainly gas-driven CHP plants.  
The new market arrangements NETA mentioned above increased the risk for small-
scale and intermittent renewable generators and triggered a debate on the role of these 
plants in the competitive market and the extent to which NETA was and should have 
been cost reflective (Bauknecht, Colella 2002; Mitchell, Connor 2002). While the UK 
government asked Ofgem to take into account this issue in the development of the mar-
ket arrangements, according to Woodman (2002: 181), “it was widely felt by generators 
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and commentators that throughout the development of NETA, Ofgem ignored the impact 
of the new trading arrangements on renewables and CHP, thereby threatening their 
increased deployment”. Ofgem maintained its view that renewables and CHP should be 
treated like any other generators in the market and policy objectives to increase their 
share should be pursued outside of the competitive market. In a similar vein, before the 
introduction of the incentive mechanisms described below Ofgem argued that connec-
tion charges for DG should be cost-reflective and include all the network extension 
costs triggered by DG beyond the point of connection (deep connection charges, see 
below), although these were prohibitively high in some cases and gave the DSOs the 
opportunity to include network costs into the connection charges that were not primarily 
caused by new DG connections (Mitchell, Connor 2002). 
This is important to understand that the DG incentive mechanisms within network regu-
lation that are described in the following sections are rather different from Ofgem’s pre-
vious approach to regulation and market design, although in conceptual terms they 
neatly fit into the standard model. Following the introduction of NETA, there were in-
creasing concerns in the government about the role of renewables and CHP. According 
to White (interview) Ofgem realised that it could not maintain its position that it was up 
to the government to support DG, if DG cannot connect to the network. 
In many other countries including Denmark, DG has not been defined as a separate pol-
icy objective. There is often no explicit DG policy, but rather policies for renewables 
and CHP plants. In the UK DG has been explicitly put on the political agenda. Since 
about 2000, it has been an issue for both the UK’s Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) and Ofgem. DG was also one of the main issues addressed by the 2006 Energy 
Review, where it is officially seen as a “long-term alternative or supplement to our cur-
rent highly centralised system” (Cabinet Office 2006: 61). According to this review, “a 
‘distributed’ system could fundamentally change the way we meet our energy needs, 
contributing to emissions reduction, the reliability of our energy supplies and poten-
tially to more competitive energy markets” (Cabinet Office 2006: 62).  
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This statement indicates that DG is not only discussed in terms of connecting a new 
technology to the existing system, but also in terms of system transformation. However, 
the UK is less advanced than Denmark in terms of developing and implementing new 
network concepts in the system, partly because the share of DG has traditionally not 
been that significant. 
When DG emerged as a policy issue, the standard model that was implemented in the 
UK already set the scene for the UK approach to dealing with it. The established role of 
Ofgem and the standard model of regulation are important to understanding why the UK 
debate on small-scale renewables and CHP was framed to a large extent in terms of 
amending the standard model, despite the fact that there are other and arguably more 
important issues for DG developers, e.g. the quota-based support mechanism (Mitchell 
et al. 2006). 
In its 2003 Energy White Paper the government emphasised the important role which 
network regulation could play for the development of DG (DTI 2003: paras 4.21-22): 
“Under the present price control rules there is no financial incentive for the DSOs to 
connect distributed generation to their networks. We therefore believe that the regula-
tory framework needs to be amended so that the DSOs connect and use higher levels of 
distributed generation“. In the same year, Ofgem began working on the 2005 Distribu-
tion Price Control Review and explicitly included DG in this process to integrate DG 
and network innovation into its incentive regulation framework. Ofgem (2004c: 54) sees 
it as its task “to encourage DSOs to undertake the investment required to facilitate dis-
tributed generation connections (and generally be proactive and positive in responding 
to connection requests).” 
As a result, Ofgem introduced both the so-called DG hybrid incentive to promote DG 
connections and two instruments to foster network innovations in 2005, namely Regis-
tered Power Zones (RPZ) and Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) (Ofgem 2004a; 
2004b; 2004d). These will be presented and analysed in more detail in the following 
two sections. 
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8.2 Incentive regulation and DG connection 
The UK energy regulator explicitly takes into account network costs of DG connections 
in the design of network regulation. The revenue cap formula has been adapted to incen-
tivise DSOs to pursue these objectives. The UK is indeed the first country in the EU and 
probably worldwide to include DG in its incentive regulation framework (Skytte, Rope-
nus 2005). As part of the 2005 Distribution Price Control Review, Ofgem introduced 
the so-called DG hybrid incentive to promote DG connections (Ofgem 2004a; 2004d). 
The analysis of the hybrid incentive includes a description of the incentive mechanism 
which compares it with the regulatory approaches in chapter 5. It also encompasses an 
evaluation of the regulation-policy interface and repercussions for DG developers. 
8.2.1 How does the hybrid incentive work? 
‘Hybrid’ refers in this context to the combination of a partial cost pass-through and a 
volume-related revenue driver, based on the connected DG capacity. The main elements 
of the hybrid incentive are as follows:  
 Shallow connection charges: Together with the introduction of the hybrid incen-
tive, deep connection charges were replaced by shallow connection charges. 
This means that in the connection process individual DG developers no longer 
pay for all the costs of network extensions that become necessary as a result of 
the DG connection. Rather, they are charged only for direct connection costs. All 
the network costs beyond the point of connection are in the first instance borne 
by the DSO. 
 Generator-use-of-system charge: DSOs can recover the difference between their 
costs and the shallow connection charge via the generator-use-of-system charge. 
This means that the difference between deep and shallow charges is distributed 
among all generators in a network area. This needs to be paid by generators con-
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nected to the network after 1 April 2005 when the new system came into force. 
While the shallow connection charge is a one-off payment, generators have to 
pay the use-of-system charge as long as they are connected. This combination of 
shallow connection charges and a generator-use-of-system charge is also called 
“shallowish” charge. 
 Cost pass-through: Via the ‘generator use-of-system charge’ network operators 
can directly pass through 80% of their DG-related costs for network expansions 
beyond the connection costs borne by the individual generator. 
 Supplementary revenue driver: For each kW of DG capacity connected the reve-
nue cap is increased by £ 1.5 per year for the duration of 15 years.  
 There is an additional £ 1 per year per kW for operation and maintenance. 
 Cap and floor: There is a cap on the overall return on DG-related investments 
that is set at twice the cost of capital as well as a floor based on the cost of debt. 
 Incremental unit costs above £ 200/kW are paid by the plant operator through 
connection charges. 
The UK hybrid incentive provides a practical example of the mechanisms analysed in 
chapter 5. In the case of the UK, the mechanism is made up of a combination of cost-
based elements (the 80% cost pass-through) and price-based elements (the kW-based 
revenue driver) to provide both connection and efficiency incentives. 
In terms of the price-based elements, Ofgem has opted for a standardised revenue driver 
instead of including DG in the comparative efficiency analysis. The revenue driver is 
rather simple and only takes into account the capacity of DG connected, leaving out 
other factors that may also influence network costs such as the type, size or generation 
of DG. 
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The pass-through rate and the additional revenue driver is the same across all DG tech-
nologies and network areas. All network operators and all technologies are measured 
against the same benchmark, irrespective of cost differences. 
The hybrid incentive fits into the standard model for the regulation of electricity net-
works. The DG scheme relies on the standard model mechanisms to enable an efficient 
integration of DG into the network. In conceptual terms, it can be argued that network 
regulation remains unchanged in principle, but takes into account DG as a new phe-
nomenon. Nevertheless, in the context of the UK the inclusion of these mechanisms 
geared towards DG represents a significant departure from Ofgem’s previous approach 
to regulation, which involved the promotion of competition and a level playing-field 
rather than supporting individual technologies. 
The effectiveness and efficiency of the mechanism crucially depends on how the pa-
rameters are set. The instrument needs to be calibrated so as to balance connection and 
efficiency incentives. The pass-through level and the value of the revenue driver need to 
be set in such a way that they give network operators a strong enough incentive without 
opening the door to excessive profits chapter 5.3.  
The UK hybrid incentive has been calibrated so that even DSOs with average costs for 
DG connections can earn a rate-of-return that is one percentage point above the normal 
regulated rate-of-return (7.5 % instead of 6.5 %). This indicates a relatively strong con-
nection incentive that not only incentivises efficiency improvements, but also rewards 
DG connections that are ‘just’ average. In addition, DSOs can further increase the rate-
of-return up to the limit of twice the cost of capital if they can reduce the network costs 
of DG below the average.  
Before introducing the new instrument, Ofgem carried out a ‘regulatory impact assess-
ment’ (Ofgem 2004e). This mainly contained rather general statements. What is inter-
esting is that the document quantifies how the additional revenue that network operators 
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can earn increases the overall costs to customers, i.e. newly connected generators, as 
compared to a ‘normal’ regulatory treatment of network costs triggered by DG.  
Table 7: Assumed costs of the DG hybrid incentives 
New  
DG capacity 
 
 
MW 
Costs if inclu-
ded in RAV at 
6.5% cost of 
capital 
(£m/year) 
Costs under DG 
incentive 
scheme  
at 7.5% return 
(£m/year) 
Total difference
 
 
 
(£m/year) 
Difference per 
kW 
 
 
(£/kW/year) 
200 10.6 11.3 0.7 0.35 
5000 26.6 28.3 1.7 0.35 
10000 53.2 56.6 3.5 0.35 
Source: Ofgem 2004b 
8.2.2 Generator-use-of-system charges and the policy-regulation interface 
In chapter 5.2.1.1 it was argued that it is difficult to integrate DG into the standard 
model if DG is only regarded as an additional way to reach the efficiency objective, 
rather than an additional objective in itself. This is because DG requires a different net-
work infrastructure in many cases and therefore leads to additional costs, rather than 
cost reductions. As a consequence, the integration of DG in the incentive regulation 
framework requires political backing to broaden the regulatory objectives.  
However, as described in chapter 5.2.1.2, this can lead to a conflict between these pol-
icy objectives and the efficiency objective of regulation. More precisely, the potential 
societal benefits of DG in such a regime can entail increasing network tariffs for con-
sumers in network areas with a particularly high share of DG to pay for the additional 
incentive schemes. In the UK, this is a relevant issue as there is already a significant 
variance in the amount of DG connecting in each region (Econnect 2006: 38). 
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As explained above, DG is a policy objective in the UK. The regulatory instruments 
described in this section are justified by Ofgem based on this objective. Moreover, the 
hybrid incentive is designed to dampen the cost of DG integration, but does not only 
incentivise DG that can lead to overall cost reductions, thereby entailing additional 
costs. Therefore, the question arises of how the UK regime deals with the conflict out-
lined above. 
As was explained earlier, the costs of the hybrid incentive are not borne by electricity 
consumers or all network customers in the UK, but only by the DG developers via the 
generator-use-of-system charge. This means that the DG developers themselves have to 
incentivise the network operators to connect DG.  
Connection costs below the level defined by the revenue driver element – either due to 
increased efficiency or the cherry-picking of low-cost connections – can lead to a lower 
generator-use-of-system charge for the DG operators. However, they also entail addi-
tional profits for the DSO, especially due to the calibration of the hybrid incentive ex-
plained above. These additional profits for the DSO represent a financial transfer from 
the DG developers to the DSOs. This is the price the former have to pay for incentivis-
ing the DSOs to facilitate grid access and potentially benefit from lower charges. This is 
in line with the general logic of incentive regulation, according to which consumers 
forego some of the benefits of cost reductions to enable these reductions in the first 
place.  
The risk that the hybrid incentive may not lead to higher efficiency is carried by the DG 
operators. Ofgem (2004e: 8) argues in its regulatory impact assessment that this risk is 
small since “evidence suggests that DSOs do cut costs significantly when provided with 
incentives to do so.” A further point made by the regulator is that the additional costs of 
the incentive mechanism are small compared to the value of the UK Renewables Obli-
gation Certificate which renewable generators can sell.  
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In the light of the plant operators being charged with the costs of the hybrid incentive, 
the rationale for introducing this scheme becomes unclear. On the one hand, the incen-
tivisation of network operators to connect DG can support the political objective to in-
crease the share of DG. The official rationale of the DG incentive mechanism is clearly 
to increase the share of generation connected to the distribution network, rather than 
‘simply’ providing a level playing field and then letting ‘the market’ decide which op-
tions to choose. 
On the other hand, given that DG developers themselves have to pay for the incentive 
mechanism, the hybrid incentive can be interpreted as a scheme that is not directly 
linked to energy policy objectives, but rather located within the regulator’s efficiency 
and competition remit. In this case, the main objective of the hybrid incentive would not 
be to increase the share of DG, but to increase the efficiency of network access for new 
market actors. Although this can also contribute to reaching political DG targets, DG 
developers rather than society as a whole are regarded as the main beneficiaries, and 
therefore have to bear the costs of the hybrid incentive. 
With this cost allocation Ofgem avoids the dilemma between promoting DG on the one 
hand and the objective to reduce costs for consumers on the other hand, or in other 
words between its secondary duty to pursue environmental objectives and its primary 
duty to promote the interests of consumers (see section 8.4.1). However, burdening the 
DG operators with the generator-use-of-system charge that also entails an additional 
profit incentive for DSOs can represent an obstacle for DG deployment. As a conse-
quence, a new potential dilemma arises: between setting up a DG incentive mechanism 
on the one hand and promoting DG deployment on the other hand. DG deployment may 
be constrained by burdening DG with the very costs of the DG incentive mechanism. 
The DG community was quite critical about the generator-use-of-system charge that is 
used to recover the hybrid incentive (interview Hartnell). One reason was that paying 
for the network costs beyond the point of connection represents an additional economic 
burden for DG developers. In the UK, switching from the previous deep charging re-
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gime to “shallowish” charges at least reduces the upfront costs of connection for the DG 
developer. Nevertheless, the mechanism does not look very attractive to DG developers, 
especially as it not only includes actual costs for network extensions, but also additional 
profits for the DSOs to incentivise them to do what they are obliged to do anyway: con-
necting generators to their network. 
Another problem in the UK context has been that moving from deep charges paid by 
each project individually to a general generator-use-of-system charge means that all DG 
plants in one network pay the same charge. Therefore low connection charges in good 
network locations can no longer be used as a competitive advantage by some DG pro-
ject developers (interview Hartnell). This issue is directly linked to the UK support 
scheme for renewables based on a quota system and therefore leads to competition be-
tween DG developers.	
8.3 Incentive regulation and network innovation 
On top of the DG hybrid incentive Ofgem set up two mechanisms to promote innova-
tions in the network. I have not found any similar mechanisms geared towards network 
innovation in other EU countries and have not encountered any such schemes outside 
Europe, either. 
8.3.1 Background 
Chapters 3 and 6 have already discussed the main reasons for why network innovations 
are becoming an issue in the regulatory debate. On the one hand, there is a lot of poten-
tial and need for innovations in electricity networks, partly as a result of the increasing 
generation capacity connected to the distribution network. On the other hand, ‘pure’ 
incentive regulation arguably has a number of shortcomings with regard to long-term 
issues and additional risk that can result from innovative activities. As shown in chapter 
2 for market liberalisation in general and in chapter 6  for incentive regulation in par-
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ticular, there is evidence that the introduction of the standard model tends to coincide 
with a decline in RD&D activities.  
In the UK, this decline can be observed across the utility sectors, the only exception 
being telecommunications (Holt 2005a: 2). As for the distribution networks, there is 
evidence that RD&D expenditure by DSOs declined significantly after liberalisation 
(Scott, Evans 2007: 42-43) and that it is significantly below the level of RD&D of other 
sectors. In 2001-2003, the average RD&D intensity of DSOs, defined as the ratio of 
RD&D expenditure to company turnover, was only 0.1 %, which was significantly be-
low the UK average of 2.5% according to Ofgem (2004b: 5). 
At the same time, DG is regarded as a significant new technical challenge for the DSOs 
(Ofgem 2004b). Moreover, according to the UK’s Electricity Networks Association, 
two thirds of network assets are nearing the end of their lifetime, meaning that signifi-
cant investments will be required soon (SDC 2007: 54). This represents a window of 
opportunity for the introduction of innovative network concepts. 
Innovation incentives do need to fit with Ofgem’s primary duty, yet at the same time the 
political objective to increase DG penetration is an important driver for judging the need 
for innovations. The regulatory debate on innovation indeed originated from the need to 
integrate DG into networks. Ofgem then looked at RD&D activities by network opera-
tors more generally and found that the lack of RD&D was a broader problem (Interview 
Evans). 
On the one hand, Ofgem (2004b) presents its primary duty – the benefits of consumers – 
as the rationale for introducing innovation mechanisms. On the other hand, the regulator 
argues that the main purpose of the new instruments and especially the RPZ is “to help 
meet the government’s targets for renewables and CHP” (Ofgem 2003: 2). This am-
biguous foundation of the innovation mechanisms is reminiscent of the analysis in chap-
ter 5.2.1 in terms of the potential tension between the efficiency objective and politi-
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cally-defined objectives as well as the blurred rationale for the DG hybrid incentive 
explained in the previous section. 
The political justification for introducing innovation mechanisms in the UK supports the 
argument made in chapter 6.4.2. It is very difficult to identify an ‘optimal’ level of 
RD&D. Therefore analysis of whether there was too much RD&D before liberalisation 
which has now been reduced to an efficient level or whether RD&D spending and in-
vestment in innovation has fallen below an adequate level is not straightforward. 
Against this background, innovation mechanisms essentially need to be based on a 
judgement that more RD&D and innovation is needed and erring on the side of innova-
tion is justified. In the UK, this judgement is based on the political DG objective. 
Although it identified a lack of RD&D, the UK regulator only partly subscribes to the 
analysis in chapter 6.2 of the shortcomings of the standard model with regard to RD&D. 
Ofgem argues that it has not prohibited RD&D (Ofgem 2004b: 7), but concedes that “it 
is possible that the regulatory system is perceived to be such that it undermines the 
commercial incentive to RD&D”, although this is not clear cut in its opinion (2004a: 
48). Nevertheless, Ofgem introduced the following innovation mechanisms to rectify 
the problems resulting from ‘pure’ incentive regulation. 
8.3.2 How do the innovation mechanisms work? 
Ofgem set up two mechanisms within the 2005 Distribution Price Control Review 
(Ofgem 2004b; Ofgem 2004d; Ofgem 2004a): 
 the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) 
 and Registered Power Zones (RPZ).  
The IFI and RPZ are designed to be complementary, addressing different stages of the 
innovation process. IFI projects are supposed to be development projects. These can 
Transforming the Grid Part III: Case studies  
 
-213- 
cover all technical aspects of distribution networks, including network design, operation 
and maintenance. The RPZ scheme specifically addresses demonstration projects that 
employ new, more cost effective ways of connecting and integrating DG into network 
operation.  
The Innovation Funding Incentive gives network operators an allowance to spend 0.5 % 
of their regulated revenue on innovation projects on a use-it-or-lose-it basis. Within this 
limit, there has been an average 80 % cost pass-through over five years with the follow-
ing profile. The higher pass-through rate at the beginning is supposed to incentivise 
first-movers. 
Table 8: Pass-through of the IFI 
Year 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 
Pass-through rate 90 % 85 % 80 % 75 % 70 % 
Source: Ofgem (2004a: 49) 
The second mechanism, Registered Power Zones, is based on the hybrid incentive for 
DG connection that gives DSOs a £/kW incentive for new DG connection. If the con-
nection is carried out in a RPZ with the help of new solutions, the £/kW incentive is 
increased. While ‘normal’ DG connections are rewarded with a £/kW 1.5 incentive rate 
for a 15-year period, the RPZ incentive is increased to £/kW 4.5 for five years. The ad-
ditional revenue that can be derived from the £3/kW uplift that a DSO can claim for 
RPZ projects is capped at £ 0.5 million per year.  
The two mechanisms provide a practical example of the instruments analysed in chapter 
6.3. Both mechanisms are designed to balance the incentive to develop and try out new 
approaches with the incentive to do this efficiently. DSOs do not get rewarded for 
RD&D, but only for useful RD&D outcomes. 
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Both mechanisms reduce the downside risk for companies through a partial cost pass-
through (lower-end truncation). The IFI is only based on this input- or cost-based 
mechanism. DSOs are incentivised to control the costs of RD&D via the 80 % cap, 
rather than through an explicit price-based element. The remaining 20 % can only be 
recovered via cost savings resulting from the innovation. As there is no price-based 
element, the IFI does not need to include a definition of innovation outcomes that would 
need to underlie the price-based element.  
The RPZ explicitly combines input- and output-based elements. The price-based ele-
ment in the RPZ scheme allows the DSO to directly recover 100 % of its costs or even 
more than that, provided that the costs do not exceed or are below the cost level defined 
by the revenue driver (£/kW 4.5 for 20 % of the costs). There is a predefined area of 
innovation to which the price-based element is linked (DG connection). 
Compared to the IFI, the RPZ is more attractive for DSOs due to the additional price-
based element on top of the 80 % cost recovery. While the IFI mechanism protects 
DSOs against part of the innovation risk, the RPZ gives them an additional positive in-
centive for the innovative connection of DG plants in demonstration projects, similar to 
the hybrid incentive. 
Taking into account that Ofgem generally assumes RPZ demonstration projects to have 
a lower risk than IFI development projects it may seem surprising that the RPZ includes 
an additional revenue driver, while the IFI does not. However, IFI projects include in-
novations that can help the DSO to reduce the costs of its core business, delivering elec-
tricity via the network. RPZ projects do not contribute to this core business. This refers 
to the discussion in chapter 6.1 on externalities which can justify an additional incen-
tive. RPZs support the DG objective of energy policy and from the DSO perspective 
they may help to reduce the costs of DG connections, but not connecting DG may even 
be more attractive to meet the regulator’s efficiency target. 
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The following example illustrates how the IFI mechanism redistributes risk between 
DSOs and network customers and how this is supposed to stimulate additional RD&D. 
In this example, the investment is profitable from an overall economic point of view, 
but without the innovation mechanisms would not be carried by the DSO as its custom-
ers would see most of the benefits, making the investment uneconomical for the DSO 
(upper-end truncation). With the IFI, which shifts costs to customers, the investment 
becomes profitable for the DSO, but customers still benefit. 
Table 9: Redistribution of costs and benefits through the IFI 
RD&D investment  £ 5 m 
Over what period? 5 years 
Savings per year as a result 
of the innovation 
£ 1 m 
Over what period? 20 years 
Discount rate 6.5 % 
Net present value £ 3.7 m 
Distribution of costs and 
benefits 
Without IFI With IFI 
Costs DSO 100 % DSO 20 %, network custom-
ers 80 % 
Savings for the DSO (over 5 
years) 
£ 5 m £ 5 m 
Savings for network custom-
ers (over 15 years) 
£ 15 m £ 15 m 
Net present value for the 
DSO 
£ -1.1 m £ 2.1 m 
Net present value for net-
work customers 
£ 4.8 m £ 1.6 m 
Source: Based on Ofgem 2004c 
As the IFI aims at general cost reductions that benefit demand customers, it is paid for 
by the latter. The costs of the RPZ scheme are treated like the costs of the DG hybrid 
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incentive and are added to the use-of-system charge for generators, leading to the same 
problems as the hybrid incentive: the mechanism is introduced to support DG, but DG 
operators have to pay for it and carry a significant part of the risk. Although it may be 
argued that the RPZ scheme does not significantly increase the level of the generator-
use-of-system charge (interview Brook), this can also indicate that the incentive for 
DSO is not very strong. In any case, increasing the incentive for the DSOs under this 
model of cost allocation increases the charges for the DG operators. 
8.3.3 The incentive mechanisms under discussion 
As discussed in chapter 6, reliance on economic regulation to pursue objectives beyond 
efficiency can be criticised both from the regulatory economics perspective of the stan-
dard model as well as from the evolutionary perspective put forward in chapter 2.2. This 
is confirmed by the empirical analysis of the developments in the UK. Although both 
the hybrid incentive and the innovation mechanisms confirm the conceptual analysis 
that the incentive mechanisms can be adapted to pursue new objectives, the process of 
introducing these instruments in the UK was less straightforward.  
Scepticism from the regulatory economics perspective was most prominently expressed 
by Ofgem itself. Although the additional mechanisms fit into the incentive framework 
and can be justified based on Ofgem’s duties, they did not fit as easily into the frame-
work provided by Ofgem as an organisation. A general attitude within Ofgem was that 
it should not become involved in intervention in the area of network innovations. Ac-
cording to the Sustainable Development Commission (SDC 2007: 35), when the inno-
vation mechanisms were “first suggested within the organisation [Ofgem] it was re-
jected on the basis that innovation spending does not always lead to increased value to 
the consumer as many innovative projects fail and there was reluctance to micro-
manage network operators’ activities.” 
At the same, the innovation mechanisms can be criticised for neglecting a number of 
important features of the innovation process. As argued in chapters 2.2 and 6.4, innova-
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tion is – from an evolutionary perspective – not simply an optimisation process whereby 
companies increase or decrease the innovation output depending on price signals such 
as the ones provided by the IFI and RPZ. Rather, the innovation process depends on a 
number of institutional factors such as the companies RD&D capacity and culture. 
In principle, the mechanisms represent a signal to network operators that long-term is-
sues and innovation become more relevant and that they should not only focus on short-
term efficiency. However, the fact that the two mechanisms were initially only set up 
for one regulatory period running until 2010 and the lack of certainty as to whether they 
would continue beyond that date arguably made it difficult for DSOs to build up RD&D 
capacity that they had lost after liberalisation (interview Brook). 
Moreover, the IFI puts a cap on how much the DSOs can spend in-house (15 % of the 
overall IFI budget). Although the regulator recognises that DSOs need to spend some 
resources internally to pursue IFI projects, according to Ofgem (2004a: 49), “it is not 
the intention of the IFI to encourage DSOs to re-establish in-house RD&D facilities”. 
However, this may prevent DSOs from increasing RD&D capacity which may produce 
effective RD&D and may be necessary for the DSOs to appropriate and translate the 
results of external projects that they have funded via the IFI. Thus, the cap represents an 
example of micro-management that Ofgem wanted to avoid.  
Another interesting point has been made by Woodman (2007) who criticised the restric-
tions imposed on the possibility of replicating the demonstration of a new technology in 
more than one RPZ. This may hamper its commercialisation and wide-spread adoption. 
While the principal design of the innovation mechanisms as such represents an elaborate 
approach to providing incentives for efficient RD&D, a critical question is how the pa-
rameters are set and how strong the incentives actually are. Against the background of 
the above arguments, it is not surprising that the incentive mechanisms have been con-
sidered to be too weak (e.g. SDC 2007: 35), especially given the fact that DSO are gen-
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erally not particularly innovative organisation, but are used to operate in a low risk envi-
ronment (interview Brook).  
The level of incentives can be explained both by Ofgem’s reluctance to introduce the 
instruments in the first place as well as the innovation model applied, which seems to 
neglect institutional factors that are necessary for DSOs to engage in RD&D. The rela-
tively weak innovation incentives must be judged against the risk for the DSOs that new 
approaches may cause network problems and endanger network quality, for example if 
the connection of DG leads to voltage problems, which would lead to them incurring 
penalties (interview Botting).  
Finally, the UK example also shows that the additional incentive mechanisms may pro-
vide some incentive for the DSOs, but are not necessarily attractive for the DG develop-
ers. As explained in the previous section, DG operators are charged both for the hybrid 
incentive and the RPZ scheme. Besides the additional costs which these entail for DG 
developers, RPZs may be unattractive even if the demonstration may lead to new in-
sights that can contribute to system transformation. Individual DG projects that are con-
nected in a RPZ are not included in the incentive scheme. They do not necessarily bene-
fit from the innovative approaches, and may even be disadvantaged due to the uncer-
tainties and delays in the connection process. While network innovation and system 
transformation are arguably important to accommodate a changing generation structure, 
the UK case shows that these issues are less relevant from the perspective of DG devel-
opers that ‘simply’ want to get connected to the network (interview Hartnell). 
8.3.4 Innovation outcome and further developments 
The practical outcome of the innovation mechanisms is difficult to measure, especially 
in terms of useful innovations. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that in the UK the effects do 
not live up to the expectations, especially in the case of RPZ. This has led Ofgem to 
review and revise its approach. 
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Before the mechanisms were introduced, Ofgem carried out a regulatory impact assess-
ment and estimated the net benefits of the mechanisms. The following table shows that 
significant benefits were expected. 
Table 10: Expected net benefits of IFI and RPZ, present value (£m) 
 RPZ IFI 
Potential savings 121 443 
Cost to customers of initiative 29 57 
Net benefit 92 386 
Source: Ofgem (2004b) 
As for the IFI, there has been an increase in RD&D spending by the DSOs (Ofgem 
2009b: 5). However, according to their annual IFI/RPZ reports for the first year running 
until March 2006, all DSOs stayed significantly below the 0.5 % cap introduced by Of-
gem, with EdF Energy reaching the highest level (0.39 %). The higher pass-through rate 
in the first years did not lead to the expected ‘early action’. 
This can be interpreted as a lack of the DSOs’ capacity to initiate, manage and make use 
of RD&D projects and confirms that DSOs have difficulty building up this capacity in a 
short period of time.  
The majority of IFI projects are found in the area of lifetime extension of the existing 
network infrastructure rather than innovative network concepts that could replace exist-
ing networks and facilitate the integration of DG (Woodman 2007). 
As for the RPZ mechanism, this has had limited practical impact on the demonstration 
of innovative concepts and DG connections. By March 2008 when the review for the 
next regulatory period began (DPCR5), only four RPZs were registered (Ofgem 2008: 
20). Moreover, after registering the RPZ, there have been significant delays in actually 
connecting the DG plants, which is one reason why RPZs have proved unattractive for 
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DG developers. It is therefore justified when the RPZ scheme is described as “less suc-
cessful than hoped” (Ofgem 2008: 20) or even when described as a failure (e.g. Pollitt 
2009). 
As a reaction to the relatively limited effects of the two mechanisms and especially the 
RPZ, Ofgem carried out a detailed review of the two mechanisms in late 2006, i.e. in the 
middle of the regulatory period. The main points that emerged from this review are: 
 All respondents have in principle supported the mechanisms. 
 Many respondents have asked Ofgem to extend the mechanisms beyond the cur-
rent regulatory period and provide more long-term stability. 
 It has been proposed that the RPZ scheme be extended beyond DG connections 
to include other decentralised resources such as demand-side measures and stor-
ages. 
 DSOs should be allowed to replicate innovative approaches in different RPZs to 
promote the diffusion of innovations. 
 A major problem identified with the RPZ mechanism is the relationship between 
DSOs and DG developers. The RPZ mainly addresses DSOs. However, in order 
for RPZs to work they require the cooperation of DSO and DG developer. 
As a result of the review, the regulator took the unusual step of announcing in the mid-
dle of the regulatory period that the two instruments will be extended beyond the current 
regulatory period to enable more long-term planning and certainty (interview Evans). 
This indicates that it is difficult to deal with innovation within the limited length of 
regulatory periods that have been set up to increase short-term efficiency. 
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The instruments have been reviewed again as part of the next distribution price control 
review, which began in 2008. While it was decided that the IFI be continued, the RPZ 
was replaced by a new funding mechanism, the Low Carbon Network Fund (LCN). An 
important change provided by this new mechanism is that innovation funding is no 
longer based on network tariffs in individual networks, but will rather be recovered 
from all DSOs (Ofgem 2010). 
8.4 Beyond changes in the incentive formula 
The DG and innovation mechanisms introduced by Ofgem fit into the standard proce-
dure of incentive regulation based on revenue incentives and regulatory periods. They 
are designed to promote network connection and innovation.  
However, as I argued in the conceptual part of the thesis and especially in chapter 7 
based on system transformation literature, it is not sufficient to add additional economic 
incentive mechanisms, especially when addressing system transformation. Rather, the 
overall regulatory framework itself may need to evolve, both in terms of additional gov-
ernance mechanisms and the role of the regulator. 
As explained in the previous section, the DG hybrid and innovation incentives were 
designed so that they can be justified within the Ofgem efficiency remit rather than as 
an instrument to pursue political objectives: they can facilitate DG connections at lower 
costs and demand customers do not have to bear any additional costs.  
Nevertheless, the evolution of the regulatory framework in the UK is not confined to 
adaptations in the incentive formula. Rather, there are a number of developments – not 
all of them driven by DG – that go beyond changes in the incentive mechanisms and 
change the overall design of network regulation. This includes both the objectives of 
regulation and its instruments. In principle, this confirms the analysis conducted in the 
conceptual part. The following two sections analyse these developments. 
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8.4.1 The role and objectives of Ofgem 
Initially the UK electricity regulator Offer (which was later to become Ofgem) had 
mainly economic duties and focused on promoting and maintaining competition. Over 
recent years, the role of Ofgem has changed to include a broader set of objectives and a 
more long-term perspective. 
The Labour government that came to power in 1997 marked the beginning of a new 
regulatory phase in the UK. When the network industries were first privatised by the 
Conservatives, the government did not put any effort into developing a regulatory con-
cept that placed network regulation into a wider energy policy context. In line with the 
standard model which was to a large extent developed in the UK, regulation was put in 
place mainly as a means to implement liberalisation and privatisation and as a surrogate 
for competition. There was no detailed regulatory ‘philosophy’, except that regulation 
should be independent based on the economic theory that provided the foundation for 
the ‘incentive regulation’ framework (chapter 3.2). As a consequence, as Helm (2003: 
273) has pointed out, “the regulatory regime for both gas and electricity was designed 
without much thought to its wider role in energy policy”. 
When still in opposition, Labour, on the other hand, did not initially show much interest 
in regulation since it was opposed to the whole liberalisation agenda (Corry 2003: 6). 
Regulation thus fell into a political void. Regulation has therefore been developed to a 
large extent bottom-up by the regulators themselves, based on the overall liberalisation 
paradigm and the incentive regulation concept developed by economists.  
Once it had remodelled itself as New Labour and was preparing to assume power, rena-
tionalisation was no longer an option and Labour had to reconcile itself to the new re-
gime. This made it necessary for a ‘Labour’ approach to regulation to be developed. 
Thus, it was only in the late 1990s that a regulatory ‘philosophy’ underwent develop-
ment, which was to be more than a continuation of competition by other means. This 
philosophy puts regulation into a broader political context and rejects the notion that 
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regulation can be neutral and value-free. In this perspective regulation is not just about 
efficiency, but also about public policy and public values (Corry 2003: 4-5) 
The most obvious in-road for Labour’s regulatory reform agenda was to tackle the dis-
tributional effects of network regulation. Firstly, this refers to the monetary distribution 
between network operators and consumers and the trade-off between productive and 
allocative efficiency. Labour sought to rectify the results of regulation under the Con-
servative government – a time that is often referred to as the “fat cat” years when net-
work operators increased efficiency and were able keep most of the gains for them-
selves. Secondly, there were concerns about certain groups of consumers, e.g. low in-
come customers threatened by ‘fuel poverty’. 
When the new Labour government started to amend the standard model, it was chiefly 
concerned with improving equity issues in the beginning. Later on, the reworking of 
regulation that was set off by the UK Utilities Act linked up with the environmental and 
long-term issues such as DG integration and network transformation which were mov-
ing up the agenda (MacKerron 2003; Helm 2005). With regard to social policy objec-
tives, Ofgem argued that these are best served by competitive markets, whereas in envi-
ronmental policy there is more recognition that market mechanisms need to be comple-
mented by other instruments (Green, Trotter 2003: 79).  
The government first amended the objective of regulation with the 2000 Utilities Act 
(Owen 2004: 18). The interests of consumers became the new principal objective, which 
should be pursued “wherever appropriate, by promoting competition”. This was imple-
mented despite concerns that downgrading the competition objective may “weaken the 
ability or resolve of the authority to pursue what has surely been the main instrument 
for progress in the industry” (Littlechild 2003: 44). A further interesting aspect is that 
according to the Utilities Act “consumers” includes both existing and future consumers, 
thus adding a more long-term perspective to regulation (Utilities Act 2000, Section 
13(6)). 
Transforming the Grid Part III: Case studies  
 
-224- 
Moreover, the new primary duty was complemented by so-called secondary duties, in-
cluding both social and environmental ones. According to the OECD (2002: 26), broad-
ening Ofgem’s remit beyond economic objectives represents “an interesting institu-
tional innovation” and “compared with arrangements in other jurisdictions Ofgem’s 
role (…) represents a ‘ quasi-policy’ function.  
This raises the question of how the regulator’s broader remit affects the relationship 
between Ofgem and the government. The discussion in chapter 7.2 showed that multiple 
objectives render regulation more political. With a more encompassing role for the 
regulator it becomes more urgent to properly define the interface between regulation 
and policy and ensure political control of the regulator (Helm 2004a).  
Broadening the regulatory remit tells the regulator which objectives to pursue, but not 
which to choose in the case of trade-offs between them. In the UK, the hierarchy of 
primary and secondary objectives provides some guidance on how to deal with trade-
offs between these objectives. Moreover, the new law enabled the UK energy minister 
to issue guidance to Ofgem as to how to take environmental and social objectives into 
account.  
On the one hand, the guidance is described as a “mechanism to resolve the issue of 
blurred responsibilities between the government and Ofgem” (OECD 2002: 26). On the 
other hand, it was criticised in the Energy Review initiated by the government that the 
guidance given to Ofgem was not “sufficiently specific about the outcomes Government 
wishes to achieve and when it wishes to achieve them” (PIU 2002: 146-147). 
In addition to social and environmental duties, the introduction of a more comprehen-
sive sustainability duty was also discussed. The England and Wales water regulator Of-
wat provided an example for a more explicit consideration of sustainability objectives in 
the regulatory framework (Owen 2004: 27). One explanation for the differences in wa-
ter and energy regulation in the UK can be found in different institutional responsibili-
ties: while Ofgem belongs to the DTI’s remit, the water regulator Ofwat is overseen by 
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DEFRA, the the UK's Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (Owen 
2006b: 213). This shows how the standard model can be interpreted differently within 
one and the same government. 
A sustainability duty was not introduced in the UK Utility Act. However, the discussion 
to amend Ofgem’s duties continued, and the 2004 Energy Act eventually added a new 
secondary duty for Ofgem to contribute to sustainable development (Owen 2006b). The 
2004 Energy Act (section 83) stipulates that that the regulator should carry out its duties 
in a manner “best calculated to contribute to the achievement of sustainable develop-
ment” subject to the principal objective, the protection of the interests consumers.  
The new duties were to some extent also reflected in Ofgem’s internal structure follow-
ing the UK Energy Act (SDC 2007: 32). A new European Strategy and Environment 
Directorate was introduced, Ofgem set up a sustainable development sub-committee and 
started producing a sustainable development report. 
There have been further debates about improving the alignment of Ofgem’s duties to 
broader government policy and further extending its duties and putting sustainability on 
the same level as economic objectives (SDC 2007: 29-32). The 2008 Energy Act further 
strengthened the sustainability duty. 
It is certainly debatable whether and how these new duties have affected the actual per-
formance of Ofgem and whether Ofgem possesses the necessary capacities to imple-
ment the new duties (Owen 2006b; Bartle, Vass 2006; SDC 2007). According to a sur-
vey carried out by Bartle and Vass (2006: 37) which focused on the effects of the sus-
tainable development duty, “there is little evidence of a substantial and significant 
change in the actions of the regulators which can be directly connected to the duty”. 
Even with the new duties in place, Ofgem is still described as an institution concentrat-
ing on incremental change, rather than long-term system transformation (interview 
Strbac). Economic issues remain Ofgem’s main objective. The regulator has been rather 
reluctant to implement the new duties. As Helm (2004a: 34) has pointed out, the gov-
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ernment unofficially wanted Ofgem to go beyond its primary duties and implement the 
2003 Energy White Paper (DTI 2004b). Yet there was a struggle between neo-liberal 
economists at Ofgem who see its environment-related objectives as political interfer-
ence and those in government who envisage a wider role for Ofgem (Green 2004: 7). 
It is therefore not surprising that there have also been more far-reaching proposals for 
revising the institutional set-up, rather than merely amending the objectives within the 
standard model. For example, Owen (2004: 30) put forward the idea of giving the UK 
Environment Agency a role in network regulation to ensure that various objectives are 
balanced. As mentioned in chapter 7.2, Helm (2004a: 34) proposed the “agency model” 
as an alternative to the regulatory office model on which Ofgem is based. In this model, 
the agency would explicitly cover the entire sector, including all the policy objectives 
related to it, rather than adding additional objectives to the economic regulator. In the 
UK context, this may require a merger between Ofgem and other bodies, including the 
Energy Savings Trust and the Carbon Trust. 
Although the effect in practice of the new objectives should not be overrated and must 
be evaluated in the specific institutional and political context, the UK example shows 
that the clear-cut economic objective of regulation has been increasingly called into 
question and the standard model of economic regulation has become a subject of politi-
cal debate. These developments in the UK support the point made throughout the con-
ceptual part of this thesis: due to political objectives such as DG which depend on the 
network and the far-reaching changes that networks may experience, it is difficult to 
maintain the standard model as a depoliticised approach and only adapt it on the level of 
the incentive formula. 
8.4.2 Regulatory instruments beyond economic incentives 
So far the UK case study has analysed how incentive regulation has been amended to 
take into account DG and network innovation and how the objectives of regulation have 
been expanded beyond economic efficiency. 
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This section briefly describes the development of regulatory instruments that go beyond 
changes in the incentives given to the regulated companies, but establish additional co-
ordination mechanisms. This is based on the conceptual analysis in chapter 7.1 that has 
argued that economic incentives are not sufficient to manage network transformation 
and that transformation mechanisms can build on the standard model. 
8.4.2.1 Coordination beyond economic incentives 
In chapter 7.1 it was argued that system transformation poses a number of governance 
challenges that cannot be met by the market, but require specific governance arrange-
ments, including strategies for dealing with systemic uncertainty, the anticipation of 
long-term system development, measures to increase adaptability, and the coordination 
of a broad range of actors. Although the UK has been a champion of the market, this 
generic analysis of the need to apply non market-based coordination mechanisms is to 
some extent reflected in the development of the regulatory regime in the UK.  
In 2005 the Distributed Generation Coordination Group, chaired by the DTI and Ofgem, 
commissioned the so-called Technical Architecture Report. It addresses issues of sys-
tem transformation and identifies the need that “a single entity is given responsibility to 
be the focal point for developing future technical architectures” (DGCG 2005, 8). Joint 
thinking would be necessary because “the largest identified barrier to Distributed Gen-
eration (DG) being adopted in large scale was the ‘lack of joined up thinking’ in the 
industry”. In a similar vein, John Scott, who was then Ofgem’s Technical Director in 
charge of the DG and innovation incentives, emphasised the importance of the new in-
centive mechanisms presented above, but at the same time questioned whether “this is 
sufficient to energise the ‘supply chain’ of parties across the wider sector that will be 
needed?” (Scott 2004). 
The Technical Architecture Report comes to the conclusion that the transformation from 
central planning to a liberalised market has led to a lack of coordination. While central 
planning by the state-owned and vertically integrated Central Electricity Generation 
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Board (CEGB) was the main governance mechanism before liberalisation, it was re-
placed by unbundling and a heterogeneous actor arena that is supposed to be coordi-
nated through the market. While this market structure is not called into question, the 
argument is made that an additional ‘focal point’ is necessary for improving coordina-
tion in the liberalised market environment and for developing a new system architec-
ture. This is illustrated in the following figure.  
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Figure 15: From central planning to a new focal point in the liberalised market? 
 
Source: Adapted from Botting (2006a) 
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Although it remains rather vague what this focal point is and what it should do, it be-
comes clear that it should complement the market and provide a coordination mecha-
nism that is located somewhere between central planning and coordination through the 
competitive market. It is a central coordination mechanism in a heterogeneous arena, 
rather than a decentralised coordination through prices. The notion of such a focal point 
resembles the proposals made by the governance of system transformation literature. 
For example, both the foresight and strategic niche management approaches presented 
in chapter 2.2 and the coordination of actors discussed in chapter 7.1 can be regarded as 
such focal points. 
In the UK, Ofgem and the DTI set up and co-chaired three consecutive groups that 
comprise a range of stakeholders to analyse the barriers for DG and propose ways to 
overcome them. In 2000, the Embedded Generation Working Group (EGWG) was es-
tablished to identify barriers for the further deployment of DG. A key conclusion of the 
group was that DSOs play a key role for DG and a lack of incentives on their side, re-
sulting from the regulation of network tariffs, represents a key barrier for DG (Botting 
2006b). This led to the DG hybrid incentive. In 2001, the EGWG was followed by the 
Distributed Generation Coordinating Group (DGCG), which was to implement the rec-
ommendations of the EGWG. This was followed by the Electricity Network Strategy 
Group. 
8.4.2.2 The Electricity Network Strategy Group 
Following the Technical Architecture Report the Electricity Network Strategy Group 
(ENSG) was set up in 2005 by the DTI and Ofgem to replace the DGCG. The ENSG 
can be interpreted as an attempt to establish the ‘focal point’ proposed by the Technical 
Architecture Report in order to tackle long-term network transformation.  
Besides the DTI and Ofgem its members include representatives from the Scottish Ex-
ecutive, the Welsh Assembly, DEFRA, network operators, generators, consultants and 
other industry participants. Thus, the group brings together different market players, 
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policy-makers and the regulator. Network governance is no longer restricted to the prin-
cipal-agent relationship between the regulator and the network operators. 
The task of ENSG is to “identify, and co-ordinate work to address the technical, com-
mercial, regulatory and other issues that affect the transition of electricity transmission 
and distribution networks to a low-carbon future” (ENSG 2006: 2) and it wants to for-
mulate “a holistic view of the strategic development of transmission and distribution 
networks” (ENSG 2006, 3).  
While the earlier industry groups described in the previous section focused on connec-
tion of DG to the distribution network, the ENSG has a broader scope and analyses both 
transmission and distribution issues. This indicates a shift to a more systemic perspec-
tive, rather than looking at innovations in individual networks. Also, network transfor-
mation is seen in the wider context of the transformation of the energy system to a low 
carbon economy. The group also takes a long-term perspective and analyses potential 
future development paths and upcoming options. This is supported by the development 
of long-term scenarios that analyse possible future network developments (Ault, Hughes 
2008). 
It is chaired jointly by the DTI and Ofgem, indicating that the clear distinction between 
policy formulation and delivery has been blurred to some extent and that there is more 
of a two-way exchange. Ofgem’s role in this group goes beyond implementing objec-
tives defined in the energy policy realm; it has an important role in moderating the 
process of defining the future development of the network. In this context, it is impor-
tant to note that Ofgem not only has a role as a financial tariff regulator, but also on a 
technical level: there is a technical group through which Ofgem becomes involved in 
the debate on potential future system architectures in the ENSG (interview Evans).  
The ENSG is not based on any explicit concept of how to deal with system transforma-
tion, as for example Transition Management in the Netherlands (see chapter 2.2), al-
though Ofgem has considered how such a process needs to be designed (Scott, Evans 
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2007: 51-52). In any case, the ENSG exhibits a number of governance features similar 
to those discussed in chapter 7.1 for dealing with long-term network transformation: the 
regulator takes a long-term perspective rather than looking only at the next five-year 
regulatory period; the group explores different options; a broad range of stakeholders 
from different parts of the electricity sector is involved in contributing to this long-term 
perspective; the ENSG pursues not just economic efficiency, but broader policy objec-
tives; networks are discussed in the context of overall electricity system development; 
the relationship between policy and regulation becomes more interactive.  
According to the regulator, the ENSG is to make explicit and analyse different potential 
developments so that DSOs can prepare and adapt to them (interview Evans). The 
multi-stakeholder approach is not only aimed at providing coordination between the 
different actor groups. Rather, the ENSG also has a role in advising Ofgem on the dif-
ferent scenarios and options available. As the regulator wants to avoid being captured 
by vested interests, it expects to benefit from a broader and more balanced perspective 
that can be elaborated in such a group (interview Botting). 
The ENSG represents an institutional innovation in the regulatory regime of the UK 
context. It complements the market mechanism and can help to coordinate the innova-
tion activities of different actors to contribute to system transformation. However, many 
in the UK have been rather critical about the ENSG and its performance, including 
those who see the need to address system transformation. Although in principle it is 
regarded as a good idea to involve a broad range of stakeholders, it is regarded as prob-
lematic that the ENSG only has an advisory role and is seen as suffering from a lack of 
power (interview White). It has therefore also been called a ‘talking shop’ (interview 
Strbac). 
One main problem of the various groups and especially the ENSG is that the rather 
theoretical work has not been sufficiently translated into actual experiments or changes 
in the regulatory framework. The long-term perspective which the group takes is not 
adequately linked to short-term regulatory actions (interview ENA, Mitchell). The RPZs 
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were expected by Ofgem to provide a tool to try out various options that emerge from 
the horizon-scanning (interview Evans), but in practice they could not live up to this 
expectation (see section 8.3.4). 
In terms of actor coordination, the ENSG also highlights the problem that these kinds of 
processes require additional resources that many stakeholders do not have. Especially in 
the case of DG developers and associations of new generation technologies, they have 
realised the importance of regulation, but lack the resources to fully participate in the 
regulatory process, including the various groups that have been set up such as the ENSG 
(interview Hartnell). 
This chapter does not provide a detailed analysis of the way in which the ENSG works 
and its practical effects. However, the above-mentioned problems are rather typical of  
such long-term and transformation-orientated governance mechanisms that often lack 
resources and power and are not properly linked to short-term decision-making proc-
esses (e.g. Kern, Smith 2008 for the case of Dutch transition management; Hendriks, 
Grin 2007).  
Although the practical effects of the ENSG may have been limited to date, the principal 
design of the ENSG and the grounds on which it has been justified potentially marks a 
departure from the standard model of economic regulation. What is most interesting in 
the context of this thesis is that such a governance mechanism has been established in 
the homeland of the standard model. Moreover, the ENSG is not a separate process, but 
is directly based on the standard model, with the regulator Ofgem playing an important 
role in this process. Although Ofgem and the ENSG are far from the transformation 
agency suggested in chapter 7.1 and despite the potential for improving the design and 
performance of the ENSG, it represents a practical example of a governance mechanism 
that can establish a link between the liberalisation and the transformation discourse as 
discussed in chapter 2. 
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9 Case study Denmark 
This chapter presents the second country case study on Denmark. Although both the 
Danish and UK case studies seek to answer the same questions and examine the issues 
laid out in chapter 4, the structure of the Danish case study differs in some respects from 
the UK one. This reflects the differences between the two cases: While in the UK the 
focus is on the standard model and how it is being adapted, the Danish case study has 
revealed other mechanisms beyond the standard model that govern the transformation of 
the Danish network infrastructure.  
As a consequence the outline of this chapter revolves less around the standard model 
and how it evolves; rather it is structured so as to present both the role of the standard 
model as well as these additional mechanisms. It also places more emphasis on innova-
tion and transformation, because this has become the key issue in Denmark. The chapter 
first presents the background (section 9.1) that is necessary to analyse the governance of 
DG connection (9.2) as well as the governance of innovation and transformation (9.3) in 
more detail. 
9.1 Background: Liberalisation, DG and system transformation 
9.1.1 The traditional structure of the electricity industry in Denmark 
The Danish electricity system is divided into two systems: an Eastern system in Zealand 
and a Western system covering Jutland and Funen. There is no synchronous intercon-
nection between the two systems. Until recently, there were also different companies 
operating in the two regions, including two separate system operators. Most DG is situ-
ated in the West and most issues surrounding DG therefore emerged in this part of the 
country. Therefore, the focus of this study is on western Denmark. Although the eastern 
and western parts of the country are still separate from an electrical point of view, they 
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have started to converge since the national system operator Energinet.dk formed in 
2004. 
The following figure shows the ownership structure of the Danish electricity supply 
industry in 1995, just before liberalisation started to transform the sector. Besides the 
separation into “east” and “west”, the figure shows another important feature, too: the 
bottom-up ownership structure.  
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Figure 16: The organisation of the Danish electricity supply industry in 1995 
 
Source: Grohnheit, Olsen (2001: 130) 
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As in other countries electricity supply was initially characterised by decentralised gen-
eration and distribution, which in Denmark was run by municipalities as well as farming 
cooperatives and consumer-owned companies. Over time the system became technically 
more and more centralised, with large-scale plants and a transmission system across 
different regions and interconnectors to other countries. However, in contrast to many 
other countries, the technical integration did not overthrow decentralised ownership, but 
the local cooperatives managed to maintain control over the centralised supply structure. 
This led to a bottom-up ownership structure where a large number of local companies 
jointly controlled the larger generation companies, which in turn used to be the owners 
of the two transmission system operators.  
This traditional set-up of the Danish electricity supply industry is rooted more broadly 
in the peculiarities of the Danish socio-political system, which is characterised by coop-
eratism and decentralised governance (Christiansen et al. 2001). 
Importantly, the ownership structure also entailed a strong public service obligation and 
an orientation of the companies towards the requirements of their local owners. Besides 
the consumer ownership system, there was a “consumer profit” system in place until 
2000, too. This meant that the electricity companies had to re-invest any profits into the 
electricity system; otherwise any surplus had to be paid back to the consumers through 
lower prices (Lucha 2006). This has become a major issue in the transformation towards 
a liberalised market: it has led to the nationalisation of the system operator (see section 
9.3.3.1) and has influenced the implementation of the standard model of network regu-
lation in Denmark. 
Another consequence of the bottom-up ownership was that Danish electricity companies 
have traditionally not been controlled by the state and the direct involvement of the state 
in operation of the electricity system was rather minimal (Hadjilambrinos 1999). Energy 
policy did play an important role, defining ambitious targets and seeking to guide the 
development of the sector. However, energy policy did not rely on ownership, but rather 
on command-and-control instruments and to a large extent also on joint planning and 
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agreements between the government and the companies (see section 9.3.4.1) These 
agreements were “the means by which many public service obligations, which would 
otherwise not be economic, are carried out” (OECD 1999: 25). Many of these measures 
were to do with environmental objectives that were a primary objective of Danish en-
ergy policy before liberalisation (OECD 1999: 10). 
Overall, in the Danish electricity industry governance through cooperation has tradi-
tionally played an important role, both between the government and the industry, and 
between companies themselves. As the large companies were owned by the smaller 
ones and eventually by consumers and municipalities, they could not unilaterally decide 
on the development of the electricity system, but had to seek the agreement of their lo-
cal owners (interview Styrbro). 
9.1.2 Overview of electricity market liberalisation 
Unlike the UK, Denmark has not been a pioneer of electricity market liberalisation, but 
it has not been a ‘laggard’ either. Liberalisation in Denmark was mainly triggered by 
liberalisation efforts outside the country, namely other Scandinavian countries and the 
European Union (IEA 2002b; Grohnheit 2002). Due to its proximity to the Scandina-
vian liberalisation pioneers, Denmark came under early pressure to open up its market. 
The first steps of electricity market liberalisation in Denmark were taken with the 1996 
amendment of the Danish Electricity Supply Act – just before the European Union 
made liberalisation mandatory in its 1996 internal electricity market directive.  
Market liberalisation went hand in hand with new environmental targets for the energy 
sector: in the same year, the Energi 21 plan was adopted, setting targets for CO2 reduc-
tions for 2005 and 2030 and the further promotion of renewables and CHP. 
The first amendment in Denmark was soon to be followed by a more encompassing 
reform that led to the 1999 Danish Energy Supply Act. The aim of this act was to im-
plement the European directive, but also to combine Danish environmental and energy 
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policies and the requirements of the energy market directive. Denmark went beyond 
some of the requirements of the EU directive; the Energy Act provides for a faster open-
ing of the electricity market than required and introduced full opening of the retail mar-
ket in 2003. 
Overall, it can be said that Denmark has implemented the main elements of the standard 
model, including an independent economic regulator. In this process, many peculiarities 
of the Danish system were abolished, while others were kept, at least initially. Electric-
ity companies became more commercial enterprises that were allowed to make a profit, 
breaking with the traditional Danish non-profit principle. At the same time, the strong 
role of local authorities and consumers continued after market liberalisation, although in 
the meantime the government has made it easier for them to sell their companies (Owen 
2006a: 49; IEA 2002).  
A major challenge in the transformation towards a liberalised market with ‘normal’ 
commercial companies was the so-called “capital issue”, i.e. the question of how to deal 
with the money the companies had accumulated and which was regarded as belonging 
to the consumers. This eventually led to the nationalisation of the transmission system 
operator Energinet.dk. This will be analysed in more detail in section 9.3.3.1. 
One important reason why Denmark and especially the former Western system operator 
Eltra became more enthusiastic about liberalisation after showing some initial reluc-
tance was its high share of intermittent and distributed generation. An open European 
market with more cross-border exchange of electricity should help to maintain system 
security even with a high share of intermittent generation (interview Bach). 
9.1.3 DG Policy 
Denmark has, at least in the industrialised world, the highest share of DG capacity. Both 
wind and CHP plants have a major share in generation capacity. More than 50% of the 
total production capacity is dispersed throughout local distribution grids of 60 kV or 
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less. Several distribution companies have an installed DG capacity several times higher 
than their total load and therefore need to export power (Lund et al. 2006).  
Only twenty years ago the generation structure of Denmark looked similar to other 
countries, with most electricity generated in large-scale plants. The following figure 
illustrates the transition of a centralised to a decentralised electricity generation system 
from 1980 to 2000. 
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Figure 17:  Decentralisation of electricity generation in Denmark from 1980 to 
2000 
Source: provided to the author by Eltra 
Source: provided to the author by Eltra 
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This development is mainly due to political support for renewables and CHP that has 
provided a stable environment for DG since the 1970s (van der Vleuten, Raven 2006b): 
 Since the oil crisis of the 1970s, Danish energy policy has sought to reduce de-
pendency on oil imports by promoting renewables and CHP. In the 1980s, envi-
ronmental objectives became the main driver of this policy. Decentralisation was 
also seen as an alternative to nuclear plants. 
 Long-term objectives, plans and instruments were set up that have been consis-
tently applied over time. 
 As the state was not involved in the electricity industry in terms of ownership it 
did not have strong economic interests in the centralised system, which made it 
easier for it to pursue these objectives. 
 The Danish Energy Agency was set up as a central actor and managed to de-
velop a long-term and coordinated energy policy. 
 While the government and the energy agency provided a strategic and long-term 
policy framework, the decentralised ownership structure of the industry was 
amenable to developing a decentralised generation structure. 
 For both CHP and renewables, effective policy instruments have been put in 
place.  
For CHP “heat planning” as well as an obligation for new and old buildings to connect 
to district heating was crucial. The 1979 Danish heat supply law made the local authori-
ties responsible for identifying the potential for public heating in their areas. In 1988, 
electric heating was banned (Lorentzen 2005; IEA 2009a).  
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For renewables, support was provided through fixed feed-in tariffs, together with an 
obligation to connect these plants to the network. With the 1999 Energy Act which lib-
eralised the market, there was to be a shift from the feed-in model to a quota system 
with a green certificate market, similar to the UK system (Agnolucci 2005; Meyer, Koe-
foed 2003). This was supposed to be a more market-based instrument. After several 
postponements, the scheme was eventually shelved and a premium system was intro-
duced, whereby renewable operators receive the market price plus a premium payment. 
The feed-in law thus became a “victim of its own success” (Agnolucci 2005: 959). The 
shift from a fixed feed-in payment to a premium payment also confirms that with an 
increasing share of DG the emphasis shifts from connection to integration, in this case 
market integration as opposed to network integration. 
Almost ironically, the attempts to replace the feed-in system have led to a surge of wind 
projects, the realisation of which was intended to occur prior to the implementation of 
the new systems, which arguably provides less favourable conditions for wind plants. 
This sudden increase in wind capacity was a main reason for the system operator to 
consider the system implications of this changing generation structure (interview Bach). 
9.1.4 From individual plants to system transformation 
Denmark has attracted a lot of interest for the policies that have been sketched out in the 
previous section and the resulting development of renewables and CHP. In contrast to 
the majority of previous studies, this analysis is not concerned with the deployment of 
individual plants, but with the governance of system integration and transformation. 
Very little research has been conducted on how this has operated in Denmark.  
Denmark is an interesting case in this respect, too. From around 2000 onwards it has 
been increasingly recognised that the large increase in distributed and intermittent gen-
eration requires adaptations in the overall system. Over the last decade Denmark has 
become a “real-life laboratory” (Nielsen 2007) for electricity infrastructure transforma-
tion and a pioneer not just for DG deployment, but also for system change. This shift 
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towards a system view has been summarised well by Nielsen: “It’s about systems, not 
technologies: we don’t know yet how the system as a whole could operate” (interview 
Nielsen). 
The argument elaborated in chapter 3 and which helped to structure this study – that 
with an increasing share of DG the focus needs to shift from connection and network 
integration to innovation and system transformation – is thus confirmed by the Danish 
case. This section briefly describes the main projects and developments aiming at sys-
tem change. 
On the one hand, the Danish case indicates that a 50% DG share is not necessarily im-
possible to operate even in a conventional power system (Bach et al. 2003). In terms of 
market integration, the strong interconnections with Germany and the hydro-based sys-
tems in Scandinavia have certainly contributed to balancing the system despite a high 
share of intermittent generation (Jäntti 2003: 46; interview Strbac). In terms of network 
integration and additional network costs, the fact that most DG was connected before 
the market was liberalised and a special cost-sharing mechanism for distribution com-
panies (section 9.2.2.1) have contributed to dampening the system consequences of DG. 
On the other hand, the Danish example shows that large shares of DG do not easily fit 
into today’s centralised power systems. As in other countries the Danish electricity in-
frastructure was aligned to the centralised generation of electricity which characterised 
the electricity system and the increase of intermittent DG has made this system less sta-
ble. The increase of less controllable DG has made network expansions and network 
redesign necessary and has resulted in problems with balancing supply and demand and 
several times the system was close to breakdown (Jensen 2002). In January 2004, there 
was a large-scale black-out. According to Tech-Wise (2002: 43), “the electricity system 
has been turned upside down without any actions being taken until recently. The conse-
quences have been that the stability of the system is put into jeopardy and that increas-
ing funds have had to be utilised to maintain the stability”. 
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Several interviewees and especially those from the system operator Eltra and Energi-
net.dk have confirmed that system issues were almost entirely neglected when the ob-
jectives to increase renewables and CHP were drawn up and implemented:  
 “There was no planned development; the DG plants simply appeared, and no-
body had foreseen the problems in advance; it was only in the late 1990s that 
the people in the industry realised in earnest the mounting problems” (interview 
Lund.) 
 And similarly: “We started to realise too late that a system change is required. 
(…) No one was thinking about the infrastructure” (interview Bach). 
Having been neglected for two decades of DG development, infrastructure transforma-
tion has been a major topic on the Danish electricity agenda since around 2000. In con-
trast to the UK, this new issue has been triggered by the high level of DG which has 
been reached and which requires infrastructure transformation to ensure an efficient and 
secure supply and to enable the system to efficiently integrate even larger amounts of 
DG.  
In around 2000, the problem became more apparent for two reasons, both of which indi-
rectly involve the liberalisation of the electricity market. First, in the second half of the 
1990s most resources, especially those of the transmission system operator were ab-
sorbed by designing the liberalised market. It was only after much of this work had been 
accomplished that enough resources could be made available to turn attention towards 
infrastructure issues. Secondly, as described in the previous section, in the wake of mar-
ket liberalisation, the support system for renewables became less favourable, which led 
to a surge of new projects that wanted to benefit from the old system. This significantly 
exacerbated the system problems. 
There have been three key programmes or projects. They all concentrate on transform-
ing the overall system architecture rather than changes in individual networks, even 
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though these changes are still in a pilot phase. The general philosophy is that the system 
cannot be rebuilt from scratch and what is therefore required is incremental system 
change adapted from the existing infrastructure. As a consequence, a focus is on intelli-
gent control, to enhance the performance of the existing system (interview Lund). 
System 21 
The first attempt to tackle the system challenges resulting from a changing generation 
structure was made by the then Western transmission system operator Eltra with the so 
called ‘System 21’ programme, in the course of which various projects were coordi-
nated to develop a new conceptual framework for a more decentralised system (Eltra 
2003: 19-20; interviews Nielsen, Bach). 
The set-up of System 21 was very much influenced by the way the system operator 
Eltra had implemented liberalisation, for which it could rely on the standard model and 
experiences in other countries. As for system transformation, however it turned out that 
this was more complicated because there were no blueprints and it was less clear what 
would work and what would not. It was therefore decided that System 21 should be 
halted and a pilot project initiated. 
Cell Controller Pilot Project 
This led to the cell controller pilot project, which was initiated by Eltra, the former 
transmission system operator in western Denmark and is now run by its successor Ener-
ginet.dk, in cooperation with the distribution system operator Syd Energi, where the 
pilot project is being implemented (Lund et al. 2006). While System 21 was mainly 
conceptual, the cell project acknowledges that new concepts need to be developed and 
tested in practice, i.e. in a real distribution network (interview Bach). Besides providing 
a system that can accommodate more DG, an important objective for Energinet.dk is to 
break the monopoly of the big generators in the ancillary service market by enabling 
DG to provide such services through the cell controller (interview Lund) 
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The Cell project is about developing a new system and control architecture based on 
distribution network cells. Cells are distribution networks that are enabled to operate 
independently from the overall system. Starting in 2006, the Cell Controller hardware 
and software have been installed and tested in a full 60/10 kV distribution system. The 
system comprises 49 wind turbines totalling 39 MW, 5 CHP plants totalling 38 MW and 
has a maximum observed load of 60 MW. According to Energinet.dk this distribution 
system is the first utility scale Smart Grid in operation world wide (interview Lund). 
The final full scale test trials will be conducted in fall 2010 and spring 2011. 
With this concept, the DSOs are to have a greater opportunity to monitor and actively 
control their network and will take over responsibilities from the transmission system. 
Decentralisation of generation thus leads to a partial decentralisation of control. A key 
driver of the cell concept is to enable the cells to disconnect from the transmission sys-
tem and run in fully automated island operation if an imminent system black-out is de-
tected. Furthermore the new control infrastructure will also enable the cell to fulfil a 
number of control and operational functions in normal operation by utilising a novel 
system design (interview Lund).  
EcoGrid 
Finally, another crucial project is the EcoGrid project, which started in 20079 with a 
pre-study. The full-scale project will most likely commence in January 2011 as an EU-
funded project. This project aims at providing the system which can handle the energy 
policy objective to cover 50% of demand with wind power in 2025. The objective is 
more encompassing compared to the Cell Controller Pilot Project which is a pure tech-
nical project to prove the concept. EcoGrid is expected to explore a number of different 
                                                 
9 http://www.Energinet.dk/en/menu/R+and+D/EcoGrid/EcoGrid.dk.htm, last accessed on 18 February 
2009 
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system solutions, including the full Cell Controller concept (Energinet.dk 2007b: 46-
47). Moreover, it is planned that EcoGrid does not just look at the technical options, but 
also explores how the transactions between the generation and demand in the cell can be 
optimised. To this end the project aims at establishing near real-time markets within the 
cell, including new markets for different ancillary services. 
9.2 Governance of DG connection 
Having looked at the structure of the electricity industry in Denmark and liberalisation 
as well as the innovation and system transformation that has been triggered by the high 
share of DG, the analysis now continues by examining the governance of DG connec-
tion and system transformation. This section investigates how DG connection has been 
dealt with in Denmark and what the role of the standard model of network regulation 
was in this process. The governance mechanisms to deal with system innovation and 
transformation, which is now the dominant issue in Denmark, are presented in section 
9.3. 
9.2.1 The standard model of network regulation in Denmark 
As described in the previous section, the standard model of liberalisation has not left out 
Denmark on its way around the world. This includes the standard model of economic 
regulation of the network monopolies. Denmark has set up both an independent regula-
tor (section 9.2.1.1) and has been shifting from cost-based to price-based regulation 
(section 9.2.1.2). At least in terms of the general regulatory model, Denmark has taken 
into account the UK example (interview Aarberg). 
Nevertheless, looking at the role of the standard model with regard to DG (section 
9.2.1.3), the situation is very different from the one found in the UK. It is not that the 
standard model of network regulation does not have any impact on DG. However, while 
in the UK the regulator plays a central role in the DG arena, the regulator in Denmark is 
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almost invisible when it comes to dealing with the infrastructure challenges of DG. The 
main factors explaining the Danish situation are presented in section 9.2.2. 
9.2.1.1 The role and objectives of regulators 
While in the UK Ofgem is responsible for both the economic regulation of networks as 
well as the implementation of some other energy policies, these tasks are clearly split 
between two agencies in Denmark, namely DEA, the Danish Energy Agency (Ener-
gistyrelsen) and DERA, the Danish Regulatory Agency (Energitilsynet). As will be ex-
plained in section 9.3.3.4, the Danish transmission system operator has a regulatory 
function, too. This was the case to some extent even before the state-owned TSO Ener-
ginet.dk was set up, as the cost-socialisation mechanism described in section 9.2.2.1 
shows. 
Danish Energy Agency 
In 1976 the Danish Energy Agency (DEA) was set up to implement Denmark’s first 
energy plan, i.e. well before liberalisation was introduced. It “continues to be the key 
institution for development and implementation of energy legislation and policy” (IEA 
2002b: 25; IEA 2002b). It is an agency within the energy department and is responsible 
for energy policy formulation and implementation. It administers Danish energy legisla-
tion, including the Energy Supply Act. An important instrument of policy implementa-
tion has been agreements with the industry, notably with the system operators (OECD 
1999: 25). The agency carries out functions that in other countries are often split be-
tween different departments and agencies. Importantly, the agency is in charge of a 
number of functions which in other countries often lie within the remit of the independ-
ent energy regulator, including licensing, setting rules on environmentally benign elec-
tricity production and defining public service obligations. This means that key regula-
tory powers with regard to renewables and CHP and their network integration are not 
delegated to the independent regulator DERA (OECD 1999: 39; Owen 2007: 74). 
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Danish Energy Regulatory Agency 
While the DEA is an organisation that was set up well before liberalisation, the Danish 
Energy Regulatory Agency is a much more recent institution that began its activities in 
2000 as part of the Danish effort to introduce the standard model of electricity liberali-
sation. It is set up as an independent body not subject to direct intervention by the en-
ergy department (DERA 2002b: 11) – a criterion that could not have been fulfilled by 
the DEA. Its main task is to regulate the monopoly companies in the energy sector, in-
cluding electricity transmission and distribution, gas and district heating. 
As explained above, the DEA has kept responsibility for a broad range of issues and 
consequently DERA’s task is very much confined to economic regulation of monopolis-
tic activities, whereas “key decisions – e.g. on connection rules and transmission issues 
for offshore wind tend to be taken by the DEA”, according to Owen (2006a: 74). The 
OECD (1999: 39), in its effort to reduce political intervention in liberalised electricity 
markets, even diagnosed that the scope of independent regulation is too narrow and that 
a “greater reliance on independent regulation could help reduce regulatory barriers, 
promote entry and accelerate the development of competition in the Danish electricity 
supply industry”. DERA has also very limited staff resources and hence less capacity to 
understand technical issues (interviews Ackermann, Styrbro).  
9.2.1.2 From cost-based to price-based regulation 
As in most countries, the Danish pre-liberalisation regulatory model, implemented by a 
Price Commission, was cost-based and applied to the overall end-user price (Grohnheit, 
Olsen 2001: 148). The allowed rate-of return was very restricted in this system (Groenli 
2001). 
In 2000, when the economic regulator DERA was set up, network operators became 
separate companies and cost-based regulation was to be replaced by price-based regula-
tion to give network companies an efficiency incentive – “in line with “best practices” 
for network regulation increasingly applied around the world” (OECD 1999: 37). The 
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transmission system operators – Elkraft System in the east and Eltra in the west of the 
country, now merged into Energinet.dk – who are responsible for security of supply and 
the coordination of the overall electricity system continue to be subject to a cost-based 
regime (DERA 2002b: 24; DERA 2002a: 15). DERA started to regulate the network 
tariffs through a revenue cap model with four year regulatory periods (Abildgaard et al. 
2003: 15; Kinnunen 2003). The revenue cap was supposed to be based on a benchmark-
ing of network companies. 
However, the implementation of price-based regulation that was planned for all network 
companies except for the transmission system operators proved more difficult than ex-
pected and they were significant teething problems that delayed the process. A main 
reason for this has been the “capital issue” mentioned above (section 9.1.2). It has been 
a major task for DERA to determine the companies’ capital base (DERA 2005b).  
The agreement that led to the nationalisation of Energinet.dk also stipulated that the 
network tariffs would be frozen at 2004 levels until 2008 (DERA 2005a; interview Aa-
berg). This meant that companies could not increase their tariffs, but at the same time 
there was no requirement for them to cut their costs. Network companies were effec-
tively given time to become normal profit-oriented companies and increase their return 
on capital from the previously ‘sub-normal’ levels. This is a prerequisite for incentive 
regulation to work – and for including DG incentives into this framework (Abildgaard 
et al. 2003). While tariffs were frozen, DERA started preparing for a new system with a 
benchmarking exercise carried out in 2007 which reintroduced efficiency requirements 
in the setting of the revenue cap. 
9.2.1.3 Network regulation and DG 
Against the background of the general development of network regulation in Denmark, 
a key question for this analysis is the role of DG in this framework. First of all, this 
concerns any impacts of incentive regulation on DG connections, and second any at-
tempts to explicitly integrate DG into this framework. 
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In terms of the effects of network regulation on DG, this does not seem to be an impor-
tant issue in Denmark, certainly not compared to the UK. I have hardly found any pub-
lications, be it scientific or documents in the policy or regulatory debate, that mention 
any negative impacts of regulation on DG. According to Abildgaard et al. (2003: 27), 
“a first assessment of the impact suggests that the revenue cap will be of very little im-
portance in relation to DG and other network operation”.  
A number of issues have received some attention, including the relatively low rate of 
return that provides a disincentive for grid extensions (Tech-wise 2002: 27), the admin-
istrative costs resulting from prioritised feed-in from DG and renewables that were not 
included in the revenue cap (Abildgaard et al. 2003: 27) as well as the fact that the costs 
for communication systems needed to control DG are not considered as an investment, 
but as operating costs, which make ‘investments’ less attractive (interview Bach). Over-
all, however, network regulation is not considered as an important impediment to DG 
development. In the interviews with the DERA, this was not considered to be an impor-
tant issue, either (interviews Aaberg, Ulrichsen).  
In line with this observation and in contrast to the UK, there are no specific mechanisms 
for DG connection within network regulation. This is the case in spite of there having 
been separate mechanisms geared towards specific objectives in other areas of Danish 
regulation, e.g. direct cost pass-throughs that have been applied for losses and costs re-
sulting from energy saving measures (Abildgaard et al. 2003: 27). As for the 2007-2008 
benchmarking process that is to reintroduce efficiency requirements the interview with 
regulator has confirmed that “DG has not been mentioned at all” (interview Ulrichsen) 
and DERA “seems to have only a marginal role in this area” (interview Hoffmann). 
9.2.2 Explaining the marginal role of the standard model 
Looking at the Danish case, it is striking that the share of DG is much higher than in the 
UK, but at the same the UK discussion about how to integrate DG into the standard 
model of network regulation, which has led to the UK hybrid incentive, has not oc-
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curred in Denmark. The standard model has been introduced, but has not been adapted 
to DG. How can this be explained? 
Firstly, the Danish regulator DERA has a relatively narrow role and limited resources, 
partly because it has not replaced the previous regulatory structure, but has been “slot-
ted into a long established framework for sustainable energy” (Owen 2006a: 74), in-
cluding DEA and the bottom-up ownership structure that has led to a degree of self-
governance within the sector. While DEA is in charge of general energy policy devel-
opment and implementation, DERA focuses on the economic regulation of networks. 
Due to this limited remit, it is not an obvious task for DERA to take on the regulation of 
DG connection and network transformation and deal with these issues within the stan-
dard model.  
Secondly, this has been further complicated by the fact that the introduction of the stan-
dard model proved more difficult than expected due to the so-called “capital issue”. As 
a consequence, the fully-fledged introduction of the standard model, including bench-
marking between companies, has been delayed. In the further process, DG related net-
work costs may well re-emerge as a regulatory issue. 
Thirdly, while DG emerged as an issue in the UK when the standard model of network 
regulation was well established, it occurred the other way round in Denmark. When the 
liberalisation process began, Denmark already had a very large share of DG. It is not 
that the network companies’ obligation to connect DG did not cause any conflicts or did 
not have to face the resistance of network companies (interview Bach). But these prob-
lems and additional costs of DG were dealt with before the standard model was intro-
duced. It certainly helped that distribution companies were not profit-oriented and were 
owned by consumer and farming cooperatives that also had a stake in wind energy de-
velopment themselves. However, a decisive factor has been the cost socialisation 
mechanism, which will be analysed in more detail in the following section. 
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9.2.2.1 Cost-sharing mechanism 
The key instrument in Denmark for dealing with the costs of DG connections has been 
the cost sharing or socialisation of the network costs of DG, which this section analyses 
(Nielsen 2003: 49-55; Panzer 2008: 50-54; interviews Nielsen, Jensen, Ackermann, 
Bach). 
Description 
With this mechanism, the network costs that result from DG, including renewables and 
CHP plants, are not borne by the individual network company that connects DG to its 
network, but companies get reimbursed for these costs and the costs are then distributed 
among all consumers via the network companies. Network companies are not reim-
bursed for their real costs, but get paid the costs calculated on the basis of a cost model.  
Cost socialisation was first introduced back in the 1980s, when the network costs of DG 
started to become relevant. The main rationale was that it was considered unfair to bur-
den some network companies and their customers with high costs that happen to be lo-
cated in areas with high potential for renewables. Many of the network companies were 
also very small and would not have been able to carry these additional costs that go be-
yond their initial task to supply customers with electricity. It was clear that such an un-
even distribution of the costs of national objectives to promote environmental-friendly 
electricity generation would not have been acceptable for the affected regions (interview 
Jensen). 
Initially the mechanism was started voluntarily by the companies themselves together 
with ELFOR, the former Danish association of electricity distributors. The administra-
tion was taken over by the transmission system operator, which is now Energinet.dk, 
subject to public auditing. A socialisation committee was set up, whereby the transmis-
sion system operator and delegates from the distribution companies jointly develop and 
adjust the model. According to Energinet.dk, this cooperative approach between Ener-
ginet.dk and the distribution companies is essential for the scheme to function and is 
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also a reason for why the scheme was not taken over by the regulator. This has also 
been confirmed by DERA (interview Aaberg). 
What is indeed remarkable is that the regulatory authority is not involved in operating 
this mechanism. It was started well before the regulator was set up, and even now the 
regulator DERA is only informed by Energinet.dk of any changes in the socialisation 
model and is given the opportunity to comment on it. This is necessary not the least to 
make sure that this scheme does not interfere with its own regulation of network costs 
and the treatment of costs outside the ‘normal’ regulatory mechanism is not misused, 
e.g. to charge certain costs twice.  
According to both Energinet.dk and DERA, there have not been any major issues so far. 
As the cost socialisation mechanism is essentially price-based it can easily co-exist with 
the general price-based regulation, because otherwise companies would have an incen-
tive to shift as many costs as possible into the socialisation mechanism. 
When the mechanism was first set up, the real project costs were refunded and social-
ised, similar to cost-based regulation. The administration of this system was cumber-
some and led to high costs (Nielsen 2003: 17). It was also difficult to separate the grid 
costs induced by renewables and CHP and other costs resulting from the ‘normal’ sup-
ply function of distribution network (interview Jensen).  
In the late 1990s it was therefore decided, again by the companies involved, to change 
the socialisation scheme from refunding the actual costs to estimating the costs based on 
a cost model. At around the same time, the voluntary mechanism was turned into a le-
gally defined public service obligation for the system operator (§ 8,1 and § 28,2 of the 
Danish Act on Electricity Supply). This was done without changing the way it works.  
With the introduction of the cost model, there was no longer any need to survey the real 
costs for each individual project. Besides reducing the administrative costs, another rea-
son for introducing the cost model was to enable network companies to plan their grid 
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in a more flexible and forward-looking way, as they are not constrained by the require-
ments of any costs statements to be made to Energinet.dk. At the same time, however, 
this change increases their risk. 
The model was initially calibrated with the help of 156 real cases. At first, the model 
was rather simple and was only based on the capacity connected, similar to the UK hy-
brid incentive. Over time, it has become more elaborate, taking into account a larger 
number of cost drivers. Increasing the number of cost drivers tends to make the cost 
model more accurate and reduces the risk again for the companies where DG is con-
nected, thereby reducing the need for cost-based elements (see section 5.3). According 
to Energinet.dk, the real costs are “close to the model” (interview Jensen); according to 
Nielsen (2003:17) the accuracy of this model is +/- 20%. 
When costs are exceptionally high, this can be treated outside the cost model as a spe-
cial case, but unlike in the UK, where costs above a certain level have to be borne by the 
plant developer, these exceptionally high costs are still socialised. 
Analysis 
The Danish cost socialisation approach was introduced well before liberalisation, but 
has now become part of the Danish electricity market regime. It seems unlikely that this 
approach ‘outside the standard model’ will be replaced by a mechanism inside the stan-
dard model, similar to the UK hybrid incentive.  
The Danish cost sharing mechanisms and the standard model of network regulation ex-
hibit both similarities as well as highly relevant differences. In terms of similarities, the 
fact that the network companies are reimbursed not for their real costs, but only for the 
costs calculated by a model makes the model very similar to price-based regulation and 
companies in principle get an incentive to become more efficient.  
However, although the shift to this approach coincides with electricity market liberalisa-
tion, it was not set up to provide efficiency incentive to companies, but to make the op-
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eration of the cost-socialisation mechanism itself more efficient and workable. Although 
in practice it does give companies an efficiency incentive, especially now that Danish 
companies have generally become more profit-oriented, it would be misleading to asso-
ciate the development from a cost-based approach to a generic cost model with the 
overall shift from cost-based to price-based regulation, as proposed by the standard 
model. The Danish approach is clearly a mechanism outside the standard model. 
This is due to important differences between incentive regulation and the Danish model. 
Firstly, as the costs of DG are dealt with outside the standard model, there is a clear 
distinction between making the system and individual companies more efficient on the 
one hand (which is DERA’s task) and dealing with the additional costs of DG and in-
creasing the efficiency of this additional task on the other hand. This distinction is rein-
forced by the fact that the Danish approach was not developed by the network regulator. 
And even now that DERA has been established to carry out the economic regulation of 
networks, cost socialisation is still a separate mechanism run by the system operator 
Energinet.dk. 
Secondly, and this is strongly related to the first point, the standard model and the dis-
cussion between cost- and price-based regulation are mainly about the distribution of 
costs between a single network company and its customers. In Denmark, however, dis-
tributed generation is not seen as a property of an individual distribution network, but 
rather as a property of the system as a whole, driven by national policy targets. From 
this point of view it would seem inappropriate to increase the efficiency of an individual 
network by not connecting DG to that specific network. Thus, the Danish approach 
takes into account the different target groups as described in section 5.2.1.2. 
The socialisation of network costs goes a long way to explain why – unlike in the UK – 
the network costs of DG have not been a major issue in Denmark and according to 
Tech-wise (2002: 32; 2002: 32) “the incentive [for the network companies] to avoid 
grid connections of distributed generation is thereby dampened”. As this mechanism 
was introduced before liberalisation and network regulation were introduced, there was 
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no need to implement mechanisms to deal with DG connection within the standard 
model of liberalisation and regulation. 
9.3 Governance of Innovation and System Transformation 
The previous section has shown that the network regulator and the standard model of 
network regulation have only been a supporting actor in the governance of DG connec-
tion. This represents a stark difference to the results of the UK case study. Against this 
background, this section analyses the governance of innovation and transformation, 
which has become a pressing issue in Denmark due to the high share of DG.  
9.3.1 The role of network regulation 
The initial effects of liberalisation on R&D in Denmark are similar to those in the UK 
and in line with the generic analysis in chapter 2. There has been a decline in R&D 
spending and a stronger focus on near-term commercial and operational issues (IEA 
2002b: 121). How has it been possible in this context to undertake the R&D efforts pre-
sented in section 9.1.4? 
Unlike the UK regulator, the Danish regulator is not active in the process of DG integra-
tion and network transformation and seems rather invisible for many stakeholders (in-
terviews Ackermann, Nielsen, Holstroem). For example Ackermann who contributes to 
the cell controller project and is well aware of regulatory issues (Ackermann 2004) 
stated that he had not noticed any involvement of the regulator during his work on the 
cell project – a statement that is difficult to imagine with regard to the UK regulator 
OFGEM. 
The interviews with the regulator have confirmed that there are no specific innovation 
mechanisms within the standard model (interviews Aaberg, Ulrichsen), similar to those 
discussed chapter 6 and implemented in the UK, nor does the regulator play a moderat-
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ing role in the transformation process. The comparison with the UK is all the more in-
teresting as network transformation in Denmark is already happening ‘on the ground’ 
while in the UK it is still mainly ‘paperwork’. 
Again, this can partly be explained by the fact that the standard model is in an early de-
velopment phase and its introduction has been impeded by attempts to solve the ‘capital 
issue’ (see section 9.2). Although the regulator officially should also support the struc-
tural development in the energy sector (DERA 2005b: 2), it has been occupied with it 
task to resolve the ‘capital issue’, which has involved long negotiations with the compa-
nies. DERA itself seems to have been unsatisfied with its role and pointed out the need 
to clarify its management basis (DERA 2005b: 6). 
Moreover, the projects outlined above represent pilot projects in selected networks, 
rather than innovation mechanisms across all distribution networks. Once these pilot 
projects are completed and the results need to be implemented in different networks, 
regulatory support will become more relevant.  
Nevertheless, as with the governance of DG connection analysed above, the weak in-
volvement of the regulator in the innovation and transformation process poses the ques-
tion of which governance mechanisms are relevant for the developments described in 
section 9.1.4. 
9.3.2 Public Service obligation and the governance of innovation 
In Denmark there are no instruments within the standard model that are specifically 
geared towards promoting innovation. Instead, there are separate funding mechanisms 
for RD&D that are financed by electricity consumers and network users. They comple-
ment tax-financed government RD&D programmes, like those funded by Danish Coun-
cil for Strategic Research. Although there was an initial decline in RD&D as mentioned 
in the previous section, according to the IEA (2006: 167) Denmark has successfully 
countered the problem that liberalisation tends to entail a reduction in utility RD&D. 
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The Danish Electricity Supply Act introduces public service obligations (PSO), espe-
cially for the transmission system operator Energinet.dk. A PSO is a compulsory service 
for companies to satisfy public interests (cf. article 3 of the EU Directive 2003/54/EC). 
§ 8 of the Electricity Supply Act stipulates that “every electricity consumer in Denmark 
shall bear a relative proportion of the collective electricity-supply enterprises' neces-
sary costs incurred in carrying out the latter’s public service obligations”. Similar to 
the cost-sharing for connection costs described in 9.2.2.1, RD&D costs are thus distrib-
uted between all electricity consumers, rather than paid for by consumers in individual 
networks as is the case in the UK.  
The Danish PSOs cover a broad range of issues. This includes funding for electricity 
generation from renewables as well as support for energy efficiency measures. PSOs are 
also a key funding mechanism for RD&D and there are several PSO-based research 
programmes.  
The system operator Energinet.dk is in charge of providing PSO-based funding for 
third-party RD&D projects. According to § 29 of the Danish Electricity Supply Act, 
“the system operator shall ensure that any research, development and demonstration 
projects necessary for using environmentally friendly electricity-producing technologies 
are carried out, including development of an environmentally friendly and secure elec-
tricity system.” One important programme administered by Energinet.dk is the ForskEL 
programme, which is to support energy policy objectives. The focus areas need to be 
approved by the Danish Minister for Climate and Energy, yet it is Energinet.dk’s task to 
make a proposal (Energinet.dk 2009: 5). The programme has focused on RD&D in en-
vironmentally-friendly electricity generation technologies. According to Energinet.dk’s 
Strategy 2010+ for the ForskEL programme, a new focus area is smart grids and thus 
the development of the electricity system, rather than individual generation technologies 
(ibid.: 12).  
In addition to the PSO-based RD&D programmes that are administered by Energi-
net.dk, the system operator itself is obliged to carry out RD&D activities that are con-
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sidered necessary to enable the electricity transmission and distribution system to ac-
commodate the changing generation structure (§ 28 of the above Electricity Supply 
Act). For this purpose it uses its internal RD&D programme ForskIN. For example, the 
cell project (see section 9.1.4) has been funded under this programme (Energinet.dk 
2009: 11). 
Although ForskEL and ForskIN have a different status, there is a close link between 
them. The way in which the EcoGrid project presented in section 9.1.4 has been set up 
is a case in point (Energinet.dk 2007a: 23). Based on the new focus of ForskEL, Energi-
net provided funding for projects dealing with electricity system control in the 2007 
ForskEL call. Rather than selecting individual projects for funding, the system operator 
decided to “unite forces” (interview Bach), i.e. to combine various project applications 
and to set up a more long-term, large scale RD&D project. 
According to Bach (interview), who led Energinet.dk’s System 21 project (see section 
9.1.4) one of the results of this project was that system transformation was not just a 
question of implementing established concepts. Rather, RD&D was required, using the 
capacities of both research institutes and industry. This is what led to setting up the 
comprehensive EcoGrid project.  
The first phase of EcoGrid that was mainly exploratory was funded under ForskEL. It 
produced among other things a list of research priorities. For the second phase it was 
originally planned to make use of Energinet.dk’s internal ForskIN resources, but Ec-
oGrid has now been turned into an EU-funded project. With this combination of differ-
ent research programmes and project proposals, it became possible for Energinet.dk 
together with a broad range of research partners to launch a programme that can link up 
different RD&D proposals and innovation activities to tackle issues of system innova-
tion and transformation.  
EcoGrid is not just about funding or incentives for individual innovations. Rather, it 
resembles the coordination of research activities discussed in chapter 7 and the strategic 
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niche management approach presented in section 2.2, although there are no such explicit 
concepts in the Danish context to justify the approach to research funding. In the case of 
EcoGrid, the Danish research programmes do not just provide funding, but the funding 
framework is capable of setting up a purpose-built niche that combines different actors 
as well as technical and market aspects. Furthermore, it is based on a joint screening of 
options (EcoGrid Phase I) and links up different individual research proposals in differ-
ent areas of research to develop a new ‘configuration that works’ (see chapter 2.2). It is 
difficult to imagine such a process in a regime where research funding is mainly pro-
vided via the standard model.  
The Danish approach is important in the context of this thesis as it shows that real sys-
tems do not just rely on the mechanisms proposed by the standard model, but also apply 
mechanisms that are similar to the transformation mechanisms discussed in chapter 2.2, 
especially to tackle issues of system innovation and transformation. The example also 
demonstrates the central role of Energinet.dk in RD&D in coordinating various research 
activities. It can be regarded as the ‘focal point’ that has also come to be seen as impor-
tant in the UK (see section 8.4.2). 
In summary, the Danish research funding is not just located outside the standard model, 
but exhibits a number of differences to the regulatory innovation incentives discussed in 
chapter 6: 
 Funding is provided through the PSO tariff paid for by all electricity consumers, 
rather than network customers connected to the DSO that happen to be particu-
larly active in RD&D. 
 Research priorities are coordinated with energy policy objectives. Under the 
standard model, this is possible too, but more difficult to achieve. 
 One of the peculiarities of innovation funding in Denmark is that the system op-
erator Energinet.dk plays a central role. Energinet.dk has a legal obligation to 
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ensure that RD&D is carried out to enable the system to accommodate DG and 
renewables. It administers the research programme ForskEL and carries out its 
own research through the ForskIN programme.  
 The EcoGrid example shows that Energinet.dk uses these resources to strategi-
cally select and design RD&D projects to carry out research on system innova-
tion and transformation together with other stakeholders. This contributes to the 
coordination of individual research activities that was discussed in chapter 7 and 
that is difficult to achieve with economic incentives for individual companies only. 
The central role of Energinet.dk is not restricted to research funding. Therefore this ac-
tor will be analysed in more detail in the following section. 
9.3.3 The role of Energinet.dk 
As the Danish case study has shown so far, the standard model was introduced, but does 
not play a significant role in DG integration and network innovation. Moreover, the 
presentation of two key mechanisms – the cost-sharing for connection costs and the 
PSO-based research funding – as well as the system transformation projects presented in 
section 9.1.4 have indicated the key role of the system operator Energinet.dk. This has 
been confirmed by interviews both inside and outside of the system operator (interviews 
Bach, Holstroem). This section analyses this key actor in some detail: how it was set up 
as a state-owned company, its relationship with the government and the regulator and its 
own ‘regulatory powers’. 
9.3.3.1 How Energinet.dk was set up 
In 2005 the Act on Energinet Danmark established Energinet.dk as a public corporation. 
The legislation was based on an agreement of March 29 2004 between all major politi-
cal parties as well as the government and the electricity association Elfor. Energinet.dk 
was founded by merging Eltra, Elkraft System, Elkraft Transmission and Gastra. The 
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new company is both owner of the 400 kV grid and system operator of the Danish 
power and gas transmission system. While the previous transmission system operators 
were owned by regional grid companies which in turn were owned by local authorities 
and consumer co-operatives (see section 9.1.1), the new transmission system operator 
has been transferred into direct state-ownership. It is completely unbundled from gen-
eration and supply. 
Nationalisation is the opposite of what the standard model proposes, namely privatisa-
tion of energy companies that used to be state-owned. The role of the state should be 
limited to regulatory functions. While other countries, including the UK, have privatised 
their electricity industry, Denmark has nationalised an important part of the industry 
that was not controlled by the state before liberalisation, or only partly and indirectly via 
the municipalities.  
It is tempting to interpret the nationalisation of the system operator as an attempt to gain 
direct influence on the development of the sector, not the least in order to guide the 
transformation of the electricity system. In its 2004 energy policy statement (DEA 
2004: 5), the Danish Minister for Economic and Business Affairs states that “the objec-
tive [of nationalisation] is to secure efficient operation and expansion of the overall 
infrastructure”. 
However, the evidence suggests that the decision to turn the system operator into a 
state-owned company was not primarily influenced by future energy policy goals in 
general and objectives to develop the infrastructure that is run by Energinet.dk in par-
ticular. The government had initially no active interest in taking over the system opera-
tor, let alone using it as an active instrument of energy policy-making. Rather, nationali-
sation was triggered by the remnants of the pre-liberalisation structure that had ham-
pered liberalisation. The main interest of the state was not to gain control over the sys-
tem operator, but to disentangle the traditional sector structure in order to enable sector 
liberalisation. According to Styrbro (interview) the government would have preferred a 
completely independent company that is not owned by the state either. 
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Nationalisation was a means to solve the so-called “capital issue” mentioned in section 
9.1.2. (DERA 2005b: 5). The fact that the state ended up owning the system operator is 
more of a by-product of this process. The problem that the government tried to solve 
resulted from the traditional consumer profit system according to which companies had 
to pay back any profits that were not re-invested to consumers. After liberalisation, 
when the regulator started evaluating the companies’ capital base and some companies 
were to be sold, this essentially led to a conflict as to how much of the distribution com-
panies’ capital base was owned by consumers and had to be transferred to them (“tied-
up capital”), and how much the companies could dispose of themselves (“free capital”). 
Given the tight linkages between energy companies and consumers on the one hand and 
between the companies themselves, nationalisation of the system operator came to be 
seen as a prerequisite for a liberalised market and further restructuring of the industry. 
Nationalisation is described as the result of a ‘horse trade’ to solve the capital problem 
(interviews Styrbro, Hanghøj), The distribution companies gave up their ownership in 
the transmission system operator and transferred it to the state. In return, a number of 
obligations were lifted from them and they got unrestricted access to their capital, in-
cluding 20 to 25 billion DKK (ca. three billion Euros) of capital that was previously tied 
up. However, as a consequence the electricity consumers lost out, because there was no 
longer an option for profit-sharing between consumers and the companies (interview 
Styrbro). Before the nationalisation agreement was struck, the government regarded the 
tied-up capital in the companies that result from the previous cost-plus regime as a loan 
to the companies that should be paid back to consumers through reductions in grid tar-
iffs (DEA 2003: 7). 
9.3.3.2 Relationship with energy policy 
As described in the previous section, the main driver for the nationalisation of Energi-
net.dk was not to use the company as an instrument for implementing energy policy 
objectives. Nevertheless, the question remains of the extent to which the company is 
now used by the government as such an instrument.  
Transforming the Grid Part III: Case studies  
 
-266- 
Energinet.dk is not an ordinary company where the state happens to be the only share-
holder. It is owned by the Ministry of Climate and Energy on behalf of the Danish state. 
According to the regulator DERA (2008: 55), Energinet.dk’s system planning is guided 
by political goals, especially integrating wind energy of up to 50% of electricity con-
sumption. All investment plans must be reported to the minister and projects of a certain 
size require the minister’s approval. As explained in the section on RD&D, the government 
also needs to approve the focus areas of the RD&D funding programmes. 
Importantly, section 13 of the Act on Energinet.dk stipulates that “Energinet Danmark’s 
profits may be carried back to the respective consumer groups”, but “Energinet Dan-
mark shall not be entitled to distribute any profit or equity through dividend distribution 
or in any other way to the State”. As the government cannot use Energinet.dk to generate 
income for the state budget, it is not faced with the trade-off between increasing the profit-
ability of Energinet.dk and using it to support its energy policy objectives with additional 
costs for Energinet.dk.  
Energinet.dk’s statutory obligations are an important driver for its activities. It has an 
obligation to promote environmentally-friendly electricity generation (Energinet.dk 
2010: 3). Moreover, the company is in charge of maintaining overall security of supply, 
developing the transmission infrastructure and carrying out coherent and holistic plan-
ning. As the new generation structure has potentially a major impact on security of sup-
ply, this is regarded as a main reason for Energinet.dk’s activites in the area of system 
transformation (interviews Holstroem, Bach, Nielsen). 
According to Scott (2007: 22), “political influence on the TSO is strong and policy finds 
its way into the objectives and obligations of the TSO in developing and operating the 
transmission system to promote RE [renewables], and in funding research and devel-
opment of RE through the Public Service Obligation”. 
However, within this general energy policy framework, Energinet.dk is a main driver 
for the work on system transformation taking place. This means that the government 
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sets ambitious political targets, but leaves it up to the system operator to provide the 
necessary system. System transformation emerged as an issue within Energinet.dk and 
its predecessor Eltra, rather than within the government. This is the picture that emerges 
from the interviews with Energinet.dk and other stakeholders, as well as the fact that it 
was not possible to arrange an interview for this thesis with the government or its en-
ergy agency DEA on system transformation. For example, Bach pointed out in his in-
terview that the Danish government set an ambitious renewables target (see 9.3.4.1), but 
did not seem to address the infrastructure requirements this entails. According to 
Ackermann (interview), the system operator’s central role in this process has been 
strengthened through its more proactive, forward-looking corporate culture that has re-
sulted from the creation of Energinet.dk. 
9.3.3.3 Regulation of Energinet.dk 
The tariffs of state-owned Energinet.dk are regulated by DERA. When Energinet.dk 
was set up, it was initially planned to regulate the company’s tariffs based on a price-
based revenue-cap scheme (Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs 2004), similar 
to other network operators. However, as mentioned in section 9.2.1.2, this has not been 
implemented. In contrast to the other network operators, the system operator is still not 
subject to price-based regulation, but continues to be regulated under a cost-based re-
gime. 
Maintaining a cost-plus regime for Energinet.dk rather than switching to a price-based 
regime as proposed by the standard model is related to its status as a not-for-profit com-
pany. Price-based regulation is based on the companies’ objective to maximise their 
profits and provides an efficiency incentive by allowing them to keep a share of the ad-
ditional profit resulting from efficiency gains. While the regulator can still set an upper 
price limit for Energinet.dk, the resulting incentives for the Danish system operator 
would be weaker. This is because Energinet.dk can only maintain the value of its assets 
in 2005 when it was set up as the state owned TSO (DERA 2008: 17). It cannot transfer any 
profits to the state, either. 
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What does this cost-based regulatory framework imply for DG integration and network 
innovation? First of all, it is important to remember that many costs are dealt with out-
side normal regulation, partly applying mechanisms with price-based elements (DG 
connection costs, see section 9.2.2.1, partly using mechanisms that are essentially cost-
based (RD&D costs, see section 9.3.2). 
As for other infrastructure development costs that Energinet.dk has to cover to react to 
the rising share of DG and renewables, a cost-based regime is generally amenable to 
these additional objectives in that it removes any cost risk from the DSO. As was shown 
in chapters 5 and 6, DG can indeed be a driver for the regulator to revert to cost-based 
elements, both to promote DG integration and network innovation. 
The interviews have confirmed that cost-based regulation of the Danish system operator 
has had the effect that those within the company dealing with system innovation have 
not been confronted with any significant regulatory restrictions (interview Bach). The 
effects of cost-based regulation in the Danish context are also well expressed by the 
following quote by the former CEO of Eltra (interview Styrbro), 
“We think it [wind power] is madness from our experience and from an engineering 
point of view, but we do not have any disincentives to deal with it. It costs more money, 
but if they want that, we can do it. The regulator has to accept the costs. Of course he 
does accept it. It is in the framework of what we are set up to do. (…) The regulator is 
not the one who is to look into it, he doesn’t understand it technically. If I buy some ce-
ment factory in America, he probably says you cannot spend on that. But if we spend 
money on what we need to run the system and solve the problems we are charged to 
solve. There is therefore much more dynamism as compared to profit-oriented systems 
with incentive regulation.” 
This quote illustrates how cost-based regulation facilitates the integration of DG. A 
guarantee for the company that it can recover its costs is not sufficient for it to tackle 
new problems such as system transformation, as is illustrated by the relatively late start 
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of this process in Denmark (see section 9.1.4). However, it does provide a solid basis. 
The quote also shows the importance of Energinet.dk’s obligations that set the frame-
work for Energinet.dk’s activities (“the framework of what we are set up to do”). Usu-
ally even under a cost-based regime not all costs are eligible. Therefore, the effects of a 
cost-based regime critically depend on which costs the regulator actually accepts. It is 
therefore important to note that cost-based regulation and especially the acceptance of 
costs in Denmark is strongly related to overall energy policy objectives, rather than ab-
solute efficiency objectives.  
Thus, these obligations are an important driver for Energinet.dk, but they are also im-
portant in that they influence the acceptance of costs by the regulator. Energinet.dk’s 
obligations thus represent an important interface between general energy policy objec-
tives and the effects of network regulation on the company and help ensure consistency 
between energy policy and network regulation. This is also influenced by a moderate 
public pressure for aggressive, cost-reducing regulation and the high visibility of envi-
ronmental issues on the public political agenda (Nemesys 2005: 18). 
However, what is not addressed in the above quote is the efficiency of DG integration. 
The statement is based on a dichotomy between cost- and price-based regulation. It is 
clear that cost-based regulation removes any cost risk for the network operator that may 
result from DG connection and innovation, but it does not give any efficiency incentives 
and shifts all the risk to the network customers. However, chapters 5 and 6 have shown 
that specific mechanisms can be drawn up that mix price- and cost-based elements and 
which can thereby balance these different objectives and provide incentives for the effi-
cient integration of DG.  
Price-based regulation as an incentive for efficiency improvement by profit-oriented 
companies may not work quite as well for state-owned not-for-profit companies. How-
ever, the regulator still needs to deal with the question of acceptable cost levels. Accord-
ing to DERA (2008: 17), this has not been addressed yet in detail. The regulator consid-
ers applying an international benchmarking between Energinet.dk and TSOs in other 
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countries. Based on the results, the regulator may not accept costs incurred by Energi-
net.dk, so that price-based elements come into play, even though DERA may not switch 
to ‘incentive regulation’ of Energinet.dk.  
If benchmarking is applied, a critical question will be how the additional costs of Ener-
ginet.dk that result from the high share of DG and renewables are taken into account, 
especially given the lower share of these generators in other countries. This leads di-
rectly to the mechanisms discussed in chapter 5. However, this debate has not yet com-
menced in Denmark. In contrast to the typical standard model discussion, where cost-
based elements are re-introduced into a system that has previously switched to price-
based regulation, the Danish development starts from a cost-based regime and adds 
price-based elements to take into account the ‘necessity of costs’. 
9.3.3.4 The regulatory role of Energinet.dk 
On the one hand, Energinet.dk’s tariffs are regulated by DERA as described above. On 
the other hand, the company itself carries out regulatory tasks which in other countries 
are within the remit of the regulatory authority (DERA 2006: 5). In the interview with 
DERA (interview Aaberg), Energinet.dk’s regulatory function is acknowledged as fol-
lows: “As a speciality – and I don’t think you will find that in so many places –  the 
competence to make (…) further regulations (…) is delegated to Energinet.dk in Den-
mark”. 
This was the case before the company was nationalised, and as a state-owned company 
it has taken on further regulatory duties. Arguably, Energinet.dk is therefore more than a 
system operator owned by the state; it is part of the regulatory regime, together with 
DEA and DERA that have divided regulatory tasks between them. These regulatory 
functions are an important instrument for Energinet.dk to fulfil its obligations and shape 
the transformation of the electricity infrastructure. 
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Energinet.dk’s tasks10 include market regulations and it is supposed to contribute to 
organising the competitive energy market. The company is also in charge of the regula-
tions pertaining to grid companies’ public obligations and can require transmission grid 
operators to make specific investments and maintain the electricity grid (DERA 2006: 
16). The mechanism to socialise the network costs of DG that was analysed in section 
9.2.2.1 as well as the Public Service Obligation Mechanism described in section 9.3.2 
are under the auspices of Energinet.dk, too. 
9.3.3.5 Summary 
Energinet.dk plays a key role in the governance of the Danish network infrastructure 
and its transformation to meet energy policy objectives. This is based on its role in 
RD&D funding, the way the company is regulated as well as its own regulatory powers. 
Thus, in Denmark governance of system transformation is not merely left to the stan-
dard model and the market, but there is also a strong element of top-down coordination. 
However, in an environment that is largely based on the standard model and in the face 
of system transformation, this top-down coordination cannot simply be based on vertical 
integration or hierarchical control, but is faced with a systemic uncertainty and a dis-
tributed control over system development. Therefore, the next section shows how long-
term planning and actor coordination play an important role, too. 
9.3.4 Governance mechanisms beyond economic incentives 
The key research question of this thesis is whether the standard model of network regu-
lation based on economic incentives can deal with DG integration and network trans-
formation and how it can be complemented by additional governance mechanisms. The 
                                                 
10 http://www.Energinet.dk/en/menu/Market/Rules+and+regulations/Rules+and+regulations.htm, last 
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Danish case study has revealed that the standard model only plays a minor role in terms 
of network integration and system transformation. The regulator DERA has not been 
significantly involved, but the system operator is a key actor. Both DG connection and 
RD&D funding are managed outside network regulation.  
Nevertheless, the question remains in the Danish context of whether other governance 
mechanisms can be observed on top of these external funding instruments, as proposed 
by the system transformation literature (see chapters 2.2 and 7.1). This final section 
provides a brief overview of long-term planning and approaches to improve anticipation 
of long-term system development (section 9.3.4.1) and actor cooperation (section 
9.3.4.2) – two of the central themes of the system transformation literature. Similar to 
the UK case study, this does not represent a detailed analysis of these instruments and 
how they work in practice, but the objective is to show that such mechanisms are impor-
tant in Denmark, too.  
9.3.4.1 Long-term planning 
Danish energy policy has a long-running tradition of policy-making based on long-term 
plans. According to Owen (2006a: 49) “Denmark has been willing to undertake a de-
gree of planning and imposition of rules in its energy sector that would seem unusual in 
many other countries”. 
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Already in the 1970s, the government invited a broad range of stakeholders to jointly 
draw up the “Energy Plan”. Negotiating these plans became a central arena for discuss-
ing energy policy visions. In the first plan issued in 1976 the main objective was the 
transition from oil to coal, nuclear power and renewables. In the following years this 
was replaced by a stronger focus on renewables; the second Energy Plan drawn up in 
1981 set the target to build 60,000 wind turbines by 2000. Later plans put a stronger 
emphasis on creating a liberalised market, but still included environmental targets, too 
(van der Vleuten, Raven 2006b: 3745). In 2007 the government published “A visionary 
Danish energy policy 2025”. It set the target to double the share of renewables to cover 
50 % of demand by 2025 (van der Vleuten, Raven 2006a). 
While long-term plans have been used for some time to define political targets, due to 
the increasing system implications of these political targets long-term system planning 
has also become increasingly important for the system operator. For example, the Co-
penhagen Strategy on offshore wind power issued by the Danish Energy Authority 
(DEA) has called for overall energy policy planning to be complemented by long-term 
grid planning and has emphasised that “any short-term solution should fit into a long 
term strategic vision” (DEA 2005, 6). The Act on Energinet.dk (section 2) requires the 
company to base its activities on “coherent and holistic planning”. The quotations 
given in section 9.1.4 (no planned development, the industry started to realise too late 
that a system change is required, no one was thinking about the infrastructure) show that 
this was not done before. 
After Energinet.dk was set up, the new company started building up the capacity to deal 
with the uncertainties of future system developments and established a separate depart-
ment for planning and scenarios (interview Nielsen). According to the head of this de-
partment the objective is to convert the government energy strategy into concrete analy-
sis (Vinther 2007). One way to achieve this is to move away from simply using cost-
benefit analysis based on single forecasts, rely more on multiple scenario analysis and 
develop a common understanding of future development options (ibid.; Energinet.dk 
2006: 9). This reflects some of the core features of the system transformation literature. 
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9.3.4.2 Actor cooperation 
Energinet.dk has a central role in the Danish electricity sector, both as a system operator 
and due to its regulatory functions. Nevertheless, the situation is very different from a 
structure with a vertically integrated monopoly as the dominant actor that characterised 
many countries before liberalisation. Rather, Energinet.dk is a vertically unbundled 
transmission system operator and a large number of companies are active in the Danish 
electricity sector and the capacities to influence transformation are distributed among 
these actors (cf. section 7.1.) Besides Energinet.dk which is the overall system operator 
and runs the 400 kV network, there are a further nine regional transmission network 
operators running networks from 60 to 150 kV and some 90 companies operating local 
distribution networks (DERA 2009: 10-11). 
Moreover, one of the main features of the network transformation taking place is that 
different network levels are to operate in a more integrated mode. The local distribution 
companies are to be included in the technical regulation of the system and take on sys-
tem responsibilities from the transmission system operator. Thus, the transmission sys-
tem operator has launched concepts that need to be implemented on the distribution 
level. However, Energinet.dk is not in a position to force any solutions or demonstration 
projects on the distribution companies, but requires their consent and trust (interview 
Ackermann). 
Therefore, in order to implement these concepts, Energinet.dk needs to cooperate with 
these companies – which it has declared is a high priority (Energinet.dk 2006: 2). On 
the one hand, this fits the cooperative culture outlined in section 9.1 that has been em-
phasised as a key success factor (interview Nielsen). On the other hand, the interviews 
have revealed that historically, transmission and distribution systems tended to be oper-
ated separately. Distribution companies were quite independent and initially sceptical 
about any interference from the transmission company (interview Nielsen). 
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To facilitate cooperation between the transmission system operator and the distribution 
companies, a grid committee was established by Eltra, one of the predecessors of Ener-
ginet.dk. It is a joint committee between the transmission system operator and the dis-
tribution companies. Energinet.dk chairs the committee and provides a secretariat. Ac-
cording to Energinet.dk its task is to “ensure economic operation and development of 
the entire power system, including coordination of the planning of the transmission 
grids and the distribution grids together with ensuring the implementation of the initia-
tives that are part of the overall development of the whole power system” 11.  
The first committee was started in 1980s. The then transmission system operator Eltra 
cooperated with the distribution companies on energy efficiency (interview Bach). 
There is also a socialisation committee to coordinate the cost-sharing mechanisms for 
DG-related network costs (see section 9.2.2.1). In terms of cooperation on grid issues 
there was initially a transmission committee made up of members from Eltra and the 
regional transmission companies. 
A distribution committee was set up after 2002 when Eltra began to realise that the new 
generation structure necessitated corresponding infrastructure development (interview 
Nielsen, who was the chairman of the distribution committee; interview Bach). Again, 
this committee was chaired by Energinet.dk. The members from the distribution com-
panies are appointed through DanskEnergi, the Danish association of energy companies. 
In the wake of the creation of Energinet.dk, there was a debate between Energinet.dk 
and DanskEnergi about their future roles. For Energinet.dk it was very important in this 
process to keep its coordinating role and remain in direct dialogue with the DSOs (in-
terview Bach). 
                                                 
11 www.Energinet.dk/en/menu/About+us/Cooperation/Grid+Committee+-
+Electricity/Grid+Committee+electricity.htm, last accessed on 29 July 2010. 
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The grid committee has a variety of functions: agreeing on connection rules, discussion 
of future system concepts and coordination of demonstration projects. The grid commit-
tee confirms the strong role of Energinet.dk in the system transformation process, but 
also demonstrates the cooperative mechanisms that are used to promote system devel-
opment. 
On top of cooperation through the committee, demonstration projects like the Cell Con-
troller project are a further cooperation mechanism which Energinet.dk uses to work 
with particularly progressive companies that are also interested in innovative network 
equipment paid for by Energinet.dk (interviews Lund, Ackermann). As explained in 
section 9.3.2, cooperation is also supported by the RD&D funding mechanism. 
In summary, this brief analysis of governance mechanisms beyond economic incentives 
confirms the central role of Energinet.dk. Despite this, the company needs to cooperate 
with other actors in the system. In doing so, it cannot merely rely on economic mecha-
nisms. The developments in Denmark show that economic mechanisms are comple-
mented by instruments that support long-term planning and actor cooperation. While 
complementary mechanisms can partly build on established Danish policy approaches 
and cultural traditions, it is also interesting to observe that both long-term planning and 
cooperative mechanisms have become more explicitly institutionalised after system 
transformation has become an issue. 
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10 Comparative evaluation of the case studies 
Following analysis of the governance of DG integration in the UK and Denmark, this 
final chapter of part III provides a comparative evaluation and summary of the two 
country case studies.  
The UK has been a pioneer of the standard model with a relatively low share of DG. 
Denmark implemented the standard model only following the international wave of 
liberalisation, but is a leading country in terms of DG development and system trans-
formation. Despite these different starting points, in both countries governance mecha-
nisms for dealing with an increasing share of DG and the resulting network challenges 
have been elaborated.  
One important difference between the two countries is that in the UK these governance 
mechanisms have been developed mainly within the standard model of network regula-
tion, whereas in Denmark the standard model has only played a marginal role in the 
governance of DG integration. Although Denmark has followed the international liber-
alisation process and implemented the standard model in its national context, the infra-
structure implications of DG have been managed mainly outside of the standard model. 
The key actor in Denmark is not the regulator, but the transmission system operator 
Energinet.dk, a state-owned company that fulfils a number of regulatory functions. This 
contrasts with the strong role which the UK regulator Ofgem has in this field. 
A further difference between the two countries is the link between the DG mechanisms 
and the energy policy framework. In Denmark, the design of the DG mechanisms takes 
into account that DG is a political objective and the costs should therefore not be dealt 
with in individual networks where DG happens to be connected. In the UK, DG is also 
driven by energy policy objectives, but the regulatory mechanisms drawn up for DG 
follow the logic of the standard model, i.e. access of individual actors to the network 
and cost allocation within individual networks. 
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While the UK confirms the flexibility of the standard model in accommodating new 
objectives as analysed in the conceptual section, the Danish case indicates that new ob-
jectives do not need to be addressed via the standard model. Rather, the governance of 
DG can be established alongside the standard model. The interactions between the two 
regimes require further attention, especially as the Danish version of the standard model 
becomes fully implemented and tested over a longer time period.  
In both countries, there are also non-economic mechanisms to coordinate the activities 
of different actors in the system and facilitate long-term system planning. This confirms 
the general argument made by the system transformation literature in general and the 
specific analysis for infrastructure governance carried out in chapter 7 in particular that 
such additional mechanisms are required. Again, in the UK these mechanisms emerged 
in the context of the standard model and can be interpreted as a process of redefining 
this model, whereas Denmark relies on other governance regimes. 
In the following sections, the results of the two case studies will be compared in more 
detail based on the connection-integration-innovation-transformation heuristic that was 
introduced in section 4.1.5. 
10.1 DG connection and integration 
In the UK the additional network costs that result from DG are included in the incentive 
mechanism of the standard model via the DG hybrid incentive. The hybrid incentive 
combines cost- and price-based elements and seeks to combine connection incentives 
and incentives for cost reduction, based on the mechanisms outlined in chapter 5. The 
mechanism has been developed and implemented by the regulator. 
The cost socialisation mechanism is the Danish equivalent to the UK hybrid incentive. 
This approach was introduced prior to liberalisation and goes a long way to explaining 
why – unlike in the UK – the network costs of DG have not been a major issue in the 
development of network regulation in Denmark. While the UK hybrid incentive has 
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developed in the framework of the standard model, in Denmark network costs of DG 
are dealt with outside of network regulation. In contrast to the UK, the Danish instru-
ment is not administered by the regulator, but by Energinet.dk in cooperation with the 
network companies. 
In terms of the cost- and price-based mechanisms presented in chapter 5, the Danish 
solution can be characterised as a price-based approach in that companies are reim-
bursed according to a generic cost model. Rather than including an explicit cost-based 
element, the Danish model contains a differentiated set of cost drivers. This can be seen 
as an equivalent to an explicit cost-based element as explained in chapter 5.3.2.  
As a consequence, there are no major differences between the two countries in terms of 
determining the costs to be reimbursed. However, in Denmark the rationale for intro-
ducing a price-based approach was mainly to simplify the implementation of the model, 
rather than to provide efficiency incentives in a competitive market environment. Nev-
ertheless, the Danish example shows how incentive regulation mechanisms that are at 
the heart of the standard model can be applied outside of this model, too. 
A key difference between the two approaches is not primarily the way in which the 
DSOs are reimbursed for their network costs. Rather, the two countries allocate the 
costs differently. In the UK, the DG developers in each network area have to pay for the 
incentive mechanism, whereas in Denmark these costs are socialised between all net-
work customers across the country. While such a cost socialisation is not impossible 
within the standard model, it constitutes a less obvious approach since the standard 
model tends to focus on the regulation of individual networks. Moreover, in the UK cost 
socialisation would have been a significant departure from the regime that was in place 
before the hybrid incentive was introduced and that was based on deep connection 
charges that were supposed to reflect the network costs caused by DG connections. 
As a consequence of these different methods, the mismatch set out in chapter 5 between 
internal objectives (increasing the efficiency of the individual network and reducing 
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network tariffs) and external objectives (connecting more DG and providing the neces-
sary network infrastructure) is resolved in different ways in the two countries. The Dan-
ish approach acknowledges that the infrastructure required to reach the political DG 
objective should not be paid for by network customers in areas with high DG potential. 
Rather, it should be financed by all consumers. The UK avoids burdening demand cus-
tomers unequally with these costs, too. However, the cost allocation does not primarily 
reflect the political DG objective, but rather passes most of the costs to individual DG 
developers. 
10.2 Network innovation 
In terms of network innovation, the comparison between the two countries yields results 
similar to the previous section. In the UK, the regulator Ofgem has designed incentive 
mechanisms within its incentive regulation framework to promote network innovation. 
In line with the conceptual analysis, the UK approach mixes price-based and costs-
based elements. The UK example demonstrates that innovation incentives can be in-
cluded in the incentive mechanism, but also indicates that in practice these may be too 
weak to lead to a significant increase in RD&D by network companies. 
In Denmark, innovations are funded through a PSO scheme that is separate from the 
standard model and the costs of which are added to the electricity tariffs for all electric-
ity consumers. Thus, similar to the socialisation of DG connection costs, RD&D costs 
do not have to be paid for by network customers in one network area. While the UK 
partly applies price-based elements to innovation funding, the Danish approach relies on 
cost-based funding outside of the standard model.  
The two approaches differ both in terms of how funding is raised and how the money is 
spent. While in the UK, each network company is incentivised individually to spend on 
RD&D, the Danish PSO funding mechanism administered by Energinet.dk together 
with the transmission system operator’s own role in RD&D contains some of the ele-
ments suggested by system transformation literature. It enables the strategic selection of 
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research projects and the setting up of niches that develop new system configurations; 
and it provides for a degree of coordination between different RD&D activities. This 
makes it possible to tackle issues of system innovation and transformation.  
10.3 System Transformation 
Finally, the case studies have confirmed that DG is not only about network connections 
or innovations in individual networks. In both countries a more comprehensive system 
transformation has moved onto the agenda; Denmark also has a leading role in develop-
ing a new infrastructure.  
Once the focus shifts from connecting DG to the current system to transforming that 
system, it can be observed that non-market-based governance mechanisms become 
more important in both cases. This is despite significant differences between the gov-
ernance regimes in the two countries. As with DG connection and network innovation, 
the UK discussion on system transformation has been dominated by the regulator Of-
gem within the framework of the standard model. In Denmark, the standard model does 
not feature prominently in the governance of system transformation. Rather, the trans-
mission system operator Energinet.dk is the single most important actor in promoting 
system transformation. 
These non-market-based mechanisms are not limited to economic incentives to allocate 
the network costs of individual DG connections or innovations in individual networks, 
but address system transformation and the challenges identified by the system transfor-
mation literature, such as uncertainty about future system developments, the need to 
anticipate long-term effects and to coordinate different actors and their innovation ac-
tivities. 
These mechanisms go beyond the governance regime proposed by standard model. The 
proposals put forward by system transformation literature (see chapters 9.3 and 8.4) 
provided a useful template for analysing them. Neither of the countries has explicitly 
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established a comprehensive system transformation regime such as, for example, the 
transition management approach in the Netherlands (see chapter 2.2). Nevertheless, in 
both countries individual mechanisms can be found. In both countries governance of 
transformation mechanisms emerge from existing governance regimes, i.e. the standard 
model regulator in the UK and the state-owned transmission system operator in Den-
mark.  
In Denmark, transformation mechanisms include the coordination of RD&D funding 
and the strategic selection and design of projects to carry out research on system innova-
tion and transformation, the institutionalisation of long-term planning by the system 
operator that complements long-term planning on a policy level as well as coordination 
of network operators on different network levels via the grid committees. 
Even in the UK, where incentive mechanisms within the standard model to promote 
network connection and innovations have received much attention, new approaches are 
emerging. The Electricity Network Strategy Group in particular is an attempt to provide 
a new coordination mechanism to address network transformation with the help of long-
term scenarios and ‘horizon-scanning’ of potential development options. There are also 
developments which extend the objectives of regulation beyond short-term efficiency 
and competition and can open the door for a broader understanding of network regula-
tion. 
10.4 Cost implications  
The two country case studies have compared the governance regimes for network inte-
gration of DG in Denmark and the UK. One question that arises when comparing the 
two countries is how the two regimes have affected electricity prices. 
The following graph shows the development of electricity prices for household custom-
ers in the two countries. It shows that Denmark has significantly higher prices than the 
UK. 
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Figure 18: Electricity prices for household customers in the UK and Denmark 
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Source: (IEA 2001a; IEA 2007a; IEA 2009b). Data are in US dollars at the time of publication. The data 
for the years 1978-1999 was published in 2001, the data for 2000 in 2009, for 2001 to 2005 in 
2007 and for 2009 
A first potential explanation for this price difference that comes to mind is the liberalisa-
tion of electricity markets that started earlier in the UK. However, the prices started to 
diverge already before the effects of the 1990 electricity liberalisation in the UK could 
become visible. Moreover, the price difference results from a price increase in Denmark 
rather than a decrease in the UK. Finally, the liberalisation in Denmark in the late 1990s 
has not led to a re-convergence of prices. A more plausible explanation is that the price 
increase in Denmark in the second half of the the 1980s was caused by the development 
of DG and especially CHP in Denmark in the 1980s (van der Vleuten, Raven 2006b).  
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Although there is no conclusive evidence, the comparison of electricity prices may indi-
cate that the higher share of DG (renewables and CHP) in Denmark compared to the 
UK has led to higher electricity prices. This is in line with the analysis presented in sec-
tion 3.1.2.3. Such an analyis is highly relevant for the evaluation of politcal objectives 
to increase the share of this type of electricity generation.  
Assuming that the lower share of DG in the UK is one explanation for the lower prices, 
this can support the argument that DG should not be promoted as it increases costs and 
consequently electricity prices. Making this argument may neglect additional benefits of 
DG, like environmental ones, as well as the potential trade-off between short-term and 
long-term costs: Denmark may have higher costs in the short-term, but this may lead to 
lower electricity system costs in the long-term. 
However, these arguments are less relevant for the comparison carried out in this thesis. 
This is because the thesis has taken the political objective to increase the share of DG 
that has been set in both countries as a starting point. Against this background it has 
analysed the potential of the standard model to adapt to this objective and has analysed 
the governance regimes in place in the two countries to deal with DG integration.  
A price comparison that complements the analysis in this thesis should compare the 
costs of integrating DG based on the UK approach with the costs resulting from the 
Danish approach to DG integration – rather than comparing the costs of a system with a 
high share of DG with a system that has less DG. Such a comparison however is diffi-
cult based on empirical data, for the very reason that the DG share in the two countries 
differs significantly. 
The thesis has shown that the standard model can provide the instruments for reaching 
objectives in an efficient way. Therefore, the UK approach may be more effective in 
reaching DG targets at low costs. However, the UK case study has also shown that the 
very focus on efficiency has made it difficult to pursue DG as an additional objective 
that leads to higher costs. Therefore, the focus on efficiency may enable a low-cost inte-
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gration of DG, but may also lead to avoiding DG that increases overall costs. At the 
same time, the Danish case study has shown that mechanisms that provide efficiency 
incentives have been implememted outside of the standard model. 
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11 Conclusions and questions for further research 
This final chapter presents the overall conclusions and indicates the limits of the thesis, 
which can form the basis for further research. 
11.1 Conclusions 
Against the background of electricity market liberalisation and the literature on govern-
ance of system transformation, the main question of the thesis was how DG integration 
and network development can be integrated as a new objective into the standard model 
of network regulation and whether and how the regulatory framework needs to evolve. 
A broad definition of the standard model was applied, i.e. the standard model is not re-
stricted to price- or revenue cap mechanisms to increase efficiency and there is more to 
the standard model than economic incentives to mimick the market mechanism. Rather, 
regulation is an institutional arrangement based on ‘independent regulators’ that can for 
example also comprise command-and-control mechanisms. 
 Based on the literature review on liberalisation and transformation as well as distrib-
uted generation and network regulation in part one, the research question was analysed 
from two perspectives: the conceptual analysis in part two and the two country case 
studies in part three. Part two asked how the standard model could be adapted in princi-
ple based on the connection-integration-innovation-transformation heuristic introduced 
in chapter 4.1. Part three analysed two empirical cases to find out how the standard 
model is applied and adapted in practice and how these empirical developments relate to 
the conceptual analysis. 
The conceptual part and the case studies complement each other and their combination 
renders their respective weakness less severe. The case study results themselves based 
on only two cases make it difficult to draw conclusions about the standard model or 
even the potential development of network regulation in other countries. Yet together 
with the conceptual part they can contribute to the evaluation of the standard model and 
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its development. The conceptual part does not take into account ‘real-life’ settings. It is 
therefore useful to check its findings in the case studies, even though the number of 
cases is only limited to two and more cases could provide a broader picture of the gov-
ernance mechanisms that emerge in the face of DG integration. 
The conceptual analysis shows how incentive regulation can accommodate the efficient 
integration of DG as an additional objective. Beyond the incentive mechanism, there are 
tensions between the standard model and the governance of system transformation, but 
the two approaches also have some features in common. There is scope for this model to 
incorporate governance mechanisms that are geared towards infrastructure transforma-
tion.  
In terms of the case studies, the UK has been a pioneer of the standard model with a 
relatively low share of DG that has tried to adapt the standard model to rectify this. 
Denmark implemented the standard model only following the international wave of 
liberalisation, but is a leading country in terms of DG development and system trans-
formation. Despite these different starting points, in both countries governance mecha-
nisms for dealing with an increasing share of DG and the resulting network challenges 
have been elaborated.  
The UK case study provides a practical example of the development of the standard 
model that was analysed in the conceptual part, both in terms of incentive schemes 
geared towards DG and additional mechanisms. As for Denmark the standard model 
plays a marginal role and economic issues of DG integration are mainly dealt with out-
side regulation. The same is true for mechanisms beyond economic incentives. The 
Danish case study adds a perspective ‘outside of the standard model’ that could not be 
captured by the conceptual analysis of the standard mode. Both case studies show that 
governance of DG integration is not limited to economic incentives and governance 
mechanisms similar to those proposed by the governance of transformation literature 
play a role. The results of the two case studies cannot be generalised to other countries, 
but they effectively complement the conceptual analysis. 
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The thesis shows the potential of the standard model to pursue new objectives as well as 
the need to broaden the scope beyond governance based on economic incentives both in 
terms of additional governance mechanisms and the regulation-policy interface. How-
ever, even if network decision-making becomes more influenced by political objectives 
and the role of regulators is complemented by additional tasks and instruments, incen-
tive regulation does not become redundant. Regulators should not rely on incentive 
mechanisms alone, but they are still important. 
The following sections summarise the results on three different levels:  
 the incentive mechanisms that are at the heart of the standard model and the rela-
tionship between the regulator and the regulated company, 
 developments beyond the incentive formula, both in terms of new regulatory in-
struments and a changing role of the regulator in the political context, and 
 more general conclusions about the standard model of liberalisation. 
11.1.1 Applying incentive mechanisms to new objectives  
In terms of the incentives for network operators to integrate DG, the analysis has shown 
that the standard model can make it difficult for the DSO to connect DG and become 
involved in RD&D due to the tension between the short-term efficiency objective and 
additional costs and risks of DG connections and network innovations. In the case of 
network innovations this is particularly problematic if network innovations are required 
to promote new objectives like DG integration. A simple level playing field approach 
that ensures network access for all market participants to the current network is there-
fore not sufficient. 
At the same time, in the conceptual section and the UK case study it was shown how 
DG connection and integration as well as network innovation can be integrated into the 
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standard model by extending the very mechanisms of the standard model to pursue 
these new objectives in an efficient way. The standard model provides a sophisticated 
toolbox for mixing cost-based and price-based mechanisms to balance different incen-
tives and pursue the efficient implementation of different objectives. 
This requires a broader understanding of incentive regulation. It should not merely be 
regarded as a regulatory concept based on price-based mechanisms that has replaced 
cost-based regulation in the wake of market liberalisation in order to mimic the market 
in the network monopoly and increase the efficiency of networks. Rather, incentive 
regulation should be interpreted as a regulatory framework in which incentives for the 
regulated company are explicitly designed to pursue specific objectives. These objec-
tives can be broader than just efficiency and the menu of regulatory options becomes 
broader, too, including cost- and price-based elements. 
While the UK case study provides an example of the practical implementation of addi-
tional mechanisms, the Danish case study provides an alternative perspective. Firstly, it 
shows that the costs of DG can successfully be dealt with outside of the standard model, 
even based on a price-based mechanism. Secondly, the Danish model distributes the 
costs differently. While the standard model focuses on individual networks, the Danish 
approach more explicitly regards DG as a political objective, rather than a property of 
individual networks. As a consequence, network costs of DG are not borne by the cus-
tomers or the DG developers in each network, but are distributed among all consumers 
across the country. 
11.1.2 Beyond the incentive formula 
While the thesis has demonstrated the potential of incentive regulation to accommodate 
new objectives, it has also shown the limits of relying entirely on this mechanism. This 
has been confirmed both by the conceptual analysis and the two case studies. Both case 
studies have shown that it would be too short-sighted to only examine economic 
mechanisms within the standard model that allocate the network costs of DG. Rather, in 
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both countries additional governance mechanisms are in place alongside economic 
mechanisms. In Denmark, these are not even strongly connected to the standard model 
of independent regulation. 
The conceptual analysis has shown that there is not only a tension between the cost re-
duction objective and the standard model and the additional costs of DG integration, but 
also between the narrow technical approach of the standard model and the governance 
of system transformation. However, it has also revealed common ground between the 
two approaches. The standard model is not only about price signals and mimicking the 
market, but involves an institutional arrangement which cannot be described in terms of 
markets only. This provides an inroad for the governance mechanisms proposed by the 
system transformation literature. Overall, the standard model offers the potential to 
evolve from economic regulation to a more comprehensive, transformation-based ap-
proach. Such a development cannot be observed yet in the two countries, although in the 
UK an open-ended process of redefining the standard model has begun. 
Finally, the analysis has confirmed the need for network regulation to be examined in its 
specific political context. DG is more than a new market actor that needs to establish 
access to the network and can therefore be dealt with in the regulatory level playing-
field framework, but DG is an energy policy objective and requires a different kind of 
infrastructure. Therefore, the amendments of the incentive formula to accommodate 
DG-related costs as well as mechanisms geared towards system transformation re-
introduce political objectives and thus change the relationship between policy-making 
and regulation.  
11.1.3 General conclusions about the standard model of liberalisation 
The research question was embedded in the more general context presented in chapter 2. 
DG and network development were used as an example to analyse the capability of the 
standard model of electricity market liberalisation to deal with new objectives beyond 
efficiency and developments that may transform the system. More specifically, the fol-
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lowing question was asked: To what extent can insights from the system transformation 
literature be integrated into the standard model? 
The analysis has confirmed the value of adding the governance of system transforma-
tion perspective to the standard model perspective, both in the conceptual section and 
the case studies. The connection-integration-innovation-transformation heuristic on 
which the study was based enables a differentiated view on the standard model and the 
need for additional governance mechanisms. While the economic incentive mechanisms 
of the standard model can make a significant contribution to accommodating DG con-
nection and integration, network innovation and especially transformation entail addi-
tional governance requirements, such as the anticipation of long-term effects on a sys-
tem level and the strategic coordination of innovation activities in an heterogeneous 
actor arena. 
The analysis showed that there is more to the standard model of regulation than mimick-
ing price signals. Extending this argument to liberalisation in general, the standard 
model of liberalisation should not only be discussed in terms of markets, but rather in 
terms of broader governance arrangements, whereby the market can be complemented 
by a combination of different governance mechanisms, including those proposed by the 
system transformation literature.  
11.2 Limits of the thesis and further research 
This thesis necessarily has a number of limitations that can provide the basis for further 
research in different directions. 
Firstly, for the case of network integration of DG the thesis has contributed a compre-
hensive analysis of the potential of the standard model to adapt to new issues and objec-
tives. However, for each of the dimensions analysed in the conceptual part in chapters 5 
to 7 (connection-integration-innovation-transformation) there is scope for a more in-
depth analysis of how the standard model can be adapted. In terms of the incentive 
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mechanisms discussed, more work is needed on the practical design of these instru-
ments. This could benefit from a more detailed analysis of the specific design features 
and their practical effects in the case studies. For that purpose, it would also be helpful 
to carry out additional case studies on a country level. 
The same applies to the proposals made in chapter 7 and the potential role of network 
regulation in system transformation. Conceptually, more research is needed on how the 
system transformation mechanisms can be linked up with the standard model, how the 
advantages of a regulatory authority with a narrow and well-defined remit can be recon-
ciled with the requirements to take into account a broad range of sustainability repercus-
sions and how the regulator could potentially be turned into a ‘transformation agency’. 
Moreover, further research is needed to investigate how governance of network trans-
formation can and should be located outside of the standard model.  
In terms of the case studies, while this thesis has identified a number of empirical gov-
ernance mechanisms that go beyond economic incentives to deal with long-term struc-
tural change and uncertainty, a more detailed analysis would be required of the extent to 
which these are in line with and could benefit from the governance approaches proposed 
by system transformation literature. 
Secondly, in terms of the standard model of liberalisation and the potential to adapt it to 
the new objectives, the thesis has provided a case study for the case of DG integration 
and network regulation. However there are other elements of the electricity sector, the 
standard model and sector transformation which could be analysed to find out whether 
and how market liberalisation which has been designed so as to increase efficiency can 
accommodate new objectives and system transformation. Examples include the govern-
ance of market integration of DG and the increasing role of demand-side load-
management to balance the intermittent generation from renewables. 
Finally, the two country case studies enabled analysis of two different governance pat-
terns and have provided some insights into how they have developed. However, the case 
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studies continued the focus on the governance mechanism itself, rather than the dy-
namic process through which they have emerged in their respective context. A more 
detailed analysis of the development dynamics of the standard model and the govern-
ance of networks as outlined by Praetorius et al. (2009: 191-225) can contribute to the 
development of policy recommendations for how the development of the standard 
model can be influenced. 
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John Eli Nielsen, Assistant Professor, Denmark Technical University, formerly with 
Eltra, 2 August 2007 and 14 November 2007 
Georg Styrbro, former CEO, Eltra, 14 November 2007 
Clement Johan Ulrichsen, Economist, Danish Energy Regulatory Authority, 17 Sep-
tember 2008 
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Appendix 
The following questionnaires represent a generic list of questions for each of the two 
countries studies. For each interviewee, more specific questions were added. 
Questionnaire Denmark 
Technical network and system transformation in Denmark 
 How would you describe the status of the system transformation process in 
Denmark? 
 What are the different projects, how are they linked together, what is their 
status? 
 What are the main drivers for these projects and the transformation process? 
 Are there different visions for the future electricity system? 
Actors 
 Who are the most important actors in the transformation process? 
 Are there any conflicts between actors regarding the transformation process? 
Are there opponents or supporters of the transformation process or different vi-
sions of the future electricity system?  
Role of the government 
 What is the role of the government and especially the ministry of Transport and 
Energy and the Danish Energy Authority? 
Role of network regulation (energitilsynet) 
 How would you describe the role of the regulator energitilsynet in promoting 
DG integration, network innovation and transformation? 
 To what extent is the transformation process driven by revenue incentives? Are 
the regulatory incentives for network innovations? 
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 How would you compare this to the role of Ofgem in UK? 
 What is the relationship between the government, the regulator and energi-
net.dk? 
Role of energinet.dk 
I would like to better understand the role of energinet.dk in the system transformation 
process. This includes 
 its status as a stated-owned unbundled system operator 
 How this came about? Was it influenced by the need to develop new solutions 
for the electricity system? 
 What role this status plays in the process of network transformation? 
 Why and through which mechanisms does energinet.dk influence the transfor-
mation process? 
Governance of network innovation and transformation 
 How would you describe the overall governance approach towards network in-
novations and transformation in Denmark? 
 To what extent is this approach typical for Denmark? 
 How would you describe the Danish approach as compared to the UK approach, 
where  
 DG and network innovation have been included in the incentive regulation of 
network operators  
 and individual actors change the network based on profit incentives? 
Coordination between different actors and visions 
 How are different actors that are involved in the transformation process coordi-
nated? 
 What is the role of cooperation (as opposed to coordination through markets and 
prices)? 
 What is the relationship between energinet.dk and regional grid and distribution 
companies in system transformation? 
 What is the role of the grid committee? 
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 Are there other mechanisms of cooperation between "energinet.dk", the distribu-
tion companies and other actors? 
 What is the role of long-term planning? How is it done? 
Alternative visions of the future electricity system 
 Assuming that there are different visions of the future electricity system, how is 
it decided which visions to choose?  
 How is uncertainty dealt with? 
 Are there experiments to test different visions? Are different network operators 
testing different visions? 
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Questionnaire UK 
How have DG and innovation mechanisms in network regulation developed? 
 UK is the only country in Europe where the electricity network regulator has set 
up mechanisms specifically for DG – although there is not much DG yet on the 
ground. Why is this the case? 
 How has the current regulatory DG policy developed? 
o actors, drivers, support, opposition? 
o Why was this specific approach chosen and not others? 
 More specifically, what explains the shift of focus from DG connection to the 
existing network to network development and innovation? 
o Although there is no real pressure yet on the network to adapt (unlike 
e.g. in Denmark) 
Evaluation of current DG instruments 
 What do you make of the DG/innovation mechanisms within network regula-
tion? 
o DG hybrid incentive  
o the RPZ/IFI 
 How do the RPZ and IFI schemes need to be reformed? 
Long-term network transformation to accommodate DG 
 Would you agree that in order to promote a long-term transformation of the net-
work, the regulatory process needs  
o be complemented by instruments that go beyond one regulatory period,  
o are not just based on financial incentives 
o enable the regulatory process to deal with future structural changes and 
future uncertainty  
o and provide coordination mechanisms for the stakeholders involved 
(network and plant operators, technology developers etc.). 
 How could such mechanisms look like? 
 Are they emerging in the UK? Where and how? 
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 Electricity Network Strategy Group 
o To what extent is the Electricity Network Strategy Group such a coop-
erative arrangement to coordinate actors and provide for a forward-
looking mechanism? 
o How does it work in practice? To what extent and how are the results of 
the ENSG translated into action? 
The role of Ofgem 
 What are the possibilities for the regulator to promote innovation in the liberal-
ised system? Does Ofgem’s traditionally narrow interpretation of ‘economic 
regulation’ limit its capacity to promote DG and network innovation and trans-
formation?  
 Do you see the role of Ofgem changing from a regulator mainly aiming at 
(short-term economic) efficiency towards a regulator  
o with a broader remit (->Utilities Act), 
o a more political role? 
 To what extent is the DG and network transformation issue a driver of this de-
velopment? 
 How do you think the objectives and remit of Ofgem should be adapted? 
 
